Farm rental obstacles to land improvements and suggested solutions by Toussaint, William Douglas
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1953




Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Agricultural Economics
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Toussaint, William Douglas, "Farm rental obstacles to land improvements and suggested solutions " (1953). Retrospective Theses and
Dissertations. 12999.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/12999
NOTE TO USERS 
This reproduction is the best copy available. 
UMI 

FARM RENTAL OBSTACLES TO LftND IMPROVEMENTS 
AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIOJe 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of 
The Reqxiirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
iSfejor Subject; Agricultural Economics 
by 
William D. Toussaint 
Apprcfved; 
Charge of Ifejor Work 
fead of Ifejo/Depariment 
Dean c^ f GraWate College 
Iowa State College 
1953 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
UMI Number: DP12117 
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
UMI 
UMI Microform DP12117 
Copyright 2005 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
TG4^ 9f 
c .  j  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
A. The Extent and Importance of Tenancy in Iowa Agriculture. 3 
B. Obstacles to lifaking and Ifaintaining Farm Improvements . . 6 
C. Lease-Oriented Obstacles to Efficient Production .... 11 
1. Intra-temporal, cost-income dissociations .... 13 
2. Inter-temporal, cost-inccme dissociations . . . . IJ4 
D. The Gap between Tenant and Owner Operation 1^  
E. Objectives 1? 
F. Hypotheses 18 
II. LEASE PR0VI3I0I6 AND THEIR EFFECT ON FARMING EFFICIENCY .... 21 
A. Cost-Income Dissociations 22 
1. Intra-temporal dissociations 23 
2. Inter-temporal dissociations 29 
(a) Rotations 33 
(b) Terraces and contouring 35 
(c) Fertilizer 35 
(d) Buildings and fences 36 
B. Reasons for Dissociations of Inccmes from Costs 38 
1. The influence of custcm 38 
C. Determining the Rental Share I4I 
III. PROCEDURE n 
PL. The Share-Type Lease K9 
B. Western Iowa as the Study Area . 51 
C. The Farms Studied 53 
1. The owner-operators $l i  
2. The tenants 55 
3. Description of farms studied . 56 
T / o f S t  
iii 
Fage 
(a) Group I 56 
(b) Group II 58 
(c) Group III $8 
(d) Group IV 60 
D. Evidence Needed to Test the Hypotheses 61 
E. Analysis 62 
1. The budgeting procedure 62 
2. The summary of 19^ 2 income 63 
(a) Machinery costs and value 6k 
(b) Building costs and value 65 
3. Normalizing the data 65 
(a) Prices 66 
(b) Crops 66 
(c) Livestock and feed fed 72 
(d) Building and machinery costs 75 
(e) Other costs and income 75 
I4. Measures of efficiency . 76 
5. Superimposing the owner systems 
to the tenant farms 77 
6. Farm value changes 79 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE FARMING SYSTEF5 8Ii 
A. Incomes under the Present Farming Systems 6Li 
1. Farms in Group I 87 
2. Farms in Group II 89 
3. Farms in Group III 91 
ii. Farms in Group IV 93 
B. Incomes under the Revised Farming Systems 93 
1. Farm I-b 95 
2. Farm I-c 103 
3. Farm Il-b 109 
U. Farm Ill-b 113 
C. Lease Changes f/hich Could Permit Shifts to the 
Revised Farm Plans Il5 
iv 
Page 
1. Lease-type changes Il8 
2. Intra-lease-type changes 121 
(a) Sharing of costs and returns 121 
(b) Cash rent adjustment 126 
(c) Long-term lease 131 
(d) Compensation for unexhausted 
improvements 131 
3. Success elements in leases . 138 
(a) Farm I-d lliO 
(b) Farm IV-b lUl 
D. Attitudes of Owners and Tenants toward the Revised Plans lijl 
1. Farm I-b II42 
2. Farm I-c Iii3 
3. Farm Il-b lUi 
I4. Farm Ill-b 11^ 5 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY . . lU? 
A. Leasir^  Adjustments Suggested by This Study litS 
1. Cash rent adjustments 111? 
2. Share adjustments 1^ 1 
3. Lengthened horizons of expectations 152 
B. Dnplementation of Leasing Adjustments 15I4 
C. Further Leasing Research 157 
D. Possible Tenure Adjustments Indicated by This Study . 159 
E. Further Tenure Research I6I 
VI. SUMmRY 163 
VII. ACMOF/LEDGEliMTS I7I 
VIII. APPENDIX 172 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
A farmer may gain control over the resources used in the production 
process through ownership, through renting, or through a combination of 
ownership and renting. Thus, renting is a method of gaining control of 
factors of production by means of which an operator can establish a 
farming unit with a smaller capital outlay than if all resources were 
owned. 
Ownership of all resources does not eliminate all possibility of 
inefficient resource use.^  Lack of knowledge and the inability to 
predict future prices, yields, and technology with absolute certainty 
decrease the efficiency of the farm, rented or owned. Obtaining 
resources through borrowing gives rise to additional uncertainty and 
its resulting inefficiency# As the amount of capital borrowed increases, 
the chance of loss of one's own capital increases. Because of this fact, 
a famer with limited assets may not wish to borrow sufficient capital 
to give him a farm of "optimian size", i.e., a farm producing at minimum 
average cost. Since it requires less capital and, hence, less borrowing, 
farming with rented land might well involve less inefficiency for many 
farm operators than would buying a farm. 
Hicks suggests that this aversion to risk is a cause of size limita-
%conomic efficiency is attained when a particular objective is 
maximized. Fran the standpoint of the firm, profit is maximized, and 
the individual is concerned with utility maximization. The conditions 
for efficiency are discussed in greater detail below. 
2 
tion of firms. He states J 
As the planned size of the firm increases, the possible 
losses become steadily greaterj arxi people will usually 
become less and less willing to expose themselves to the 
chance of such losses.^  
Similarly, Schultz concludes that "... changing tenant farmers over 
to encumbered owners reduces measurably the returns of farmers who 
have limited assets."^  This does not mean that tenancy is a superior 
form of tenure to owner-operatorship. Society may still desire farm 
ownership as a goal of public policy, but the effects of owner-
operatorship, tenancy, or a ccsnbination of the two in acquiring 
control of resources and on the product forthcoming to society should 
be clearly recognized. 
Although renting sane of the productive factors may decrease the 
risk associated with decreasing equity and, thus, tend to increase 
the efficiency with which resources are used, serious problems arise 
in the lease arrangements themselves which tend to discourage the most 
efficient operation of the farm as a firm.^  For example, the one year 
length of most Iowa farm leases shortens and adds to the uncertainty 
of tenants' horizons of expectations, making planning for more than one 
J^. R. Hicks. Value and capital. Second edition. London, Oxford 
University Press. 19^ 0. p. 200. 
T^. W. Schultz. Capital rationing awi farm tenancy reform. Journal 
of Political Economy. I48; 309-32lt. 19i40. p. 323. 
L^ease arrangement refers to the kind of rent paid, such as a cash 
or a crop-share lease, while lease provision refers to the particular 
conditions of the lease, such as length of lease, share cterged as rent, 
or length of termination notice. 
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year even more difficult than under owner-operatorship. Lard improve­
ments, such as buildings or terraces, which would add to the efficiency 
of the farm operation tend to be discouraged because of the dissociation 
of inccme and costs between landlords and tenants. It is not renting 
per se which is inefficient, but, rather, that various provisions 
contained within leases are of such a mture that inefficient operation 
is fostered. 
This study is directed toward the analysis of lease-oriented 
inefficiencies, particularly with respect to improvements on rented 
lands, and suggests certain measures for overcoming these inefficiencies 
in the interest of increasing the productivity of rented farms and the 
returns to both landlord and tenant. 
A. The Extent and Importance of Tenancy in Icwa Agriculture 
The period of high yields and farm prices during the World War II 
and Korean War periods has brought about a considerable decrease in the 
proportion of farms operated by temnts. According to the 1950 Census 
of Agriculture,^  the proportion of farms operated by tenants has 
decreased from 38 percent to 2? percent for the United States, from 
36 percent to 2k percent for the North Central Region, and from iiS 
percent to 38 percent for Iowa during the decade of 19i»0 to 1950,^  
S. 17th Census. Census of Agriculture, 1950. General reporf.^  
II, Chapter XI. 1952. pp. 956, 958, 968. 
2 
A tenant rents all of the land he farms, an owner owns all of the 
land he operates, and a part-owner rents scsne and owns the rest of the 
land he farms. 
k 
The proportion of farm land rented is greater than the proportion of 
tenancy, however. In 1950, 35 percent of the land in farms in the 
United States, ijS percent of the North Central Region, and 53 percent 
of Iowa farm land was rented. Although there has been a decrease in 
tenant numbers, the proportion of Iowa farm lard which is rented has 
remained almost constant during this period (Table 1). 
Table 1. Tenancy and farm land rented in Iowa, 19h5 and 1950, 
by type-of-farming area.^  
Tenancy Land rented 
ca 
19li5 1950 Change 19i45 1950 Change 
( % )  i%) i%) ( % )  i%) ( % )  
North Central Grain I47.8 li6.3 -1.5 62.8 62.2 -0.6 
Northeast Dairy iil.li 35.6 -5.8 50.2 147.li -2.8 
Western Livestock ii7.0 l|l4*0 -3.0 57.6 58.9 1.3 
Eastern Livestock 33.it 26.0 -7.U l»6.0 iil.l -I4.9 
Southern Pasture 39.1 35.8 -3.9 50.8 50. Ii -O.ij 
State average k2.2 38.2 -It.O 53.0 52.9 -0.1 
R^eproduced from Table 2 of William D. Toussaint. Effects of lease 
arrangements on farm income and improvements. Unpublished M. S. Thesis. 
Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Library. 1951- P» 6. 
The proportion of land rented has remained constant or nearly so 
because of a large increase in the proportion of farmers who own part 
of the land they farm and rent additional acres (part-owners). The 
number of these part-owner farms increased by 3it.l percent from I9I4O to 
5 
19?0^  for the United States as a whole and by 3U'9 percent for Iowa 
durir^  this same period.^  
This rapid increase in part-owner farming reflects the trend toward 
larger farms in the United Statesj the average size of farms increased 
frcan 17I4.O acres in 19iiO to 215.3 acres in 19$0.^  As farms becane more 
mechanized, the capital requirements of farming become greater, and the 
amount of land needed to make efficient use of the labor and managerial 
resources supplied by the family also increases. To obtain a larger, 
more efficient unit, an increasing proportion of owners has rented 
additional acreages rather than buy the added land. Also, contributing 
to the larger proportion of land rented (in relation to the proportion 
of tenancy) is the fact that tenant farms are of a larger average size 
than owner-operated farms. The U. S. Census reports an average farm 
size of 135.6 acres for owner-operated farms and lit6.8 acres for tenant 
farms in 1950 for the United States.^  The average size of owner-
operator farms in Iowa was 1514-6 acres, and Iowa tenant farms averaged 
168.8 acres in 1950.^  
%. S. 17th Census. Census of Agriculture, 1950. Farm tenure, 
a graphic summary, 1950. Ydhme V, Part 5. 1952. p. 20. 
U^. S. 17th Census. Census of Agriculture, 1950. General report, 
p. 968. 
I^bid., p. 956. 
I^bid., p. 956. 
I^bid., p. 969. 
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In 19$0, the U- S. Census reported the average value of land and 
buildii^ s of Iowa tenant farms as $31>9U5 and the average value of 
Iowa owner-operated farms as $20,985.^  The larger size of tenant farms, 
the rapidly increasing number of owners who rent additional land, and 
the large amount of capital associated with rented farms emphasize the 
importance of tenancy and of improving lease arrangements in increasing 
the efficiency of Iowa farming. 
What is the outlook for the amount of tenancy in Iowa? Although 
this cannot be accurately foreseen, there seems to be little reason to 
expect the amount of rented land to decline appreciably. The huge 
capital requirements to operate an efficient-sized farm unit make it 
extremely difficult to own both land and operating capital, at least 
for the beginning farmer. Thus, as a step toward full ownership or as 
a pemanent way of farming, tenancy is likely to continue at its present 
level or increase in importance unless legislative measures are taken to 
increase ownership. 
B. Obstacles to Making and Ifeintaining Farm Improvements 
There are many possible reasons for farmers failing to make or 
to maintain farm improvements where they might be profitable.^  Risk 
aversion, as already mentioned, is one factor. There may be lack of 
I^bid., p. 969. 
2 Farm improvements are defined for this study as inputs which in­
crease the productivity of the farm over a period of more than one year. 
Examples are buildings, terraces, and applications of lime and fertilizer. 
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knowledge on the part of the farmer, or credit may not be available so 
that the farmer can purchase the needed factors of production, ifery 
of these obstacles have been isolated in a study by Frey. With specific 
reference to soil erosion, Frey found that the major obstacles to the 
adoption of erosion control plans weres (1) change in farm enterprises} 
(2) rental arrangement and the landlord's cooperationj (3) mortgage 
indebtedness and the annual cash outlays for operatirg arxi living 
expenses J and (it) short expectancy of tenure. These four obstacles 
were found to explain partially the significantly higher erosion losses 
on the farms expressing one or more of the above reasons as obstacles. 
Forty-nine of the 83 tenants in the sample stated that the rental 
p 
arrangement or their landlord's cooperation was a major obstacle,^  Of 
all the farmers expressing short tenure as an obstacle, many were tenants 
not expecting to remain on the ferm long, or they were older operators 
with a definitely limited planning horizon. 
Shifting to a soil conservation plan which utilizes terraces, con­
touring, and rotations containing large amounts of forage usually 
entails a reduced income for a period of years followed by an income 
which is greater than the income expected if the more exploitive system 
of farming were continued. To change to rotations containing larger 
amounts of forage, the acreage of oats is increased and corn acreage is 
J^ohn C. Frey. Some obstacles to soil erosion control in V^ estern 
Iowa. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 391. 
1952« p. 966. 
2Ibid., p. 969* 
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decreased the first year or two. Since oats does not yield as high a 
return as corn, the inccaaae fron crops is less than under a farming 
system employing larger acreages of corn. The yield increases which 
result from changing rotations to include more forage do not occur 
immediately, and their full effect is not felt until several rotation 
cycles have been completed. When the higher yields due to rotations 
and to the soil and water conserving action of terraces or contouring 
take effect, income begins to rise. Figure 1 illustrates such a 
t^ J^ pothetical situation. In this figure, AB represents the income 
stream which would exist if a maintenance system of farming were being 
employed, while CD represents the income stream if a conservation plan 
were put into effect in 19^ 2. It is this income deficit area (ACN) 
which is especially troublesome to tenants with short expectancy of 
tenure who would like to emplcy a conservation system of farming. Even 
though the present farming system would decrease income over time, such 
as AE, the income over a one or two year period would be greater (until 
point L is reached) than if the change to a conservation system were 
made. 
Stoneberg substantiates such an income pattern in a study in Western 
Icwa. He employed the budget approach to estimate income over a 15 year 
period under a farming system which utilized the cropping system of a 
soil conservation plan, and he used ten alternative livestock programs 
and feeding ccmbinations as ways of processing the grain. Under a few 
of the alternative combinations, the future inccme under soil conservation 
never got above the income of the present system. Under other alterna-
9 
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Figure 1. Net incomes under farming systems which result 
in maintained yields (AB), decreasing yields (AE), 
and increasing yields (CD) over time. 
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tives, it took froa three to seven years for the net income of the soil 
conservation program to equal that of the present program.^  
Short expectancy of tenure and failure to share costs and incane in 
like proportions appear to constitute the major obstacles to the adoption 
of soil conservation practices on rented farms. Rental arrangements 
also pose serious problems with respect to the repair of buildings and 
the erection of new buildings. Under a crop-share or cash lease, 
p 
landlords often receive no direct return from buildings. As a result, 
landlords may feel that additional investment in buildings is not 
profitable. 
A recent Iowa study reports that 78 percent of the tenants inter­
viewed would make farm improvements if they owned the farm. Of those 
indicatir^  the need for improvements, 7h percent stated that they would 
improve the house or the other buildings.^  Fifty percent of these 
tenants desiring improvements stated that the landlord did not feel the 
improvement was needed or that satisfactory arrangements had not been 
E^verett G. Stoneberg. Income canparison of land use programs in 
Western Iowa. Unpublished M. S. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College 
Library. 1953. p. 137-
A^ cash lease is one where the rent is paid as a fixed cash amount, 
either per acre or for the farm as a whole. Crop-share leases include 
those leases which provide for the tenant and landlord to receive a 
fixed share of the crop, and a cash payment may be made for pasture, hay 
land, or buildings. Under a stock-share lease, the tenant and landlord 
share returns from both crops and livestock. 
3 John F. Timmons. Iniproving farm rental arrangements in Iowa. 
Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 393. 1953. 
p. 85. 
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reached between the landlord and tenant.^  These data give sane indication 
of the importance of this problem to the tenant farmer. 
Farm size also may limit the adoption of soil conservation practices 
or the maintenance of farm buildings. The net income from small farm 
units may be so small that, after living expenses have been met, 
nothing is left for capital improvements. Frey found size of farm to be 
an obstacle to the adoption of erosion control plans, along with price 
change expected by operators, influence of custom and inertia, and 
p 
several factors other than those already mentioned.' 
C. Lease-Oriented Obstacles to Efficient Production 
Although there are many obstacles to efficient farming, it seems 
advisable, if the problem is to be manageably narrow, to concentrate 
one one obstacle and attempt to delimit the specific causes and remedies 
for this obstacle. Because of the widespread tenancy in Iowa, the 
importance of this obstacle in explaining failure to adopt soil conser­
vation plans and to make buildir^  improvements, and the high degree of 
interest in lease provisions as expressed by landlords and tenants alike, 
this study is concentrated on the delimitation, diagnosis, and the remedy 
I^bid., p. 86. 
F^rey, op. cit., p. 965. 
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of rental problems as one cause of inefficiency in production.^  
As mentioned above, one of the major obstacles to the efficient use 
of resources by farmers is rental arrangements. It remains to isolate 
the specific causes of inefficient resource use within this major obstacle 
category and to develop remedial measures or constructs of action to re­
move these causes. Qnphasis of this study is placed on developing remedial 
measures which accomplish the task of removing causes of inefficiency and, 
at the same time, are relatively simple and acceptable to both tenants 
and landlords. This is not to say that remedial measures which are not 
acceptable at this time are to be eliminated as unworkable. The passage 
of time and the process of education can change prevailing attitudes and 
The conditions for economic efficiency are those for profit maxi­
mization of the fim, and ar^  lease provision which hinders the attainment 
of any of these conditions is an inefficient lease provision. Heady states 
the conditions of economic efficiency for the leased firm as follows: 
"(1) Factor-product relationships and cost structures for single products 
must be retained over time in a manner consistent with the technological 
conditions of the short-run plant which relate to time. The scale of the 
firm must be one which defines a maximum return in a manner consistent 
with the market prices for factors and products and with the given tech­
nical conditions of production. (2) The marginal value productivity of 
substitute resources must be equated, and factor-factCJT relationships 
must not be distorted. (3) A combination of products must be attained 
which will equate marginal returns on the last unit of resources employed 
for each product at a given point in time and the leasing arrangement must 
facilitate retention of transformation functions as they would exist under 
other factor market and pricing systems. (li) The combination of products 
in time must be such that, with proper discounting of future returns, 
marginal value products are equated over time for all resource units. 
(5) The leasing arrangement must not bring about resource inefficiency 
through an increase of uncertainty above that which would normally exist 
in the market." Earl 0. Heady. Economics of agricultural production and 
resource use. New lork, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1952. pp. 590, 591» 
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customs which influence the acceptability of proposed remedies. However, 
if two alternative remedial measures have the same effect, and one is 
more acceptable, the process of change would be hastened by use of the 
more acceptable lease provision. 
These lease-oriented obstacles are of two types, intra-temporal and 
inter-temporal dissociations of inccsne and costs. The furdamental 
difficulty lies in the failure to share returns in the same proportion 
as costs, whether the incane associated with the cost is received during 
the same year or in succeeding years. For example, a landlord who 
receives no direct return from buildings under a crop-share lease may 
not be inclined to maintain or improve the buildings. The tenant who 
does receive a direct return from buildir^ s may be unwilling to invest 
in such improvements where he has no assurance of remaining on the farm 
to receive all of the income from the particular improvement. 
It should be recogrdzed that such cost-income dissociations occur 
between farms as well as within farms. For example, a farmer may not 
terrace his land, and a good share of the costs of not doing so may be 
borne by an adjacent farm because of silting or gullying. The fact that 
this analysis has been restricted to a single farm, cost-income study 
does not mean that inter-farm problems are unimportant. 
1. Intra-temporal, cost-income dissociations 
Within a lease period, landlords and tenants may not share income as 
they do costs. The tenant may pay all of the harvesting costs or the 
costs of fertilization and receive half of the crop for his share, or the 
lli 
landlord may pay for all of the grass seed or for all the seed corn 
while receiving a one-half share of the crop. Such arrangements may 
cause friction and failure to produce in a manner consistent with the 
conditions necessary for profit maximization. 
2. Inter-temporal, cost-incone dissociations 
Probably of greater importance than dissociations within one lease 
period are those which occur over time. There are numerous examples 
of this situation. Buildings, fences, terraces, lime applications, and 
some fertilizers yield return for a period longer than one year. Even 
though a tenant and landlord might share the original cost of fencing in 
the same way that they share the returns from livestock and crops unier 
a stock-share lease, there may be a serious over-all dissociation. 
Should the tenant move before the returns are all received, the farm 
would retain the unused portion. Because leases are short in duration, 
nomally one year in length, tenants are often uncertain that their lease 
will be renewed. This uncertainty of length of tenure further reduces 
a horizon of expectations—probably already short because of other 
uncertainties of yield, price, and even life itself. 
A "short lease and long tenure" is a goal canmonly suggested, 
especially by professional farm managers.^  There may be sane basis for 
believing that a short lease will serve as an incentive for the tenant 
to deliver a high level of performance so that the owner will wish to 
%eady, op. cit., p. 6l6. 
15 
renew the lease. But, there may be offsetting disadvantages. For example, 
a tenant with a one year lease probably would not erect, say, a thousand 
dollar shed if he might have to move and leave part of the receipts 
behind. 
The landlord receiving no direct return from buildings under a crop-
share lease is another case to be considered. Actually the dissociation 
of income and costs is intra-temporal as well as inter-temporal, but the 
results are the same. The landlord, from a purely business standpoint, 
will not make the building improvements. 
D. The Gap between Tenant and Owner Operation 
The area between the existing situation and the goal defines the 
specific area of inquiry or the problematic gap. There must be some goal 
or noarm toward which the inquiry is directed. This norm need not and, 
for all practical purposes, probably cannot be an "ideal" or ultimate 
solution. With reference to different methods of inquiry, Dewey states: 
It does not follow in any of these cases that the "better" 
methods are ideally perfect, or that they are regulative or 
"normative" because of conformity to some absolute form. 
They are the methods which experience up to the present time 
shows to be the best methods available for achieving certain 
results, while abstraction of these methods does supply a 
(relative) norm or standard of further undertakings.^  
Although his reference is to the form that inquiry should take, the 
same reasoning holds for other situations. To obtain maximum production 
J^ohn Dewey. Logic, the theory of inquiry. New York, Henry Holt 
and Comparer. 1938. p. lOU. 
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from a limited set of resources might well be the goal or norm for a 
farmer. He may be far from his goal because of an educational lag, 
improper ccanbination of resources^  risk, and other factors. Tf/hat, then, 
is the norm for a study in improving farm rental arrangements? 
The goal of a lease, as taken in this study, is to allow the tenant 
farm to operate as efficiently as an owner-operator farm. Recognizing 
the many deviations from the conditions of economic efficiency for 
owner-operator farms. Heady states,^  «. . .the test of leasing systems is 
this*, they should not cause further deviations from the conditions 
which define economic efficiency."^  The assumption made in restricting 
the goal of this study to the norm of owner-operatorship is that the 
differences in operation are due to lease provisions. Adjustments in 
leasirg provisions which make possible the attainment of owner-operator 
methods of farming are a further step toward the goal of economic 
efficiency of the farm, owned or rented. 
There is sane question as to how this gap can or should be 
quantified. In his quest for utility maximization, the individual 
is concerned with more than income, i. e., leisure, security, religious 
H^eady, op. cit,, p. 591. 
2 Since tenant-operation may actually be more efficient than owner-
operation, especially that of the owner operator heavily encumbered with 
debt, the goal of the lease might well be to bring about a type of 
operation which is more efficient than that of owner-operation. The goal 
of owner-operation is more definite and, therefore, more workable. 
Further, to state that the lease should not cause further deviations 
frcxn the conditions which define economic efficiency does not eliminate 
the possibility that renting may possess attributes which make it a more 
efficient form of tenure than owner-operation. 
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freedcm, and other non-monetary ends. But, from the standpoint of the 
firm, income is the major consideration, and income is the major yardstick 
used to measure the gap between tenant and owner-operation in this study. 
Other than income, living conditions and farm improvements are also 
measures of the gap. Presumably, differences in improvements, such as 
terraces or farm buildings, would be reflected in income. However, this 
may not hold because present inccme may be gained at the expense of 
future income. For this reason, the condition of buildings and other 
improvements may give some insight into the real income of the farm. 
E. Objectives 
This study attempts to determine the nature of lease provisions 
which tend to cause tenants to farm in a manner which differs from that 
of owner-operators and which tend to provoke disagreements between 
landlords and tenants. In line with the above, this study develops 
alternative ways in which these obstacles to efficient operation can be 
overcome. The specific objectives of the study ares 
(1) To delimit the problematic gap, i.e., to establish what differences, 
if arQT, exist between the operation of physically similar, tenant 
and owner-operated farms. 
(2) To determine the specific provisions of leases which cause tenants 
to farm in a manner different fron owner-operators and to locate the 
provisions which enable certain tenants to operate as if they were 
owners. 
(3) To set forth alternative lease provisions which would allow landlords 
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and tenants to more nearly approach owner-operators in the efficiency 
with which they utilize farm resources. 
F. Hypotheses 
In the process of inquiry, hypotheses serve as guides for the re­
search. The original typotheses are developed from knowledge of the 
problem and economic theory. The stated l^ potheses are to be tested; 
they are not necessarily correct and are always subject to change as 
more knowledge is gained during the process of inquiry. The specific 
hypotheses of this study are; 
(1) Tenant-operated farms are less efficiently managed and organized 
than are owner-operated farms. More specifically; 
(a) The net inccane over time of the tenant-operated farm is 
smaller than the net income of an owner-operated farm employ­
ing ccanparable resources. 
(b) A more exploitive system of farming is followed on tenant farms, 
resulting in higher soil losses and more rapidly decreasing 
crop yields over time than on owner-operated farms. 
(c) There are fewer farm improvements on rented farms than on 
owner-operated farms. 
(2) The inefficiency of tenant-operation is due to specific provisions 
in leases regarding sharing of costs and income. The dissociations 
of income from costs which tend to cause inefficient operation are 
of two types. They are; 
(a) Dissociations within one lease period. These are the provisions 
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where tenants and landlords pay a share of variable costs which 
differs from the share of crops or livestock received within 
the same lease period, usually one year. For example, a 
tenant may pay all fertilizer cost or a landlord may pay for 
all grass seed, and, yet, they may share returns equally, 
(b) Dissociations over time. These are precisely the same as 
intra-period dissociations in their effect, but the problem is 
somewhat more complex because of the length of the time period 
involved. Buildings are improvements which yield return over a 
rather long time period, and the problems arising with respect 
to building repair and construction are problems of this 
category. 
Lease obstacles to efficient operation can be overcome by sharing 
income in the same proportions as the costs within a particular time 
period, such as a particular leasir^  period (intra-temporally), or 
between two or more such time periods (inter-temporally). Some of 
these specific remedial typotheses are: 
(a) Sharing all variable costs, such as fertilizer, seed, and 
harvesting costs, in the same proportion as the income. 
(b) providing compensation for the unused portion of unexhausted 
improvements, such as fertilizer, buildings, and lime. This 
also applies where income is foregone by a tenant in order to 
shift to a conservation system of farming. 
(c) Changing the share of crop given as rent in order to align total 
income and costs with changes in variable costs paid by the 
tenant and landlord. This would assure that the incane of the 
firm is increased while the inccane position of neither tenant 
nor landlord is worsened. 
(d) Changing the type of lease in some cases. 
(e) Charging a building rent in some cases to give the cwner a 
direct return for his buildings* 
The remainder of this study is concerned with testing these hypotheses 
and presenting the results of the study. The theoretical setting for this 
study is set forth in the next chapter. 
21 
II. LEA.SE PROVISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON FARliING EFFICIENCY 
As suggested previously* renting may provide a means whereby more 
efficient production can be attained than under full ownership. That is, 
if there are economies of size in farming, a larger, rented unit can be 
more efficient than a smaller unit operated by a full owner. Although 
renting may reduce the risk associated with capital ownership and, thus, 
tend to increase farm efficiency, many provisions of leases are now 
being used which tend to promote other than optimum resource use. 
The conditions for efficiency of the leased farm have been stated 
in Chapter I. Essentially, to be an efficient lease, the lease 
arrangement must cause no fvirther deviations from the conditions of 
econcsnic efficiency than those which exist under owner-operatorship.^  
The rented farm uses resources contributed by two separate sources, 
the landlord and the tenant, and the returns are also divided by land­
lord and tenant. TiThere the returns received by the two parties involved 
are dissociated frcsn the costs incurred, inefficient operation is 
fostered. The solution to such lease-oriented inefficiencies must lie 
in bringing about an association of the incomes with the costs. 
\n elaboration of this goal can be found in Chapter I. 
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A, Cost-'Income Dissociations 
A cost-inccaae dissociation occvirs when the marginal value produc­
tivity of a resource contributed by one of the parties to a lease is 
received in whole or in part by the other party. To achieve optinmm 
resource allocation, the factors of production must receive their 
marginal value productivity. Thus, the solution to better resource 
use under leasing is to provide means whereby the factors contributed 
by tenant and landlord are imputed their marginal value product. 
Granted that it is impossible from a practical standpoint to 
ascertain these marginal value products for the resources, there is, 
fortunately, a method for removing lease imperfections due to these 
income-cost dissociations. If both partners own seme proportion 
(the same for all factors) of all factors and share returns in these 
same proportions, no distortions in resource use mil arise out of the 
leasing arrangement, even in the long run. This, of course, would 
require a complete economic partnership arrangement.^  
However, the principle of sharing all costs and returns in the 
same proportion can be modified so as to promote optimum resource 
allocation under the common arrangements that exist today. That is, 
where the landlord provides the land, the tenant provides the labor 
and often the machinery, and various divisions of other factors are 
r 
S^ee Heady, op. ext., pp. 587-621 for a thorough discussion of the 
meaning of a "perfect" lease and for a detailed analysis of the effects 
on efficient operation of various lease arrangements. It should be 
cautioned that the use of a legal partnership arrangement has serious 
disadvantages although it dees provide a means for attaining a "perfect" 
lease. 
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made, satisfactory arrangements can still be reached. If landlord and 
tenant share the variable costs which might actually affect the profit 
of the farm in a particular period, in proportion to the share which each 
receives, inefficient operation will not be fostered by the lease. Heady 
calls these inputs which must be shared, . .inputs which are near the 
periphery of profitability."^  
The concept of associating incomes and costs applies equally well 
to those inputs which are completely dissipated within one year (intra-
temporal factors) as to those which return income for many years (inter­
temporal factors). There is, however, a difference in the type of 
solution to the inefficiencies brought about by the two forms of income-
cost dissociations. 
1. Intra-temporal dissociations 
Certain inputs, such as seed corn, certain labor inputs, and 
machinery services for growing crops, return their complete product 
within a single year. Therefore, the failure to carry the use of these 
inputs to the point of maximum profit is not affected by the security or 
length of the tenant's or larxilord's horizon of expectations. Because a 
tenant or lar^ lord is uncertain as to his length of tenure, there actually 
may be a shifting of resources from enterprises requiring more than one 
year to be completed to those enterprises which come to complete fruition 
I^bid., p. 600. For the sake of simplicity, these inputs shall be 
called profit-periphery inputs or profit-periphery costs in this study. 
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within one year. 
The basic intra-temporal problem is demonstrated diagrammatically 
in Figure 2. Here is the marginal cost for the owner-operated farm, 
"the marginal revenue for the owner-operated farm, and MRg the 
marginal revenue for either tenant or landlord idiere each receives 
one-half the crop. If the tenant pays all variable costs, he will 
maximize profits by producing only the amount Ck corresponding to the 
intersection of his relevant marginal cost and marginal revenue curves, 
and The only way to obtain optimum resource allocation is for 
the landlord to share the costs so that the tenant's relevant marginal 
cost curve is reduced to 102• Then, the intensity of operation to 
maximize profits will be the same as if the farm were owned and oper­
ated by one individual, i.e., an output of CB.^  
The situation exemplified in Figure 2 is an example of an intra-
temporal dissociation of cost and inccane, the solution of which is 
relatively simple in theory. In practice, however, there remain im­
portant questions which need to be answered. For example, what inputs 
are near the periphery of profitability, and what manner of comperjsation 
should be made to the party of the lease who would pay a greater share 
of certain variable costs than under the existing arrangement? 
Lease provisions provide an excellent opportunity for canpensation. 
Where a concession is made by landlord or tenant to pay a share of some 
cost which he did not previously pay, compensation can be made by 








Figure 2. Farm output for an owner-operator 
and a crop-share tenant. 
adjusting the share of returns which is received by each. Since, to 
promote efficient resource use, the landlord as well as the tenant must 
pay the same share of the profit-periphery costs that he receives of the 
returns, compensation for changes in sharing of these particular costs 
necessarily must be made by adjustment of the share. To adjust the 
share requires a relaxation of the grip of custom, however, if it is to 
be a useful technique for compensation. 
Certain inputs are more or less fixed. Land and family labor are 
two examples. Other inputs, although variable in the sense that the 
input can be applied or not applied in any one year, are inputs which do 
not really belong in the category of profit-periphery costs. For example, 
certain field operations are necessary to grew any corn or oats. The 
field must be cultivated and seeded and the crop harvested. These inputs 
could be shared, but there is a question whether efficiency is in ariy 
way affected by not sharing these particular costs. 
What, then, are profit-periphery costs? Fertilizer and weed spray 
definitely belong in this category. Harvesting and costs of seed could 
well be included. Fertilizer and weed spray are not required to produce 
some crop, but they do have an effect on the amount of crop. In a recent 
study. Heady and Kehrberg found that 60.0 percent of crop-share farms 
where fertilizer costs were shared did apply fertilizer to corn ccanpared 
to only 6.9 percent using fertilizer on corn where the landlord did not 
share costs. The intensity of fertilizer application was also much 
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greater on those farms where fertilizer costs were shared.^  
Ifeirvesting costs are usually a relatively sinall proportion of total 
costsj and, when harvest arrives, the preceding costs are fixed. 
Harvesting is the only cost which is actually margiral and affects the 
tenant's decision to harvest or not to harvest. Where the yield is low, 
as is the wheat crop in The Great Plains on many occasions, the total 
cost of harvesting may exceed the tenant's share of returns, but harvest­
ing might be profitable to both tenant and landlord if they shared the 
costs. In such instances, it is obvious that harvesting costs belong 
in the category of profit-periphery costs. 
A tenant, feeling that he is paying for picking the landlord's 
share of corn, may purposely do a poor job of picking so that more down 
corn is left for his hogs to glean from the field. At this point, it 
might be well to mention that sharing costs does not necessarily 
eliminate practices such as leaving down corn in the field. Sa»e of 
these practices are simply due to poor management or to dishonesty. 
Sharing such costs should, however, remove one of the reasons for 
inefficient practices. 
If technological advances are made and provisions for sharing costs 
are not made, the adoption of such innovations may be delayed by share 
leases, i^ brid corn caused maxjy landlords to pay one-half the seed so 
that tenants would wish to change frm the use of cheaper, open-pollinated 
E^arl 0. Heady aM Earl W. Kehrberg. Relationship of crop-share and 
cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa Agricultural Experi­
ment Station Research Bulletin 386. 1952. p. 662. 
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varieties# For this reason^  it is desirable that seed and other costs 
be shared proportionately to avoid difficulty due to changing techniques. 
One might conjecture that, if landlords and tenants beccane accustomed to 
sharing profit-periphery costs, they would find more rapid agreement of 
sharing of costs arising out of technological advance. 
Under the crop-share lease, land and buildings are supplied by the 
landowner, and labor is supplied the tenant. The tenant also supplies 
the machinery in nearly all cases. te.ny machinery services are performed 
directly for the landowner's share of the crop. For example, shelling 
corn and hauling grain to market are in this category. Sharing these 
costs might avoid conflicts, in maiy cases. 
Why not share all costs except labor, machinery costs (other than 
fuel and oil), and land? This, no doubt, could be done, but for each 
resource to get its marginal productivity would mean that tenants would 
have to accept a smaller share of the total receipts than they do under 
present crop-share arrangements. They would pay a smaller proportion of 
the costs and, thus, would receive less in return. Along with the pros­
pects of greater returns, more risk would be assumed by the landlord as 
the share of the resources contributed by him is increased. 
Thus, there are two major alternatives. The tenant can assume 
greater risk and get a larger share of the product (he would pay for 
more of the costs which are neither fixed nor profit-periphery costs, 
and there might be a greater chance of resource mal-allocation with 
this method), or he can put in fewer inputs, receive less in return, 
and have less risk. 
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2. Inter-temporal dissociations 
Although the great majority of Iowa leases are for a period of only 
one year, many inputs are of such a nat\are that returns accrue over a 
period of years.^  With the knowledge that they may not be on the farm 
fear the coming year, tenants are naturally reluctant to invest in im­
provements like buildings, lime, or terraces if they have no assurance 
of compensation for the unexhausted value of their inputs. Associations 
of costs in one period with returns in another can be brought about by 
longer leases, by the landlord assuring the tenant of canpensation, or 
by the landlord making the improvement and charging the tenant for the 
use of the improvement. 
Longer leases would allow the tenant greater security of expectations 
and would enable him to receive full returns fron mary types of improve­
ments.^  S(XDe farm managers and landlords object to the use of longer 
leases on the basis that they are advantageous only unilaterally, firom 
the staiKipoint of the tenant. They feel that if a tenant wished to 
leave, the landlord could not prevent it. Legally he could, but the 
tenant-landlord relationship would usually be so upset by so doing, that 
n^ly 6 percent of leases in a recent study were for periods longer 
than one year, although many with one year leases expected to remain 
indefinitely. Timmons, op. cit., p. 102. 
2 Lengthening the period of the lease does not eradicate the difficult-
ties encountered in the last years of the lease. Some sort of continuing 
lease (lease always for five years ahead, for example) or compensation 
provisions would be necessary even though the lease period were to be 
extended to twenty years, the legal limit in Iowa. 
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the landlord would gain by allowing the tenant to move. Also, a shorter 
lease might promote efficiency by encouraging the tenant to greater 
endeavor so that he may remain on the farm another year. 
Because there is objection to longer leases and because longer 
leases are not a ccxnplete solution to inter-temporal dissociations, 
compensation or "use" rents provide important alternatives. The ccmpen-
sation concept is used extensively under the English system of tenancy, 
where arrangements for compensation are actually drawn up into law.^  
There is also a provision allowing the landlord to increase rent where 
he has carried out a new improvement.^  Vifhere disagreements arise in 
England, the disputes are carried before an arbitration board. 
The time may eventually cane when it will be necessary to make such 
provisions into law in the United States. However, there are mary 
instances where tenants and landlords can agree without legal coercion on 
ccmpensation or "use" rent schemes by which both will benefit. Of course, 
once the agreement is reached through freedom of contract, the agreement 
is just as binding as if sanctioned by statute law. 
When a tenant makes his production plans, he can put his resources 
into short-term enterprises, long-run enterprises, or into a canbination 
of the two. ¥/ith reference to Figure 3, the tenant can invest his re­
sources so as to receive all returns in the first time period (t]^ ), to 
r^eat Britain. Mirustry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Agricultural 
Act 19ii7 and Agricultural Holdii^ s Act 19U8. Rights and obligations of 
landlords, tenants, arxi owner-occupiers of agricultural land. London, 
His Ifejesty's Stationery Office. 19U9. pp. 15-I7j 28-35. 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
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A' 
Figure 3. Effect of tenure uncertainty on resource 
use for time periods 1 and 2. 
receive all returns in a future time period (t2)> or "to receive various 
combinations in the two time periods. If the tenant has certainty of 
tenure, he would plan according to the iso-resource curve MN and would 
maximize returna by equating his marginal rate of substitution of returns 
in t2 for returns in t^  ^with the narginal rate of transformation on the 
iso-resource curve. The line AB represents the iso-revenue curve to a 
tenant or an owner with normal uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty not related 
to the leasing situation and is discounted for this normal uncertainty. 
If uncertain as to tenure, the tenant will discount returns in t2 at a 
greater rate than under certain tenure, and the relevant iso-revenue 
curve would have less slope, such as CD. 
The result of uncertain tenure would be to shift resources from 
production in t2 to t^ . VJith certainty of tenure, the resources of the 
tenant would be used to produce OL in tj^  and OH in t2j compared to OP in 
t]^  and CXJ in t2 where uncertain tenure affects his decisions. To 
encourage the tenant to produce more efficiently, he would have to be 
assured of canpensation equal to the difference in revenue between AB 
and A 'B' which is parallel to AB and goes through R, the point of tangency 
of iso-resource curve MN and the heavily discounted iso-revenue curve CD. 
To look at the problem in a slightly different manner, the tenant should 
be assured of compensation equal to the area ACL in Figure 1 if he is to 
change his farming pattern. 
Compensation for unexhausted improvements should be made on the basis 
of discounted value of future production, not on the basis of costs, if 
optimum allocation of resources is to be enco\iraged. However, cost is 
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kncwn definitely, and future production is not. If tenants would be 
assured of a percentage of the original cost, they should at least be 
more willing to invest in long-term enterprises than if no ccxnpensation 
were given. Assuming that ccmpensation would be made on the basis of 
cost, there are two possibilities—replacement cost or original cost. 
Replacement cost has the advantage of reducing risk associated with 
changing price levels, but it might present some conplex problems. To 
( determine the replacement cost of improvements, such as buildings, where 
there is no set market value at any time, the original cost would have to 
be indexed or the replacement cost estimated. If a percentage of original 
cost is used as the basis for compensation, the cmputation is simple. 
The ultimate decision regarding the choice between replacement and 
original cost as a basis for ccmpensation will lie with the parties 
involved. 
If a landlord is to provide compensation for an improvement, he will 
expect that improvement to benefit him if a different tenant were to rent 
the farm. An owner-operator may feel certain that he will wish to 
continue his dairying enterprise and would build a milkhouse. The land­
lord, whose tenant desires a milkhouse, cannot be sure that a future 
tenant will have the same enterprise preferences as the present tenant. 
In such a case, compensation does not provide a solution. 
Specific improvements, the problems which they present, and alter­
native solutions are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
(a) Rotations. A tenant with uncertain expectations of tenure will 
strive to grow large acreages of corn. By so doing, he maximizes his 
income, but the landlord income and the inccme of the farm over a period 
of years may be greatly reduced by this exploitation of the present at 
the future's expense. Assume that line AE in Figure 1 represents an 
expected income stream under a cropping system utilizing a CCOg rotation 
and CD represents an income stream for a change to a CCOMM rotation. 
Income would be reduced the first three years but would be equal to or 
greater than for the CCOg rotation after three years. Although the land­
lord also receives a high incone during the first years under the more 
exploitive system of farming, part of the tenant income is, in a sense, 
an exploitation of future landlord income. 
Where the landlord desires to maximize income over a period of 
years, he may stipulate the rotation to be followed in the lease. Or, 
in order to encourage the tenant to shift fran the CCOg to the CCOMM 
rotation, a compensation arrangement could be made so that the tenant 
would receive that portion of the area ACL which he has not received 
because of the rotation shift. A more workable scheme might be to 
compensate by means of changes in the shares. For example, the tenant 
might receive 60 percent of the crop product for the first two years, 
55 percent for the next two years, and maybe 50 percent from that time on. 
The use of budgeting is prerequisite to ary such compensation 
schemes, and a major difficulty faced in ary such ccanputations is the 
inability to predict the effect of innovations. New fertilizer practices 
or better methods of conservation could be developed which would com­
pletely change the relative profitability of various rotations and 
systems-of-farming in general. However, planning can be and is based on 
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present knowledge. One can do little else unless one does nothing. 
(b) Terraces and contouring. The returns from terracir^  or 
contouring are realized l^ y tenant and landlord, but the effects are of 
long-term duration. During the first years after a terrace is built, 
yields may be reduced because the topsoil and subsoil are mixed in the 
terracing operation. The incme pattern frcan terracing may follow some­
what the same pattern as that for a change in rotations, decreasing the 
first years before the beneficial effects are obtained. The compensa­
tion measures suggested for rotations are equally applicable for this 
type of input. 
Fertilizer. The productivity of fertilizer and lime inputs is 
not all returned during the first year. There is a definite carry-over 
effect. For example, tests have shown that about one-fourth of the 
value of nitrogen fertilizer is carried over to the second year.^  The 
original cost of both lime and fertilizer should be shared in proportion 
to returns by tenant and landlord. To be practical, canpensation should 
be provided for that proportion of costs which has not been used. These 
costs should include the material as well as labor and other costs of 
hauling and spreading. The incoming tenant shtmld be willing to pay the 
cOTipensation, either directly to the outgoing tenant in lump sum or to the 
landlord as added rent.2 
L^loyd Dvimenil and R. P. Nicholson. Nitrogen carry-over? More than 
you think. Iowa Farm Science. 6; 131^ -136. 1952. p. 136. 
2 The incoming tenant would be willing to pay compensation only if the 
improvement would be profitable for him under his farming system and if no 
other farms were available on which he could obtain more favorable rental 
terms. 
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(d) Buildings and fences. Under stock-share lease arrangements, 
productivity of buildings (except the house) and fences is received by 
both parties of the lease. A major improvement in b\iildings by the owner 
should warrant a revision in the share rent, and, where the landlord and 
tenant share the costs of repair for buildings and fences, compensation 
provisions are required to give the tenant assurance of receiving full 
productivity of his inputs. 
There appears to be no logical reason why tenants should not pay a 
cash rent for the house under stock-share agreements and for all the 
buildings where a crop-rshare lease is used. Heady states: 
Lump-sum or standing rents, while creating some added risk, 
are entirely justified, under the haphazard customs of share 
rentals, as a basis for encouraging building investment where 
its marginal productivity is sufficiently great.^  
The value of buildir^ s can be added into the landlord's share of inputs 
when determining the rental share, but such a system leads to cost trans­
fers between enterprises and results in inefficient resource use, A cash 
rent for house and/or buildings imputes the marginal value product direct-
/ 
ly to its source, a requirement of optimum resource use. 
Where the landlord does actually use certain buildings, for example, 
corn cribs and granaries, such buildings should not be included when 
calculating the building rent. The tenant could be allowed to work off 
part of the building rent or ary rent by repairing or improving the 
buildings and fences if he so desires# 
H^eady, op. cit., pp. 601, 602. 
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Once rent for buildings is agreed upon or where no building rent is 
presently charged, it still is possible to use such a, system in paying 
for additional improvements. A tenant may be very willing to pay an 
annual improvement rent for a bathro(Hn with running water, for a new hog 
house, or for other simi.latr improvements* This also can be handled by 
having the tenant make the improvement and the landlord pay compensation 
should the tenant move* 
Crop-share leases often provide that a cash payment be made for land 
in hay or pasture. If a ccmplemenbary relationship exists between forage 
and grain production, the landlord interested in maximizing income over a 
period of 10 to 20 years would actually gain by charging no cash rent for 
acres in forage up to the point where forage and grain production are 
canpetitive. Where the landlord pays for all grass seed, he shotild ex­
pect some cash payment. In fact, he should receive payment for the 
pasture and hay land if he is to receive the productivity of his resource. 
Even though forage and grain are complementary, there is no a priori reason 
for either landlord or tenant to receive all the return of the complemen­
tary product if the tenant is assured of compensation or of tenure which 
is long enough to emble him to receive full benefit of forage in the 
rotation. 
The major categories of cost-inccme dissociations have been discussed 
above. It remains to examine the reasorjs why such inefficient practices 
came about and why they continue to exist. 
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B. Reasons for Dissociations of Incomes frcMU Costs 
There seem to be several reasons> not necessarily distinct, as to 
lease provisions are as they are. Landlords and tenants may not be 
aware of the fact that the other party is benefiting or that there is 
anything which can be done to correct lease-oriented obstacles. It is 
possible that either landlord or tenant may have, at some time, been in 
a relatively strong bargaining position, and the arrangement made might 
result in resource mal-allocation. Once an arrangement gains common usage 
in any area or takes on the nature of custm, it is difficult to charge. 
1. The influence of custom 
Custcsnary lease provisions need not be inefficient, as custom merely 
perpetuates the inefficient as well as the efficient. Vifhat may work 
perfectly well at one point in time can become completely outmoded by 
changes in farming methods aiKi in relative values placed on the different 
resources used in production. 
Custom operates in a peculiar fashion. Between different agricultizral 
areas there are many differences in leases. For example, the common share 
of crop which the landlord receives as rent is one-third in the Red River 
Valley area of North Dakota in contrast to one-half in most of Iowa, 
Since the value of Iowa land is greater than that of North Dakota land, 
the landlord provides a greater share of the inputs and, thus, receives 
a greater share in return. However, within areas, the share of crop paid 
as rent does not vary to any large extent. Heacfy and Kehrberg found that 
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98.6 percent of the tenants in a sample of Iowa farms paid one-half the 
corn as rent.^  What variation in provisions that did exist occurred in 
the percent of landlords who paid a share of seed, fertilizer costs, or 
other variable costs, and some variation was found in the share of soy­
beans and oats paid as rent. Custom is a strong force in determining the 
share of crop charged as rent. Timmons found that 2I4 percent of all inter 
viewees stated that a fair rent is what is customary, and this was the 
most frequent response to the question concerning fair rent.^  
Further evidence of the influence of custom on rental shares and 
shares of variable costs is given by Held. 
It is not the purpose of this stuc^  to indicate those rental 
shares that are appropriate for a particular farm. It is 
inconceivable, however, that with the wide variation in 
productivity found on the farms in the area one particular 
share arrangement would be appropriate for most cases. Yet 
in 35 cases out of I4O where a crop-share lease was used, the 
landlord's share of the crop was half of the corn and two-
fifths of the oats. As far as costs were concerned, under 
this same arrar^ ement the landlords on 1$ farms paid no 
part of ary seed costs for grain while 20 paid for half of 
the cost of corn only. Of the remaining five, only one 
landlord shared seed grain costs in proportion to his share 
in the returns.^  
The way in which crops are shared under customary lease arrangements 
suggests that the shares are set up to make crop division easy. It 
%eady and Kehrberg, op. cit., p. 614^ . 
p 
Timmons, op. cit., p. 109. 
Burnell Held. Overcoming obstacles to soil erosion control in 
Western Iowa. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College 
Library. 1953. p. 137. 
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appears evident that bargaining between tenant and landlord does not 
center upon the share of the crop given as rent.^  Instead, what bargain­
ing there is concerns what share of the variable cost will be paid by 
whom. As has been shown, these are the very provisions which lead to 
inefficient operation.^  
What is customary need not be the most efficient method of operation 
although custcanary procedures often do have a sound basis. But, where 
custanary leasing provisions interfere with optimum resource allocation, 
changes must be made if efficiency is to be improved. 
Landlord-tenant relationships display sane measure of bilateral 
monopoly. The returns which the parties receive will be a function of 
their relative bargaining power. If bargaining were to be on the basis 
of the share charged as rent rather than on the basis of which party 
contributes profit-periphery inputs, leases would presumably tend to be 
more efficient. 
P^ossibly the 1/2 - l/2 share lease or the I/3 - 2/3 share lease 
arose out of a system of measurement where one wagon of corn or oats was 
the landlord's, and the next one or two went to the tenant. It should 
not appear to be too difficult a task to make more refined divisions of 
crops, say, by increments of five percent or even less. To emphasize the 
effect of the share, a one percent change in share paid as rent is a 
difference of $50 on a gross product of $5,000. 
A^nother way of changing the rent without changing the share is to 
charge a cash premium for hay and pasture or buildings on different 
grades of land. Beneke found a slight premium for the higher grade land, 
axid the correlation between premiiim paid and corn yield was significant 
at the five percent level. Raymond R. Beneke. An economic analysis of 
crop share leases in Iowa. Unpublished M.S. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa 
State College Library. 19146. p. 26. 
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C. Determining the Rental Share 
If custom is not acceptable as the criterion for determining the 
rental share, an alternative which is more efficient must be used. One 
method which might be used is to evaluate the z;onr-proflt-'periphery 
contributions of both parties and to share the returns in the same pro-
p<xrtion as these costs are sharedt If there were constant returns to 
scale and all resources were paid their marginal value productivity^  the 
total product would then be exhausted*^  Assuming constant returns to 
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scale> one need only impute the marginal value product to the factors 
contributed by tenant and landlord in order to determine the rental share 
which promotes optimum resource allocation. Unfortunately* no method is 
available by which marginal productivity of resources can be accurately 
and easily established. 
Sam iaputational scheme must be used. A method often used is to 
value contributions at their market prices, assuming that market prices 
reflect the value productivity of resources. Of this assuiqption. Heady 
says: 
ibrket prices might be expected to equal the value productivity 
of resources in the long-run under competitive conditions* 
However, this condition need not hold true in the short-run or 
in a dynamic economy in which expectations are imperfect and 
where competition does not have full reign.3 
%ee Heady, op. cit., pp. ii07-lili« or Oeorge J, Stigler. The theory 
of price. Ifew York, The Macmillan Ccmpaty. 19Ul» p. 130. 
T^his is probably a reasonably realistic assumption. See Heady, 
op. cit., p. 359* 
I^bid., p. I4O6. 
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Accepting this as true, there does not appear to be a better approxi­
mation to the value products than market prices« 
If the market price for one factor underestimates its true produc­
tivity, part of the factor's retiirn will be imputed to other factors 
since there will be a residual to divide. Where one resource is not in­
cluded in the imputational procedure, the residual is, implicitly at 
least, assumed to represent the marginal value productivity of that par­
ticular resource. It should be recognized that this residual return 
imputed to the factor may be caaposed of two elements, the marginal 
productivity of the resource itself and errors in estimating the value 
products of the other inputs. 
Dividing resource units into the four broad categories of land, labor, 
capital, and managaaent, problems of imputation arise in all four cate­
gories, A rate or rates of interest must be chosen which represent the 
cost or the opportunity cost of the capital invested in the farm enter­
prise. Depreciation and annual repairs are difficult to measure, and a 
value must be placed on land, labor, and other inputs. The heterogeneity 
of labor inputs makes the evaluation of this factor extremely complicated. 
As great as the obstacles are for valuing the contributions of land, 
labor, and capital, none of these resources seem to present the diffi­
culties associated with the imputation of management's contribution. 
Everyone seems to recognize that management decisions directly affect the 
profit of a farm or an individual's utility, but the relative value of the 
many management decisions has not been ascertained. As a result, manage­
ment is left with the residual return in comparisons of economic efficiency 
it3 
or other problems involving imputation.^  
One method of determining the rental share for a crop-share lease 
is illustrated in Table 2. The contributions, excluding the profit-
peripheiy costs and annual building costs, total |li500, of which 60 
percent is contributed by the tenant.^  Ignoring the contribution of 
management, the returns would be shared in the proportion 60th0. How 
does the addition of management affect the share? In the absence of a 
method to evaluate management and for the sake of simplicity, one can 
assuii» that management is contributed in the same proportion as the 
other costs. 
Such a system is not too realistic. Another alternative is to 
leave the final share determination to the bargaining table. Starting 
with the value of other contributions, the landlord and tenant would then 
bargain on the final share according to their valuation of their respective 
This stuity uses return to management as a measure of efficiency. 
This is discussed in Chapter III. Farm managers do charge a fee which 
purportedly represents their contribution to production. In Iowa, for 
example, landlords commonly pay these farm managers a fee of ten percent 
of the gross landlord return. But this fee is not the total management 
contribution of the landlord since the landlord must necessarily make a 
significant management contribution in his choice of manager. He also 
makes other decisions ai»i is often consulted by the farm manager before 
final actions are taken. 
P^rofit-periphery costs would be shared in the same proportion as 
returns. The problem of separating building value from the total value 
of land and buildings is not as yet solved. For this reason, the 
composite value is used, and the tenant might pay a building rent which 
covers the annual cost of insurance, repairs, and depreciation for the 
buildings* 
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Table 2. Annual contributions of tenant and landlord 





Land and buildings ($30,000 © .05) 
Labor (8 mos. ® |200) 
Real estate taxes 













Total non-profit-periphery costs 1800 2700 
Table 3. Cost of custom work for corn and oats operations. 




Plow (2 bottom) 3.25 
Disc 1.15 
Drag .75 
Plant (2 row) 1.80 
Drag .75 




Broadcast oats .80^  
Disc 1.15 






D^ale Hull and Roger Yoerger. Hov; much for custom work in 1953? 
Iowa Farm Science. 7: 165-167. 1953. 
'Estimated. 
management inputs.^  This does not necessarily eliminate the imputational 
technique as a useful method of aiding tenants and landlords in reaching 
agreement on a rental share. It may still be of assistance to landlords 
and tenants who have no other basis for intelligent bargaining. 
Under a crop-share lease, it is very difficult to determine the 
proportion of the family labor used on crops and the proportions of 
machinery costs attributable to crops and to the livestock enterprise. 
In order to circumvent these problems, a custcan rate approach to contri­
butions may be feasible. 
The landlord contribution is the same as in Table 2, but the tenant 
contributions are based on what it would cost the landlord to have all 
work done ty custom machines. In Western Iowa, the major crops are corn 
and oats with legume and grass sown with oats as a nurse crop. Hull and 
Yoerger have listed custom rates for many machine operations. Using 
these rates and the usual field operations for western lomra, the cost 
for corn is fl7.50 per acre, and for oats it is $11.85 per acre (Table 3). 
Assume that the farm under consideration has 120 acres of cropland, 
of which 60 acres are in oats and 60 acres in corn each year. Land in 
pasture or hay is mitted because the tenant pays all costs and receives 
all returns. For the 120 acres of cropland, the tenant contributes $1761, 
A^n interesting l^ pothesis can be made to rationalize the existence 
of customary share rents. Starting with the share as given, the farms 
which are better are rented by tenants possessing the greatest managerial 
skill. Thus, the difference in relative contributions would be equalized 
by the management input. 
2 
Dale Hull and Boger Yoerger. How much for custcsm work in 1953? 
Iowa Farm Science. ?: 165-167* 1953• 
146 
and the landlord's contribution is still $1800. The ratio of contribu­
tions is $0:50. The factor of management has to be included as for the 
other method, and, in the custcan rate approach, the landlord would pay a 
share of sane costs which were not paid under the total contributions 
method. Under the second proposal, the owner would share in the costs of 
hauling, elevating, and binning the harvested grain. Further, the land­
owner should pay for his share of the cost of hauling manure and even 
for a share of the value of manure as a fertilizer. 
This chapter has dealt with the theoretical aspects of share renting 
and its effect on farming efficiency, and an attempt was made to analyze 
methods of putting the theory into practice. The method used in this 
study is presented in the next chapter. 
a? 
III. PROCEDURE 
The general procedure for testing the above hypotheses was to 
study individual cases composed of groups of farms, consisting 
of one owner- and one or more tenant-operated farms. Obviously, 
broad inferences and generalizations for the area or tenure groups 
therein cannot be made from this stucfy of cases. However, analysis 
of cases, including the interaction of relevant factors, can provide 
valuable insight into the problems and possible remedial alternatives. 
Since this study was partially methodological in the sense of develop­
ing a way whereby existing provisions could be changed, the case 
method seemed appropriate. Also, each farm unit is a problem in 
itself as far as valuation of the various contributions of the two 
parties is concerned, and the rental rate must be determined separate­
ly for each unit by the bargaining parties. Results of this analysis, 
including remedial suggestions, should be useful in other situations 
with similar problems and in posing further hypotheses for future 
study. 
Tifithout proper handling of the problem and the inquiry, no method 
of analysis can give worth-while results. This, of course, is just as 
true with case studies as with studies of mass data. Salter states! 
If a case study is, as commonly interpreted, an intensive 
study of everything that bears on a given unit, then there 
is no formulated problem and no hypothesis, and the work 
Ii8 
is not a scientific inquiry.^  
On the other hand, the case study can yield extremely useful 
results if properly handled. To be effective, it should be used to 
test the specific hypotheses with which the study is concerned. "If 
a case is an acting unit and if the interactions and sequences in its 
experience are preserved within the unit, then it has strong testing 
force.That is, it can provide a means for testing the interactions 
within the case. V^ '^hen generalizations are made to other farms from a 
case study, however, one is skating on rather thin ice. The problems 
of one rented farm are not wholly representative of those of the 
remainder of rented farms. For this reason, conclusions obtained from 
a case study should be used largely as hypotheses for further testing. 
Alfred I5arshall apparently was av;are of the usefulness as well as 
the pitfalls of the case analysis. Of this tool of analysis, he says: 
To work it well requires a rare combination of judgement in 
selecting cases, and of insight and sympathy in interpret­
ing them. At its best, it is the best of allj but in ordinary 
hands it is likely to suggest more untrustworthy general con­
clusions, than those obtained by the extensive method of col­
lecting more rapidly very numerous observations, reducing 
them as far as possible to statistical form, and obtaining 
broad averages in v/hich inaccuracies and idiosyncrasies may 
be trusted to counteract one another to sane extent.3 
L^eonard A. Salter, Jr. A critical review of research in land 
economics. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 19^ 8. p. 71. 
I^bid., p. 71. 
-^ Alfred ifarshall. Principles of economics. Eighth edition. 
London, llacmillan and Compare, Limited. 1930. p. 116. 
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To disagree sorae;'fhat with liisrshall, the case study not only is 
likely to produce more untrustworthy general conclusions than the 
analysis of mass dataj it should not be used to make general con­
clusions. It is, however, useful as a test of methodology or as an 
instrument for ascertaining l^ rpotheses for further testing. 
Landlord-tenant relationships appear to lend themselves extremely 
well to the case method. Not only are the problems of the rented farm 
economic; they are also social. It would appear that there is a great 
deal of insight to be gained into these socio-economic problems by 
utilizing the case method of analysis. It is an appropriate tool of 
analysis for certain situations, just as the study of mass data and 
the application of statistical methods to test conclusions by use of 
the mathematics of probability is appropriate in other situations. 
A. The Share-Type Lease 
To narrow the scope of this study still further, it is limited 
to share-type leases, i.e., crop-share or stock-share lease arrange­
ments. The problems of cash leases are somewhat different from those 
of share leases since inefficiencies due to failure to share costs and 
returns in equal proportions are largely circumvented. However, other 
problems, such as short expectancy of tenure, are the same, and lease 
provisions applicable to share-type leases should be equally applicable 
to cash leases. 
A recent study by Chryst dealt vifith the cash lease and measures 
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which would tend to make this type of lease more efficient.^  Under 
a cash lease, the tenant must assume more risk than under a share-
type of lease, and, therefore, the effect of risk discounting is 
greater. This is indicated by the low cash rent tenants woiold be 
willing to pay to shift from a crop-share to a caah lease. To 
reduce this risk, some measure of flexibility in the cash rental is 
necessary. 
The share lease is the predominant lease type in Iowa today. Of 
the 77,536 tenants in Iowa in 1950, 16.8 percent used a straight cash 
lease, while 77.3 percent operated under a crop-share, a share-cash, 
or a livestock-share lease.^  The problems peculiar to the crop-share 
lease are essentially the same for the stock-share type of lease. 
However, many causes of inefficiency and antagonism between owner and 
tenant are removed or are less severe under stock-share arrangements 
because of the customary way that costs and returns are divided.^  
Walter E. Ghryst. Adjusting farm rents to changes in prices, 
costs and production. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa 
State College Library. 1952. 
Heady and Kehrberg, op. cit., p. 669. 
•^ U. S. 17th Census. Census of Agriculture, 1950. General 
report, p. 1005. 
%cwever, additional causes of disagreement can arise under a stock-
share lease because of additional decisions which must be reached 
jointly, such as when to market or buy cattle and hogs. "Two heads 
may be better than one," but quite often, with stock-share leases, it 
is more true that "too many cooks spoil the broth." 
$1 
B. ?/estern Iowa as the Study Area 
This study has been limited to selected cases in the Ida-Monona 
soil association area of Western Iowa (Figure h)' There are several 
reasons for choosing this area. First, this is an area where tcnancy 
is very prevalent. The proportion of farmers who are tenants and the 
proportion of farm land rented is second only to the Worth Central 
Grain area, and it was the only type-of-farming area showing an increase 
in renting from 19hS to 1950 in proportion of land rented (Table 1). 
Second, the topography of this area is extremely rolling, and 
the loessial soils are very subject to erosion. Since the loess parent 
material in this area is extremely deep, sheet erosion is not too great 
a problem. However, gullies do form rather readily and make farming 
difficult, if not impossible, in the gullied areas. Because of the 
erodible nature of the soils in this area, there has been considerable 
emphasis on soil conservation in the past years. The shift to a 
conservation type of farming brings into sharp focus lease problems 
concerning dissociation of returns and costs over time. 
Third, two recent studies have been made in this area which add a 
good deal of insight into the leasing problem.^  A sample of liji^  farms, 
83 of which were operated by tenants, was dra?m in 19h9, and soil con­
servation plans were made for all of the farms in the sample. The 
physical information concerning soils and buildings on these farms and 
the previous questionnaires with rotation, livestock, and attitude 
1 

















Figure I4. Location of farms studied in the Ida-Monona 
soil association area of Western Iowa, 
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information were available for use in this study. These data made it 
possible to select cases which most closely represented the leasing 
problem as defined in this study. 
C. The Farms Studied 
Since the existence of a gap in net incomes over time between 
farms operated under tenancy and under owner-operatorship was to be 
tested, the farms to be compared had to be similar. It is impossible 
to pair farms so that they are exactly alike. However, using the 
information on the llii4 farms in Frey's study,^  groups were chosen so 
that the farms in each group, rented and owner-operated, were as nearly 
comparable as possible with respect to farm size, soil type and slope, 
climate, distance to markets, and attitudes of the operators toward 
different farm enterprises, particularly the live-stock enterprises. 
Four groups of cases were selected for intensive study. The groups 
represent three farm sizes—120 acres, 160 acres, and 21^ 0 acres. Two 
of the groups consist of 120 acre farms. Two general-purpose farms are 
paired in one, and two farms emphasizing the livestock enterprise are 
paired in the other group of small farms. 
In setting up similar owner-operator farms as norms for the tenant-
operated farms, it was assumed that differences which existed in the 
operation of the farms would be lease-oriented. Since one cannot find 
two identical farms and two identical operators, some of the variation 
F^rey, op. cit. 
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in systems of farming was the result of non-lease-oriented factors. 
But grouping the farms did eliminate a large portion of the variation 
which was not due to obstacles created by leasing.^  
1. The owner-operators 
Four owners were chosen as the norms for each of the four groups. 
Although no information concerning net incomes was available from the 
two previous studies^  of the lljit farms, some data was available to aid 
in the selection of owner-operators who appeared to have high incomes 
and who were holding soil losses at a low level. The owner-operators 
were chosen to fit the different size categories and because their crop 
yields and livestock numbers indicated a high level of income. They 
were not necessarily keepir^  soil loss below the level suggested by 
the Soil Conservation Service,3 but their soil losses were relatively 
low. Other information concerning these owner-operators was supplied 
by Burnell Held^  who aided in the selection since he had previously 
interviewed all of the men. Thus, the norms were not randomly chosen 
T^his was discussed in Chapter I. 
F^rey, op. cit., and Held, op. cit. 
T^he goal of this agency is a maximum soil loss per acre of five 
tons for the Ida-Monona soils. This is a loss which they feel will 
enable future production to be maintained, assuming no change in 
technology. 
R^. Burnell Held. Ames, Iowa. Information concerning abilities 
of landlords and tenants in sample. (Private communication.) 1953» 
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but were picked because they had the desired physical characteristics and 
were thought to be farmers with a moderately long term interest in their 
farms. 
2, The tenants 
Four of the six tenant-operated farms were chosen because of the 
lease difficulties Tidiich had been expressed in the previous two surveys. 
The farms were as similar to the owner-operated farms chosen as possible. 
Two tenant farms were chosen because of evidence pointing to an excellent 
working arrangement with their landlord. The inclusion of these two farms 
T/as for the express purpose of locating success elements within the 
arrangements, in contrast to the failure elements in the others. That 
is, it was thought that these farms might provide insight into constructs 
of action which would be applicable to other rented farms where problems 
are similar. 
The tenant-operators were not necessarily thought to be as aggressive 
or as good managers as the owners. The difference in managerial ability 
could account for some difference in the systems of farming. However, 
the lease arrangement could conceivably affect the tenant's attitude 
toward the farm business, and, since innate managerial ability is diffi­
cult to ascertain, this factor was ignored in choosing the tenants but 
not in the analysis. 
Since landlords were to be interviewed, the added restriction of 
having a landlord who lived within the immediate area of the study or 
within a few hours driving time was imposed in choosing the farms for 
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study. This procedure eliminated landlords living in California or other 
far-away states and had the disadvantage of ignoring distance from the 
farm as a possible cause of much of the rental inefficiencies and 
difficulties. 
3' Description of farms studied 
Three of the tenant, farms were grouped with one owner, and the 
other three were paired with separate owners. Some differences in farm 
size did exist, but these were not great differences. The number of 
crop acres was also similar within the groups. 
(a) Group I. The owner farm for this group (Farm I-a) is a I6I4 
acre, general-purpose farm with 125 acres of cropland, 32 acres of 
permanent pasture, and 7 acres of farmstead and waste. This farm had 
an average soil loss of 13*5 tons per acre in 1952.^  About ten acres 
are contoured, manure is spread regularly, and some commercial fertilizer 
is applied. The owner attended Iowa State College for a short time and 
is h2 years old. He raises 20 litters of spring pigs, has four milk cows 
and ten beef cows, and feeds out the calves raised. 
Farm I-b is a I60 acre, tenant-operated, general-purpose farm with 
135 crop acres, 1? acres of woodland pasture, and 8 acres of farmstead 
T^he 1952 soil loss figures were obtained from Held, Overccming 
obstacles to soil erosion control in Western Iowa. The so-called 
Brovming factors were used in these cmputations. George M. Browning. 
Browning's erosion factors. (Mimeographed data.) Iowa State College 
Department of AgrononQr. l^ ItS. 
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and waste. The average soil loss in 1952 was 20.0 tons per acre, and 
the over-all topography is slightly rougher than that of Farm I-a. All 
of the cornland is contoured, manure is spread on high spots, and a 
little commercial fertilizer is applied on corn. The tenant raises 12 
spring litters and two fall litters, has seven milk cows, and has three 
beef cows. He sells beef calves and feeds out dairy calves at about 
1000 pounds. He also has 190 hens and about 100 ducks and geese. The 
tenant is ijl years old, and an elderly widow owns the farm. She has a 
middle-aged daughter who did most of the talking during the interviews. 
Farm I-c is another 160 acre, tenant-operated, general-purpose farm 
with 137 crop acres, l6 acres of permanent pasture, and 7 acres in waste 
and buildings. None of the land is contoured, and the 1952 soil loss 
was 18.0 tons per acre. Ifenure is spread on the high spots, and some 
commercial fertilizer is applied. The tenant is a young man who has 
been building up to the present ten spring litters and six milk cows. 
The calves are kept and fed out at about 1000 pounds. The landlady, an 
elderly widow, hires a farm manager to look after the farm. 
The fourth farm in this group (Farm I-d) is a tenant-operated farm 
containing li40 acres. There are 132 crop acres and 8 acres in buildings 
and waste. The tenant has lit spring and four fall litters alor^  with 
200 hens. The livestock system deviates considerably from the other farms 
in the group because the tenant feeds out about 100 head of cattle each 
year. This is one of the two success tenants. That is, the owner and 
tenant were thought to have a good working arrangement, so the farm was 
included in the group even though there was a considerable difference in 
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livestock systems. The tenant is a 31-year-old, former veteran's on-the-
farm trainee under the Veteran's Administration, and the owner is 7h years 
old and formerly farmed the land himself. The 1952 soil loss was 2.9 tons 
per acre. All of the farm is contoured, 12 acres are terraced, manure is 
applied, and commercial fertilizer (phosphate) is applied on legume 
seedings. 
(b) Group II. The owner of this group (Il-a) operates 120 acres, 
89 acres of which are in cropland, 22 acres are in permanent pasture, 
and 9 acres are taken up by buildings and waste. He raises 11 spring 
litters and has two beef cows and 150 hens; he hires much of his work 
done by custom machines and only recently purchased his first tractor. 
The 1952 soil loss was 7.3 tons per acre, about 20 acres is contoured, 
and he purchases manure from the Sioux City stockyards for spreading on 
the farm. He is about 60 years old. 
The tenant of this pair (ll-b) is 60 years old and does not appear 
to be overly interested in change. He finds a good deal of fault with 
the lease provisions but does not seem to extend himself in getting them 
corrected. Of the 120 acres, there are 111 crop acres, 5 acres of 
pemanent pasture, and acres waste and buildings. He does no contour­
ing and does not use ary cramnercial fertilizer. However, he does spread 
some manure. There are no hogs, but he has six milk cms and 200 hens. 
He keeps the calves and feeds them to about 1000 pounds. The soil loss 
in 1952 was severe, an average loss of kO,6 tons per acre. The owner is 
a middle-aged widow. 
(c) Group III. Owner Ill-a appears to be very progressive. He 
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sells grade A milk from a herd of 15 holsteins, raises seven spring 
litters, has 200 hens, sells his bull calves, and his heifers (other 
than those needed for replacement) are sold as bred two-year-olds. 
Of the 120 acres, 116 acres are cultivable, and I4 acres are in buildings 
and waste. The 1952 soil loss was 5-7 tons per acre. All of the land 
is contoured, and manure and phosphate on legiune seedings are used. 
This man is 1^ 3 years old. 
The paired tenant farm (Ill-b) contains 121 acres, 66 acres of 
which are in cropland, 53 acres are in permanent pasture, and 2 acres 
are in buildings. The 1952 soil loss was 5^ 4.7 tons per acre. None of 
the land is contoured, manure is applied on the high spots, and some 
commercial fertilizer is used on the corn. The livestock on the farm 
consists of seven fall and seven spring litters, ten milk cows, and 
250 hens. The calves are fed to a weight of about 1000 pounds. He 
also feeds 20 head of yearling feeder cattle each year. This farm has 
a livestock-share lease, in contrast to the other five leases which are 
of the crop-share type.^  The tenant is 35 years old, and the owner, a 
I^t is often stated that one cure for the inefficiencies caused 
by customary crop-share leases is to change to a stock-share lease. 
This tenant, operating under such a lease, still expressed serious lease 
difficulties. The stock-share lease is no panacea for all ]ease 
difficulties. It can contain many of the same provisions which bring 
about resource mal-allocations under the crop-share lease. Further, 
all tenants and owners are not equipped financially or do not have the 
ability to handle livestock which is needed for success in such 
operations. 
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livestock buyer and trucker, is the tenant's father-in-law.^  He is 61 
years old. 
Group IV. Farm IV-a is a 2U5 acre farm. There are 229 acres 
of cropland, h acres of woodland, and 12 acres of waste and buildings. 
The 1952 soil loss was 6.6 tons per acre. All of the land is contoured, 
and terraces are used where needed. Manure is spread regularly, and 
phosphate fertilizer is also used. The owner is 39 years old. Eighteen 
spring litters and 180 hens are raised annually, and the operator also 
feeds 125 head of cattle each year. 
The paired tenant farm (IV-b) is the other success farm. It has 
209 acres of cropland, 18 acres of permanent pasture, and 13 acres of 
buildings and waste. The 1952 soil loss was 6.5 tons per acre. All 
of the land is contoured, and a little manure and phosphate fertilizer 
are used. Ten spring and six fall litters are raised each year. The 
tenant also has 85 hens and ten milk cows, and the calves are fed to a 
weight of about 1000 pounds. There are two sets of buildings on the 
farm. All are used by the tenant, with the exception of one house and 
a chicken coop which are used by the landlord's father. The tenant is 
I4I4 years old and the owner is a middle-aged, farm machinery dealer. 
A^lthough the landlord and temnt are related, this relationship 
appears to be on a highly commercial basis with little evidence of 
family help. Since the farm has a stock-share lease and lease 
difficulties were expressed, it was desirable to include this farm 
for study. 
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D. Evidence Needed to Test the Hypotheses 
Since the present system of farming on the tenant farms was to be 
compared with that of the owner-operator, detailed information concern­
ing the farm operation v/as required. The physical data, as well as 
attitudes of the operators and landlords, had to be obtained. Fortunately, 
much data on the sample farms was already at hand from the studies of 
Frey^  and Held.^  Frey obtained information on the obstacles to soil 
conservation and the rotations and crop practices used, and Held had 
the fields mapped for the year 1952 as well as other data on attitudes 
toward leasir^  and conservation. 
Needed for the study and not already available were the cost and 
income data. This was obtained by field interview in the spring of 1953' 
Information was obtained at this time on all expenses, livestock numbers, 
machinery, crop yields, and buildings. 
To test tenant and landlord reactions to the alternative remedial 
measures, it was necessary to interview them after the analysis was 
completed so that they might express their opinions and choices of 
alternative lease changes which would increase the farm income over time 
without reducing income to either party. 
F^rey, op. cit. 




The basic approach was to superimpose the farming system of the 
owner-operator to the paired tenant farm. That is, where the lease 
hindered the tenant from achieving the same income as the paired owner, 
the system of the temnt was changed and the lease altered in such a way 
that the tenant and landlord would be willing and able to make the change. 
1. The budgeting procedure 
To estimate future income under changed farming systems, the 
budgeting technique was used. By use of budgeting it is possible to 
estimate the effect of ar§r specific change as well as the differences 
in total net income over a period of years. 
An individual is not interested in maximizing his income today but 
his income over a certain period of time. Hicks says the entrepreneur 
". . . maximizes the present value of his prospective net receipts."^  
It is difficult to ascertain the length of an individual's horizon of 
expectations. It undoubtedly varxes from one individual to another. 
For this study a period of 10 years was used."^  It is quite likely that 
this is a longer planning period than exists for mar^  farmers. However, 
%icks, op. cit., p. 196. 
2 The average rate of turnover in ownership of farms is about once in 
II4 or 15 years in Vifestern Iowa. John F. Timmons, et. al. Teamwork 
toward better land use and soil conservation in western Iowa. Iowa Agri­
cultural Experiment Station Special Report No. U. 1950. p. 11. Although 
farms may be owned for a period longer than 10 years, the planning period 
of the individuals might be considerably shorter. 
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it is a period long enough to cover the major effects on crop yields of 
a change in rotation, and it is a relatively simple matter to calculate 
the present value of income for a lesser number of years. Income for 
future years was discounted back to present value using a discount rate 
of 5 percent.^  Therefore, the present value of future income was the 
sum of all discounted future annual incomes. 
2. The summary of 19^ 2 income 
Using the data collected in the 1953 interview, net income for the 
tenant and owner farms was estimated. The expense and income figures 
were taken as given ty the interviewees. Where the farmers expressed 
no dollar value for income and costs, the pl:Qrsical quantities were used 
and were multiplied by the prices.^ 
Interest on investment was taken at $ percent for land and buildings 
and at 6 percent for livestock and machinery. These percentages approxi­
mate the rates of interest charged for loans on real estate and on work­
ing capital, respectively. 
I^ndividuals' time preferences and the discount rate which they 
place on future returns vary. Obviously, this 5 percent rate will 
not apply to all individuals, but the correct rate may never be deter­
mined. This rate is assumed to be the mortgage rate of interest and 
does not include discount due to uncertain tenure. One of the obstacles 
to greater efficiency is short tenure, and this is one of the factors 
with which this study is concerned. 
2 A list of prices used for budgeting is in the Appendix. 
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(a) Ifeichinery costs and value. Farmers have difficulty remembering 
what they paid for machinery, and have little idea of the value of the 
used equipment. However, they know the model and age of their equipment. 
Thus, the make, model, and age of all equipment was obtained frcan the 
farmers. To establish the annual depreciation of the machinery, the 
replacement cost minus salvage value was divided by the machine's 
expected years of life. 
In estimating machinery costs, prices f.o.fe. Des Moines were used, 
with 5 percent added for sales tax and freight to Western lowa.^  
Salvage value was estimated at 10 percent of the replacement cost,^  
and the straight line method of depreciation was used. The present 
value of machinery was obtained by subtracting the total depreciation 
from the replacement cost. Although there would be some variation in 
value and cost of machinery from year to year, the value and costs for 
19^ 2 were assumed constant for the 10 year period of the income calcula­
tions. This procedure assximed that the 1952 machinery organization 
would not change over the ten year period. Also, the value and costs 
were taken as the same for 19$2 and for the normalized data. 
For the 1952 income summary, t-he data on repairs and insurance 
obtained by interview were used. A different method, explained below, 
was used for normal repair and insurance costs. 
%oger Yoerger, Ames, Iowa. Information on machinery costs. 
(Private communication.) 1953* 
I^bid. 
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(b) Building costs and value. Farm buildings are usually evaluated 
on the market in conjunction with the land. Their value depends on 
their use to the farm as a producing unit and, to some extent, on their 
convenience and appearance. Therefore, the value of the investment was 
taken for land and buildings as a unit in determining interest on 
investment. The interviewee estimate of farm value was used for both 
the 1952 and normal budgets. Where the tenant and landlord gave a 
different estimate of value, the mean of the two estimates was used. 
The use value and annual depreciation were obtained for the separate 
buildings by using a procedure described by Wooley and Beasley,^  and 
the 1952 depreciation and value were those used in the normal budgets. 
Although the repair and insurance costs were normalized, the interview 
data were used for the 1952 summary. 
Yifhere Wooley's tables and method were not applicable, an estimate of 
value was made. This was necessary for only three buildings, however. 
3. Normalizing the data 
Using 1952 income and cost figures has several disadvantages. The 
price ratios in the one year might be distorted from a long-time average, 
making a particular enterprise appear overly profitable. Also, the crop 
yields, livestock births and deaths, and building repairs may be different 
J^. C. Wooley and R. P. Beasley. The appraisal of farm buildings. 
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Circular 213. 19ill. 
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from year to year. 
Because of these deviations from "normal", it was necessary to 
perform the operation of normalizing the data. That is, prices, yields, 
repairs, and losses were made as nearly typical as possible for each of 
the farms. It would invalidate inccane comparisons, for example, if one 
farm made major repairs, while the paired farm had no repairs in the 
particular year studied. 
(a) Prices. For this study, a constant price level was used in 
order to eliminate the influence of a changing level on income. The 
prices used and listed in the Appendix are based on a 1902 price level. 
In order to eliminate unusual price ratios for the one year, an average 
of the prices from 19142-51 was used and indexed up to the 1952 level. 
In some instances the 10 year average could not be obtained, and a 
1952 price was used. For the major income items, however, the prices 
used were based on the prices of the preceeding 10 year period. 
This method does not suggest that the price ratios used would 
necessarily exist on into the future, but that they are more realistic 
than if the actual 1952 prices were used. In estimating the income 
effects of various farming systems, the price relationships between 
products and between factors and products is of more importance than the 
absolute price level. 
(b) Crops. If the farm income over a period of years is to be 
obtained, there must be knowledge of crop yields during the period. 
That is, certain soils may decline in fertility and have declining 
yields under some rotations, and, under other conditions, the yields 
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may increase. 
Yield information was available on the sample farms for the period 
1950-1952. However, because of the abnormally high yields during these 
years, using them would give a distorted picture of the yields likely 
to occur in the ten year period under study. Further, the farmers were 
not able to remember yields accurately, and the few years for which they 
could remember did not provide a long enough period to show ary definite 
trend. 
Recently, Aandahl, Allaway, and Riecken of the Iowa State College 
Department of Agronomy estimated average yields for eight rotations 
under two management systems, cash grain and livestock.^  The estimates 
were for five major soil types and phases and for no conservation 
practices, for a terrace-contour system, and for a terrace-contour-
fertilizer system utilizing the amounts of fertilizer specified in their 
report. The estimated yields represent the average yields after major 
effects of the rotation and conservation practices have taken place. 
Once the estimated yields were reached, probably after a length of 
time of about three rotations, it was assumed that the yields would 
remain at a constant level. However, the soil loss would be very heavy 
under some rotations, and a maintenance level of productivity did not 
appear to be a logical assumption in some of these cases. The Aandahl, 
A^. A. Aandahl, W. H. Allaway, and F. F. Riecken. Estimated 
average yields of corn, oats, and alfalfa-brome hay for the five 
principal soil type and phases in the Monona-Ida-Hamburg soil 
association area of Iowa. (Mimeographed data.) Iowa State College 
Department of Agronomy. 19^ 0. 
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All&way, and Riecken yields were used as a base to estimate yields over 
a ten year period.^  The procedure used to estimate yields was worked 
P 
out with William D. Shrader of the Agronomy Department of Iowa State 
College. The following assumptions were made; 
(1) Yields on the soils in this study are limited primarily 
by the available nitrogen supply. 
(2) Nearly all nitrogen is in the upper 7 inches of soil, 
and production will be at a minimum when 7 inches or 
1000 tons per acre of soil are lost. 
(3) Rate of decline of crop yields is a function of the loss 
of top soil and the decline in the amount of "stable" 
organic matter. 
(it) This "stable" organic matter breaks down at the rate of 
about one percent per year. 
(5) Under cropping systems where yields decline, these yields 
decline to a minimum, and this minimum yield is equal to 
five bushels of corn or five bushels of oats plus that 
amount of corn or oats produced by nitrogen added by the 
rotation and/or fertilizer. 
(6) For the Ifepier soils, there is no soil loss, or at least 
it is less than five tons per year. Actually, there may 
be additions of colluvium for this type of soil. 
I^bid. 
2 Vi/illiam D. Shrader. Ames, Iowa. Information on yields for the 
soils of Western Iowa. (Private communication.) 1953« 
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Figure 5 represents the yield behavior over time for a particular 
case. A.S an example, a rotation of CCOg on eroded Ida silt loam of 16 
percent slope and with no fertilizer or mechanical conservation practices 
is estimated by Aandahl, Allaway, and Riecken to yield 16 bushels of 
corn.^  Line AB is the minimum yield which the parent material would 
produce, assuming some nitrogen is added annually in rainfall. The 
rotation of CCO, with other factors the same, is estimated to yield 
10 bushels of corn by Aandahl, Allaway, and Riecken. The difference is 
attributed to the nitrogen added by the sweet clover or an amount equal 
to AC. The original yield of 16 bushels or OE diminishes because of 
soil loss and loss of organic matter until the minimum yield, CD, is 
reached. The formula used for determining the yield is 
I = a^  ar, ar^ , , ar9, 
where Y is yield, a is the original yield, and r is one minus the per­
centage loss of nitrogen annually. Thus, the yield in the first year 
is a, and the yield in the tenth year is ar?. 
In calculating the percentage loss of top soil per year, the annual 
soil loss was reduced by five tons per acre. This was based on Browning's 
assTimption that productivity could be maintained on loessial soils if the 
soil loss did not exceed $ tons per acre.2 That is, the productivity 
would be maintained if a certain minimum rotation were followed. Vfhere 
A^andahl, Allaway, and Riecken, op. cit. 
2 Browning, op. cit. 
70 
6 8 2 0 4 
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Figure 5. Yield pattern under assumptions made 
for estimating crop yields over time. 
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annual soil loss was less than 5 tons per acre, and the minimum rotation 
was followed, the original estimated yield was assumed constant, as EH 
in Figure 5* For the Ida and Monona soils, the minimum rotation was COMM, 
and for the Jfeipier silt loam, a rotation of COgCOM was assumed to main­
tain productivity. The yields of hay as estimated by Aaxidahl, Allaway 
and Riecken were assumed constant over time.^  
Basic yield estimates were available for only three types of 
conservation practices, teny other canbinations were desiredj the most 
common combinations being no practices with fertilizer, contouring with 
fertilizer, and contouring alone» Obviously, it vfould be beneficial to 
have estimates for many different fertilizer applications, but the num­
ber of calculations would be excessive. Therefore, the level suggested 
by Aandahl, Allaway and Riecken is the only level used.2 
For fertilizer and no mechanical practices, the original yield was 
obtained by adding the difference in yield from the addition of fertilizer 
to a terraced soil to the yield estimate for no practices. The yield for 
contourii^  was assumed equal to that for terracing, and, for contouring 
and fertilizer, it was assumed equal to that for terracing and fertili­
zer. Thus, the original yields were the same for different practices or 
combinations of practices, but the yield curve over time differed because 
of the differences in soil loss under the alternative erosion control 
practices. 
A^andahl, Allaway, and Riecken, op. cit. 
I^bid. 
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Although there are many difficulties attached to estimating yields, 
it is necessary to do this if a realistic measure of the value of con­
servation practices is to be obtained. To get more accurate estimates 
of yield trends, a great deal more experimental evidence must be gathered 
by the agronomists. It is important to know how quickly and to what level 
yields will increase if terraces or longer rotations are put on a soil 
after it has been seriously eroded and depleted. 
The estimates used in this study have many failings. They are not 
supported by adequate experimental evidence, in many cases. However, 
even though the absolute level of the yields may be in error, it is 
assumed that the direction of yield movements over time is correct. 
Also, as more reliable yield responses become available through agronomic 
research, corresponding adjustments, if indicated, may be made in the 
data used in this study. 
(c) Livestock and feed fed. The amount and kinds of livestock 
on the farms in 1952 were assumed to represent the typical program on 
the farm, unless the operator gave information to the contrary. Original 
plans had called for use of the input-output relationships in livestock 
production with respect to feed as obtained in the interview. However, 
in some cases, the stated amounts of feed fed were unreasonable and, 
therefore, unusable. The farmers were simply unable to supply accurate 
information on the amounts of feed fed. 
Thus, it was necessary to resort to averages of feed fed in experi­
ments and from farm record data in order to determine costs and returns 
from the livestock enterprises. An attempt was made to maintain the 
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feeding systems of each farmer as closely as possible, and an indication 
of the system of feeding followed was obtained from the feed fed portion 
of the schedule. Unfortunately, data from experiments do not always fit 
a particular situation perfectly, but the one system of feeding which 
most closely resembled the actual situation was used. 
Certain obvious difficulties arose, such as not knowing the pro­
ducing ability of the dairy cows on the farms. Further, it is likely 
that the milk cows on mar^  Western Iowa farms have a producing ability 
below that of cows used by colleges in experiments. Although there are 
errors associated with the method of averages, the errors should be less 
than if the estimates of the farmers had been used. 
Where the typical method of feeding and typical livestock numbers 
on a farm indicated that more feed was consumed than produced, it was 
assxuned that feed was purchased.^  Mary farmers prefer to keep live­
stock numbers in line with feed produced, and, unless it was definitely 
established that they intended to purchase hay and feed grains, live­
stock numbers were adjusted to the feed supply. 
It was assumed that the average egg production per hen was 200 
p 
eggs. The cockerels were assumed to be sold at a weight of 3 pounds, 
heavy hens at 6 pounds, medium hens at 5 pounds, and the light breed 
T^he feed requirements for the various classes of livestock are 
listed in the Appendix. 
T^hese assumptions of egg production, mortality rates, and rates of 
replacement used in this study are within the range which livestock 
specialists consider typical. 
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hens at It pounds. A mortality rate of 25 percent for laying hens and 
15 percent for baby chicks up to laying age was assumed.^  
A 5 percent death loss for feeder cattle and a 90 percent calf 
crop were assumed, and one-eighth of the beef cows and one-fifth of 
the dairy cows were replaced annually, 
A few substitutions among feeds were required. Tfhere silage was 
fed, 1 ton was substituted for 214? pounds of corn and 580 pounds of 
hay, and an additional Ih pounds of soybean oil meal was required for 
each ton of silage fed,^  Each 100 pounds of skimmilk fed to hogs 
substituted for 7.3 pounds of tankage and 10.9 pounds of corn.3 
Permanent bluegrass pasture was assumed to have a carrying capacity 
of 75 pasture days per acre per animal unit and rotation pasture a carrying 
capacity of 175 pasture days.^  Assuming an average hay yield of 2 tons 
per acre, 100 pasture days would be equivalent to 1.15 tons of hay. It 
was necessary to make this substitution because the yields of alfalfa-
brome were in tons, and feed requirements were in tons of hay and in 
pasture days. 
R^aymond R. Beneke. Estimated feed requirements. (Mmeographed 
data.) Iowa State College Department of Economics and Sociology. 
(n.d.). 
p 
F^rank B. Morrison. Feeds and feeding. Twenty-first edition. 
Ithaca, New York, The Morrison Publishing Company. 1950. p. 39h' 
I^bid., p. 589. 
'^ loma State College Staff. Midwest farm handbook. Second edition. 
Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Press. 1951- p. II42. 
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(d) Building and machinery costs. In determining normal repairs 
for machinery, the replacement cost was multiplied by various percentages 
depending on the type of machine.^  The machinery insurance was charged 
at a rate of .0025 times the replacement cost.^  Although all farmers do 
not insure machinery or buildings, the charge appears to be justified 
because they must stand the risk themselves if they do not insure against 
loss from fire, wind, and hail.^  
For buildings, annual repairs were calculated as .0103 times the 
replacement cost, and insurance at .OOI4 times the present value.^  
(e) Other costs and incone. The normal amount of fertilizer used 
was obtained by multiplying acreage to which the fertilizer was applied 
by the amount in the Aandahl, Allaway, and Riecken estimates.^  Seed 
purchased and custom v/ork hired, such as baling, were estimated according 
to the number of acres and amount of production. Other custom work, not 
dependent on crop production, was charged at the same rate as in 1952. 
ifer^ y expenses were assumed to be the same for the normal budget 
J^ay G. Porterfield and Roger Yoerger. The costs of using farm 
machinery. (Mimeographed report.) Iowa State College Department of 
Agricultural Engineering. 195l» p. 19» 
I^bid., p. 9. 
3 
•^ Although all calculations of value and costs for machinery and 
buildings are not listed in the Appendix, these can be found in the 
files of the Iowa State College Department of Economics and Sociology. 
J^. C. Wooley. Farm building studies in Northwest Missouri. 
Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 218. 193ij. 
p. 31. 
5 Aandahl, Allaway, and Riecken, op. cit. 
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as for 1952, These were, in addition to those already mentioned, weed 
and insect spray, gasoline, tractor license, taxes, and farm share of 
auto expense. The livestock enterprises included no charge for a bull, 
and $8.00 per cow was charged for breeding fees.^  
Annual fencing repairs were charged at a rate of $.75 per acre for 
cropland and $1.00 per acre for permanent pasture.^  Ifearly all of these 
other expenses were rather small, and inaccuracies would not greatly 
affect the results. However, the data presumably gave a more realistic 
picture than if the costs were simply ignored. 
To avoid the possibility of double accounting, interest was not 
charged on debts because interest on total investment was taken out 
later. Qovernment payments were omitted, but other income from machine 
work and refunds was taken directly from the 1952 data. 
Imputation of an amount for labor is a problem. There is no market 
price which can be fallen back upon as an estimate of the laborer's 
marginal value productivity. In this study, operator labor was imputed 
a value of $210 per month and other family labor $1S5 per month. 
I4. Measures of efficiency 
Net income and the residual to management or management return 
T^his is compared to $7*00 per ccw charged in the area around 
Council Bluffs, Iowa. However, this allows $1.00 per cow for extra 
services, beyond three, which might be required. 
Stoneberg, op. cit., pp. hS, 50. 
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•were used as measures of efficiency for the sample farms® Net inccme, 
as defined for this study, was the incone available for landlord, 
tenant, or owner-operator to meet his living expenses. That is, all 
expenses were deducted from gross income, with the exception of 
family labor and interest on investment. Since interest was not 
deducted, management return was the more plausible measure of efficiency. 
Where management returns, after the farming system revisions, were in­
creased, the revised farm plan was said to increase efficiency. Net 
income, as defined above, could be increased by the addition of capital, 
and the residual or return to management actually lowered. Therefore, 
management return was used in determining the value of the revised farm 
plans to tenants and landlords. 
5* Superimposing the owner systems to the tenant farms 
Where the lease appeared to hinder the tenant-operator from 
operating in a manner similar to the paired owner-operator, that portion 
of the farm plan which was affected was revised. For example, the land­
lord may have prevented the temnt from seeding a greater acreage of hay. 
In such a case, the rotations were changed to correspond to those of the 
owner-operat or. 
Where more forage was produced under the revised plan than under the 
present plan, livestock was added if needed to utilize the additional 
forage. The buildings on the farm and the preferences of the tenant were 
considered in altering the livestock enterprise. 
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When a rotation change or a change from up-and-down-hill cultivation 
to contouring and terracing is made, the effects on yield are not 
immediate. The greatest yield increase occurs after the first rotation, 
and the complete effect is not felt until about three rotations have 
elapsed. It was assumed that $0 percent of the effect occurred by the 
end of the first, 80 percent by the end of the second, and 100 percent 
by the end of the third rotation. Since meadow is the crop which adds 
to the nutrient supply, the last year of meadow in ai^ y rotation was 
taken as the end of that rotation. The effect of added fertilizer was 
assmed to be immediate, i.e., increased the yield during the year 
of application. 
In all cases, the assumption was made that the revised farm plans 
could be carried out without additional labor. However, a more intensive 
utilization of operator labor might be required. 
Costs of seed, baling, fertilizer, and feed purchased were 
different under the revised and the present plan. The income from 
livestock increased in the two cases where livestock systems were revised, 
and income from crops sold changed on each farm. 
The shift to new rotations was made in such a way as to cause a 
minimum disruption of the cropping plan. The old rotation was maintained 
until the oats was planted. The 2egume was sown with the oats, and the 
new rotation was in effect from that point on. 
Although farmers would presumably store hay and grain from one year 
to the next, annual income was calculated on an accrual basis. Hay, corn, 
and oats were treated as being purchased or sold each year, depending on 
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the yield of the crops. Since the acreage of these crops varied from 
year to year, the net incomes and management returns fluctuated con­
siderably. The years with the greater corn acreages showed a relatively 
larger income than the years with more acres in oats because of the 
relatively higher yields and higher price of corn. 
The differences in management returns between the revised and 
present farm plans over the ten year period were discounted at a rate 
of 5 percent, and the sum of the discounted differences was assuraed to 
be the present value of the revised farm plan for the ten year period. 
6. Farm value changes 
An integral part of the worth of a change in land utilization is 
the effect of such change on the value of the farm. The present value 
of the change in value of the farm at the end of the ten year period 
represents a real income to the landlord with a long-term interest in 
the farm.^  That this clxange in value is difficult to ascertain is 
widely recognized. Murray states! 
The change in soil productivity which accompanies erosion 
ranks as one of the most difficult for the appraiser to 
evaluate. If it were necessary to estimate only the present 
producing power of the soil the task would be relatively easy. 
But in most cases the buyer or lender on farm security wants 
to estimate future as well as present yields, and any factor 
Many other studies pertaining to the value of erosion control 
practices have failed to consider sufficiently this effect of change in 
farm value, e.g.. Earl 0. Heady and Harald R. Jensen. The economics of 
crop rotations and land use. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
Research Bulletin 383. 1951. 
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such as erosion which may cause yields to decline must have 
an important place in the valuation. 
Assuming that it v/ould be economic, at some point in time, to con­
serve or maintain soil productivity, Bunce defines land value as the 
2 
capitalized rents plus the value of the gains from exploitation. In 
order to estimate farm value, a rotation system must be assumed. In 
doing this, it is virtually impossible to separate the value of 
management from the value of the land. As has been indicated above, 
yields may increase, decrease, or remain constant, depending on the 
farming system followed. If land is the residual claimant, land rent 
and farm value would differ under alternative farming systems. One 
cannot ascertain what portion of the increase in productivity is due to 
management and what portion to increased soil fertility. 
Even if one assumed that all change in productivity were due to 
the land factor, land appraisal presents other complications. If the 
landlord's net retvirn after a return for management has been deducted, 
is assumed to represent the economic rent to land, the leasing provisions 
actually are capitalized into land value. 
In this study, an estimate of value change was made for the four 
farms where farming systems were altered. In the strictest sense, the 
estimated value change was the value of the revised farm plan to the land-
William G. Murray. Farm appraisal. Secorxi edition. Ames, Iowa, 
Iowa State Colleg© Press. 1950. p. 58. 
2 
Arthur C. Bunce. Economics of soil conservation. Ames, Iowa, 
Iowa State College Press. 19i|2. p. 86. 
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lord at the end of the ten year period under study if lease provisions 
remained as they were, and the present farming system was again resorted 
to at the end of this ten year period. 
In Figure 6, the curve AF represents the yield of corn or oats if 
the present farming system were maintained, and curve ABD represents 
yield under the revised farm plan. At the end of ten years, the yield 
per acre under the revised system would exceed that which would have 
resulted if the present system were continued by an amount BC. But 
the income or rent to the landlord might not be increased because there 
might be a smaller acreage in corn each year under the revised plan. 
Lease provisions, as well as yield, determine the net income to the 
landlord. If the difference in net income were capitalized, the value 
change might be negative, but the value to a potential owner-operator 
might be considerably enhanced. Assuming that lease provisions could 
be altered to improve the income of both landlord and tenant under the 
revised plan, another problem arises. 
Within the area of possible compensation which landlord or tenant 
could pay under the revised plan and be equally as well off as under the 
present farming system, there is an infinite number of alternative lease 
changes and alternative compensation payments which could be made. 
Unless the lease arrangement which would be acceptable to landlord and 
tenant is known, use of income under the two plans as a measure of farm 
value is impossible. 
The method used in this study assumed that the revised plan could 
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Figure 6. Effect of farming system on 
yield and farm value. 
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the present lease provisions. The present value of this change in farm 
value plus the present value of the change in landlord income is the 
value to the landlord if no change in lease provisions were possible. 
The method used in appraising farm value changes did not account for 
total soil deterioration by gullying. In the 20 year period used for 
estimating yields, gullies of considerable magnitude could form and re­
move acres from cultivation. This^  of course, would have a definite 
effect on future farm value. 
A ten year period, beyond the original ten years, was assumed to 
be long enough to estimate the major portion of the change in value. 
Starting at either B or C in Figure 6, the yields approach the same 
minimum yields, and they would be near the minimum after ten years. 
Further, change in farm value is the sum of discounted changes in net 
income, and discounting greatly decreases the incomes from distant years. 
Thus, the value change estimated for the four farms studied corresponds 
to the discounted value of the cross-hatched area BEFC in Figure 6. 
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IV. EFFECTS OF THE ALTERMTIVE FARMIMi SISTEIS 
Fariss are like fingerprints or snowflakesj no two are alike. 
Although the farms in this study were paired so that they would be 
similar, there are important differences. Because of these differences 
in managerial preferences and abilities, in total capital inputs, and 
in the soil resources between paired owner- and tenant-operated farms, 
inter-farm comparisons must be made with care. 
A. Incanes under the Present Farming Systems 
The data obtained by interview for the sample farms are summarized 
in Table I4. Cattle prices used for estimating these incomes were not 
the prices in 1952 but those prices expressing a normal margin between 
feeder and fat cattle. Prices for cattle fell rapidly in 1952, and the 
incomes estimated in the table may be higher than the actual 1952 
incomes for those farms on which cattle were purchased and fed. 
It is interesting to note that in 1952 the tenant farms had a 
lower average cost per dollar of output than the paired owner farms. 
The one exception is Farm I-b. On this 160 acre farm, an eighteen-
year-old son works on the farm 12 months and a fifteen-year-old son 
worked during the summer months. Thus, |l48ii5 was imputed to family 
labor, compared to $2520 on farms with only operator labor. This 
relatively high average cost and low managerial return on this farm 
is probably a result of placing too high a value on the labor resource. 
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since the size of farm operations appears to be no larger than that of 
Farm I-a or Farm I-c. 
Vifith the exception of tenant-operated farms I-d and IV-b, the two 
success farms, the tenant farms utilized a more exploitive system of 
Table Gross income, net income, management return, and average 
















(acres) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
I-a I6h 250 12678 6155 776 .9k 
I-b 160 165 102[tl 6859 183 .98 
I-c 160 150 10769 6662 2W4I4 .77 
I-d li40 200 30676 127i4l 7630 .75 
Il-a 120 300 8720 I4669 U 1.00 
Il-b 120 125 5821 U0I43 527 .91 
Ill-a 120 175 11389 6208 1906 .83 
Ill-b 121 150 m966 7635 3388 .77 
IV-a 2li5 175 149801 15656 87146 .82 
IV-b 2iiO 175 15281 9781 3313 .78 
•^Average cost per dollar of gross product. 
rotations than did the paired owner-operator farms (Table 5)« Because 
of the greater acreages in corn and oats and fewer erosion control 
practices on the four tenant farms having lease difficulties, these farms 
had relatively high net incomes in 1952, an excellent year for corn in 
Western Iowa. This fact would seem to explain partially the relative 
advantage of the tenant farms in terms of average cost. The 1952 incomes 
seem to be, in part at least, an exploitation of future production on 
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Table Land in corn, oats, meadow, and permanent pasture for 
present and revised farm plans. 
Farm 
Plan^  
Total Permanent Total 
number land^  Corn Oats Meadow pasture forage'^  
(acres) (acres) (acres) (acres) (acres) (acres) 
I-a present 155 i49.2 38.3 35.5 32.0 67.5 
I-b present 156 56.8 56.7 II4.5 28.0 142.5 
I-b revised 156 37.0 143.6 28.0 71.6 
I-c present 153 6h. l  57.3 13.0 18.0 31.0 
I-c revised 153 ti8.3 36.9 I49.8 18.0 67.8 
I-d present 131 It6.2 I42.9 I4I.9 I4I.9 
II-a present 113 145.9 36.5 6.6 2k.0 30.6 
Il-b present 110 53.9 38.5 10.6 7.0 17.6 
Il-b revised 110 h9.9 3i4.5 18.6 7.0 25.6 
Ill-a present 115 35.i4 35.14 I4I4.2 I4I4.2 
Ill-b present 119 27.7 1 7 . 7  20.6 53.0 73.6 
Ill-b revised 119 33.0 16.5 16.5 53.0 69.5 
I¥-a present 229 98.0 6I4.2 I45.8 21.0 66.6 
IV-b present 221 128.9 614.5 9.6 18.0 27.6 
T^here are revised plans only for the four tenant farms where lease 
difficulties were expressed. 
E^xcludes land in buildings and waste land. 
'^ Sum of acres in meadow and permanent pasture. 
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these four farms. That is, the average cost figures do not take into 
account the changes in inventory of the land resource. Other factors 
which have relevance to the results in Table Ij are brought out below 
in comparing the farms within groups. 
Farms in Group I 
Each of the farms in this group contains about 160 acres. A more 
complete description of the groups and the individual farms is in 
Chapter III. The net inccanes and management returns for the owner-
operator farm, I-a, and for the success, tenant-operated farm, I-d, 
are considerably higher over the ten year period than the net incomes 
and management returns for the tenant farms, I-b and I-c (Figure 7). 
Farm I-d employs a greater amount of capital, in the form of feeder 
cattle, than do the other three farms, arxi this partially explains the 
high net income. Capital is imputed 5 percent of its value annually. 
The marginal productivity of investment in feeder cattle may be greater 
than 5 percent and would explain some of the difference in management 
returns between Farm I-d and Farm I-a. 
Although the sample farms were not actually appraised, the values 
estimated by the operators and owners are interesting. There appears 
to be some evidence of greater farm value for the success, tenant-
operated farms and the owner-operated farms. The buildings on these 
farms are in better condition, and the land is apparently more pro­
ductive, largely because of erosion control practices followed on these 
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Figure ?. Net farm incomes and management 
returns for farms in Group I. 
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types and slopes of Farm I-b, Farm I-c, and Farm I-a, but the depleted 
condition of I-b and I-c has apparently caused the owners and tenants to 
place a lower value on their farms. 
An important- fact to note from Figure 7 is the trend of net incomes 
and management returns over the ten year period. Because of the income 
fluctuations corresponding to highs and lows in corn acreage, this trend 
is often difficult to ascertain in this figure and others which follow. 
Looking at Figure 7, a definite downward trend can be perceived for I-b 
and I-c, while no such trend is evident for the owner-operator farm and 
the farm operated by the success tenant. Declining income is, of course, 
characteristic of farming systems similar to those employed on the two 
tenant farms, I-b and I-c. 
2. Farms in Group II 
Neither Farm Il-a, the owner-operated farm, nor Farm Il-b, the 
tenant-operated farm, employ a large quantity of capital, and the 
management returns are low on both farms. Although the particular 
rotations followed result in an exceedingly unstable income pattern, 
Figure 8 would indicate that the incomes on both farms decline over 
time—to a slightly greater degree on Farm Il-b than on Farm Il-a. Both 
farms are small, in acreage and in capital employed, and the operators 
must utilize a relatively large percentage of the land for corn in 
order to meet annual living expenses (Table 5)« This is especially 
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Figure 8. Net farm incomes and management returns 
for farms in Group II. 
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The operator of Farm Il-a, by utilizing grass waterways and con-
touring^  is controlling erosion to the extent that the soil loss is 
only about 7.3 tons per acre. Little meadow is included in the rotation^  
an average of 6.6 acres, and no commercial fertilizer is employed. For 
these reasons, the soil fertility is being depleted and yields are 
slowly declining. 
In contrast, Farm Il-b does not employ contouring, other than a 
make-shift job on corn, no commercial fertilizer is applied, and only 
10.6 acres of the cropland are in meadow annually. The soil loss is 
about ho.6 tons per acre, and yields will presumably decline at a more 
rapid rate than yields on Farm Il-a. 
3. Farms in Group III 
The farms in this group have similar net incomes and management 
returns (Figure 9). The trend in income is again difficult to perceive 
because of year to year fluctuations. But, yields and income on Farm 
Ill-a are more nearly maintained over the ten year period than are the 
income and yields on Farm Ill-b. No erosion control practices are 
followed on the latter, whereas the former utilizes a plan involving 
terraces and grass watenways. 
The somewhat greater net income and management return on the tenant 
farm might be explained by the greater amount of purchased feed. An 
average of |3609 is spent for purchased hay and grain, while the owner-
operated farm is nearly self-sufficient with respect to feed, buying 
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Figure 9. Net farm inccsnes and management 
returns for farms in Group III. 
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income and management return is partly a function of this added feed 
which is processed through the livestock. 
It. Farms in Group IV 
Although the soil loss is relatively low on Farm IV-b, about 6.5 
tons per acre, a large proportion of the land is in corn and very little 
in meadow. The soil loss is about 6.6 tons per acre on P'arm IV-a, but 
a much larger acreage is in hay and pasture (Table $), with the result 
that yields and income on Farm IV-b do decline relatively more over the 
ten year period. Both farms employ terraces and grass waterways in 
controlling erosion. As is the case in other groups, the two farms are 
comparable in acreage, but Farm IV-a, the owner-operated farm, utilizes 
more capital in the form of a heavier feeding program, and, as a result, 
has a higher net incorie and return to management. 
As can be seen in Figure 10, the net incomes and residual incomes 
or management returns on these two farms are at a high level compared 
to other farms in this study. Both operators appear to be utilizing 
their resources in a relatively efficient manner. 
B. Incomes under the Revised Farming Systems 
Estimating the income effect over time of two different systems of 
farming on the same farm would appear to be a valid method of comparing 
the efficacy of the alternative systems. As explained in Chapter III, 















1952 1954 1956 1968 I960 1962 
Figure 10. Net farm incomes and management 
returns for farms in Group IV. 
barrier to such changes. The revised plans for each of the four tenant 
farms on which revisions were made are similar to those of the paired, 
owner-operator farms; they are not identical. For example, those 
differences which appeared to be due to dissimilar managerial preferences, 
livestock feeding systems, or capital positions were not altered. 
1. Farm I-b 
The revised plan for Farm I-b includes a shift to 29.1 additional 
acres in forage and a corresponding decrease in corn and oats (Table ^ ). 
Under this plan, all field operations are to be performed on the 
contour, and the annual amount of fertilizer employed is increased from 
I1I48 to $162. Corn is planted on the contour at present, but oats is 
not* With the present plan, there is a shortage of forage, as indicated 
by the fact that the tenant was forced to rent additional pasture for 
six cows and four calves during 1952. 
The tenant's livestock preference is beef cattle, and, for this 
reason, five head of beef cows are added to utilize the additional forage 
produced under the revised farm plan. The calves, other than those 
needed for replacement stock, are assumed to be fed to a weight of 1000 
pounds and a grade of good. That is, the feeding system of the present 
plan is maintained; only the number of cattle is varied. Buildings are 
adequate for the livestock under the revised plan, and no additional 
investment in land improvements is required of the landlord. 
There should be little difference in the per acre cost of field 
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operations between a plan in which contouring is employed and one in 
which up-and-down-hill cultivation is used. Engene and Anderson showed 
that labor requirements increase about 2 percent with use of erosion 
control measures.^  Since labor requirements are not affected significant­
ly and since there appears to be a saving of about 10 percent on power 
and fuel where contouring is practiced,^  the assumption of no added cost 
for labor and machinery Y/ith a shift to an erosion control farming system 
appears to be justified. 
The additional livestock in the revised plan would require an added 
32 tons of forage (hay and pasture) after the first year. During the 
first year of the transition, the additional feed required is less because 
the calves from the five cows need little hay or forage. According to 
estimated feed requirements, the livestock in the revised plan would 
utilize the average amount of forage grovjn with the exception of about 
It tons. 
During the first year or transition year for the livestock enter­
prise, additional costs and income are less than after the system is 
established. Feed costs are less, arri. there is a smaller added investment 
in cattle. Income is also less; the only income is the increase in 
S^. A, Engene and A. W. Anderson. Effect of an erosion control 
program on labor and power requirements. University of Minnesota 
Agricultural Extension Service Bulletin 396. 191+7. P« lh» 
2 
G. M. Browning, R. A. Norton, A. G. McCall, and F. G. Bell, 
Investigation in erosion control and the reclamation of eroded land 
at the Missouri Valley Loess Conservation Experiment Station, Glarinda, 
Iowa, I93I-U2. U. S. Department of Agriculture Technical Bulletin 
959. 191+8. p. $8. 
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inventory plus sale of one-eighth of the additional beef cows. In this 
transition year, interest on investment is $5$ and livestock income is 
$$37' The changes in cost and income after the transition year are shown 
in Table 6, with the exception of changes in net income which are related 
Table 6. Annual changes in income and cost for revised farm plan. 
Farm I-b.®-
Item Tenant Landlord 
(dollars) (dollars) 
Beef cows sold 87 
Feeder cattle sold 895 
Total livestock income 982 
Interest on investment 122 
Fertilizer 7 7 
Seed corn -15 - —  
Seed oats -132 — 
Alfalfa seed - —  51 
Sweet clover seed - - - -37 
Breeding fees 1^ 0 
22 
—— 
Total cost 21 
Change in income 960 -21 
•^Does not include annual changes in income and cost which are 
associated with annual crop yield, acreage, and cash rent shifts. 
to total annual crop production and cash rent paid for hay and pasture.^  
The yields of grain and forage and cash rents under the two farm plans 
are given in the Appendix for the four tenant farms where revised plans 
In the process of budgeting, some simplifying procedures were used. 
The items in Table 6 were assumed constant for each year of the ten year 
period in order to facilitate computations. Fertilizer and seed actually 
do vary with the rotation, but these costs are a small portion of total 
costs. Since they are such a minor factor in net income determination, 
this should not greatly affect the results. 
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were used. 
In the first year of the revised plan, 6 bushels of corn and 16.5 
tons of hay more than under the present plan are needed. After this 
first, transitional year, an additional 32 tons of hay and 123 bushels 
of corn are consumed annually as compared with present feed consumption. 
A comparison of net incomes under the two plans is shown in Figure 
11. The trend in income under the revised plan is somewhat obscured by 
the year-to-year fluctuations in net income, especially for the landlord, 
but it can be seen that average income under the i-evised plan is in­
creased and that this income appears to be maintained over a period of 
years. 
As shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12, the tenant gains relatively 
more than the landlord in the change to the revised farm plan,^  i.e., 
using the present lease provisions. Under present lease provisions, the 
landlord receives one-half of the corn, two-fifths of the oats, $176 cash 
rent for the permanent pasture, and |8 per acre for the acres in hay. 
Seed corn and oats are furnished by the tenant, the landlord furnishes 
grass seed, and fertilizer costs are shared equally by tenant and 
landlord. 
Using the procedure described in Chapter III for estimating change 
in the value of the farm, the present value of this change at the end of 
the ten year period is 1378 (Table 7)» The effect of any change in farm 
A^n explanation for this advantage to the tenant and alternative 
lease changes which might make a shift to the revised plan possible are 
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present and revised farm plans with present 
lease provisions. Farm I-b. 
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value is, of course, a cost or return to the landlord. 
Since the income fluctuations due to rotation effects make it 
difficult to ascertain the degree to which the tenant and landlord do 
benefit from a shift to the revised plan, it is probably more enlighten­
ing to examine the dollar differences between the two plans. In Table 8, 
Table ?• Estimated effect of revised farm plan on value 






of change^  
Total Per acre Total 
(dollars} (dollars) (dollars) 
I-b 632 3.95 378 
I-c 31406 21.29 2039 
Il-b 1052 8.77 630 
Ill-b 652 5.39 390 
E^stimated change in discounted (at 5 percent) future returns 
at end of ten year period. 
Discounted at a rate of 5 percent. 
the present value of the revised plan is shown for the farm, the tenant, 
and the landlord. The tenant on Farm I-b receives a major portion of the 
additional income, and the landlord receives only a small increase in 
income over the ten years. When the change in farm value is included, 
the landlord benefits from the revised plan by |8ll. 
In all of these cases, a certain amount (ccanpensation) can be paid 
or received by the tenant or landlord which will leave him with the same 
income he has under the present plan and will, at the same time improve 
102 
Table 8. Present value of the revised farm plan with present lease 
provisions for the farm, tenant, and landlord for a ten year period.®' 
Present value 
number Farra*^  Farm'^  Tenant Landlord^  Landlord*^  
(dollars) (dollars} (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
I-b 3635 I4OI3 3202 h33. 811 
I-c 5628 7667 6625 -997d I0li2 
Il-b 2ii59 3089 lii77 982 1612 
Ill-b 2I4I3 2803 1613 800 1190 
discounted at a rate of 5 percent. 
E^xcludes the present value of the estimated change in farm value. 
"^ Includes the present value of the estimated change in farm value. 
J 
The present value of the landlord's income under the revised plan 
is less than under the present plan. 
Table 9. Estimated annual compensation which landlord and tenant 
could pay under the revised plan and maintain the same income 




Landlord"^  Landlord*^  Tenant 
(dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
I-b 101 399 
I-c -1214^  130 825 
Il-b 122 201 1814 
Ill-b 100 II48 201 
T^his is actually an annuity whose present value is the present 
value of the revised plan to the larxilord and tenant. 
E^xcludes effect of change in value of the farm. 
Includes compensation which could be paid because of increase in 
farm value. 
d, 
A negative value means that compensation is required by the indi­
vidual if he is to be as well off as under the present plan, whereas a 
positive value means that compensation could be paid. 
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the income of the other party in the lease (Table 9). This is possible 
because the present value of the revised plan is positive on all four 
farms. On Farm I-b, for example, the tenant could affoi'd to pay the 
landlord any amount up to |399 per year and be as well off as he is 
under the present farm plan. The landlord could pay up to per year, 
unless the change in farm value is included, if he is to maintain his 
present income position. One might conclude that the revised plan on 
Farm I-b provides relatively less incentive for the landlord, as can-
pared with the tenant, to make such a shift unless lease provisions are 
altered. However, in absolute terms, the landlord, as well as the tenant, 
experiences increased income, measured in terras of present value of 
expected future income and land value changes. 
2. Farm I-c 
The revised plan for Farm I-c involves the greatest change, both 
in the croppir^  and the livestock enterprises, of any of the four 
revised plans. Little forage is produced under the present plan, and 
all field operations are performed up-and-down-hill. Under the revised 
plan, it is assumed that all fields are contoured, the annual fertilizer 
input is increased from $78 to $120, and the cropping system is altered 
to include 67.8 acres of forage, compared to 31.0 acres with the present 
plan (Table $). 
No additional capital investment is required of the landlord, but 
five milk cows and five beef cows are added by the tenant in order to 
lOli 
utilize the greater forage production under the revised plan. In other 
words, it is necessary for the tenant to make an initial capital invest­
ment of II8J4O, using the prices in the Appendix. Buildings and facilities 
are adequate for the increased livestock numbers of the revised plan. 
Table 10. Annual changes in income and cost for revised farm plan. 
Farm I-c.^  
Item Tenant Landlord 
(dollars) (dollars) 
Beef and milk cows sold 2iili 
Feeder cattle sold 1701 
Butterfat sold k2h 
Total livestock income 2369 — 
Interest on investment 287 
Fertilizer 21 21 
Seed corn -ih -II4 
Seed oats -137 
Alfalfa seed 66 
Sweet clover seed -h2 
Custom work 261 — 
Supplemental feed purchased 149 — 
Veterinary costs 22 — 
Breeding fees 80 — 
Total cost 569 31 
Change in income 1800 
-31 
•^Does not include annual changes in income and cost which are 
associated with annual crop yield, acreage, and cash rent shifts. 
The differences in income and cost between the two plans are shown 
in Table 10, except for those changes which vary from year to year with 
shifts in crop acreages. These crop production and cost data are in the 
Appendix. During the transitional year for the livestock enterprise, 
222 bushels less of corn and 2$ tons less of hay are needed than after 
10$ 
the new livestock system is fully under way. Interest on investment is 
less by $136, and livestock income is only $13i43 during this transitional 
year. 
The landlord on Farm I-c absorbs a sizeable decrease in income during 
the second and third year of the revised plan (Figure 13 and Figure II4). 
After these first years, the landlord's income remains at about the same 
level as under the present plan. The tenant on Farm I-c receives more 
than the total increased farm income due to the farming system revision 
(Table 8). 
A large factor on this farm is the change in farm value associated 
with the two farming systems. The estimated change in farm value for 
this farm amounts to over $21 per acre or a present value of $2039 for 
the entire farm (Table 7). Vfhen this increased farm value is considered, 
the landlord does gain by a shift in farm plans, but the pattern of 
income is such that a loss must be absorbed for the first years after 
the revision. 
The management returns for tenant and landlord reverse position 
canpletely under the two plans (Figure lii). Whereas the landlord 
receives the greater income residual with the present plan, the tenant 
management return is higher with the revised plan. 
The landlord receives one-half of the corn and two-fifths of the 
oats under the present lease. Cash rent for hay and pasture is a maxi­
mum of $15 per acre, depending on the hay yield. For this study, the 
maximum amount of $15 per acre was used as cash rent for the acres in 
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farms on which cash rent is charged^  ^and the landlord for Farm I-c 
receives the greatest decrease in income (excluding the effect of farm 
value change) with the revised farm plan (Table 8). 
Why does this situation exist? A comparison of the crop acreage 
shifts of Farm I-b and Farm I-c adds some insight into the cause (Table 
5). In the short-run at least, corn returns the highest income of the 
principle cornbelt crops to the landlord. Oats yields are lower than 
those of corn in Western Iowa, and the price is about one-half that of 
corn. Therefore, if shifts to more meadow in the rotation are at the 
expense of corn acreage rather than oats, the short-run effect is to 
decrease landlord income to a greater extent than if oats acreage were 
to be reduced relatively more than corn. For example, the forage 
acreage on I-b is increased about 29 acres and on I-c by about 36 acres. 
But, on I-b, average corn acreage is reduced only 9 acres canpared to 
over 16 acres on I-c. The revised plan for Farm I-c increases the 
acreage of forage by 7 acres more than I-b, and the additional acreage 
is compensated for by a reduction in corn. 
If a landlord receives |28 per acre return from corn (for example, 
one-half of ijO bushels at ll.hO per bushel), he loses income in the 
short-run where cash rent for meadow is less than this amount. Further, 
landlord costs are slightly greater for hay under lease provisions where 
the landlord pays for all legume seed but only one-half of the seed corn. 
Oats, on the other hand, may return only about $10 per acre (for example, 
F^arm Ill-b has a stock-share lease, and no cash rent is paid. 
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two-fifths of 30 bushels per acre at $.82 per bushel), and acreage shifts 
to meadow at the expense of oats do not decrease landlord income to a 
great extent. 
Although the landlord on Farm I-c does receive a higher cash rent 
per acre, the greater decrease in corn acreage, relative to Farm I-b, is 
an important factor in the low value of the revised plan for Farm I-c. 
However, on Farm I-c, the long-run effects of the increased hay acreage 
and the use of contouring have an effect on the estimated change in 
farm value which exceeds that of the other three farms by $12 per acre 
or more. 
Unless change in farm value is included, the landlord for I-c must 
receive an annual compensation of fl2ii if he would be equally as well 
off with the revised and the present plans (Table 9). Again, the land­
lord (especially if he has a short planning horizon) on this farm has 
little incentive to put such a revised cropping system into effect. 
3. Farm Il-b 
The revised plan for this farm does not include major changes. 
Acreage in legumes is increased by 8 acres, all field operations are to 
be performed on the contour, in contrast to the present system of up-
and-down-hill cultivation, and no fertilizer is used. Hay yield with 
such a system is low because no fertilizer is added. Using the present 
farm plan and the livestock program which the tenant said he had, about 
18 tons of hay would need to be purchased annually, filth the additional 
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hay production under the revised plan, it is still necessary to purchase 
about 8 tons of hay each year. For this reason, the livestock enter­
prise is not altered; the income effects of this plan are solely due to 
the increased forage acreage and the adoption of contouring. 
No further capital expenditure is needed for the revised plan. Yifith 
such slight changes, one would expect the effects to be minor. The trend 
of income, although downward for both plans, does not decrease to as 
great an extent under the revised plan (Figures 15 and 16). Since there 
are at least two hills on this farm v/hich would require terracing if 
gullies are to be avoided and if yields are to be maintained, income will 
fall over time if no further erosion control practices are employed than 
are used in the revised farm plan. 
The cost changes for this farming system, other th&n those associated 
with the rotation shift (Appendix), are negligible (Table 11). In only 
one year, the third, does either tenant or landlord receive a smaller 
income with the revised plan than with the present farming system, and 
the plan revision has a positive value for both parties for the ten year 
period (Table 8), i.e., using the present lease provisions. 
The production of corn and oats and the costs of seed corn are 
shared equally by the tenant and the landlord, the tenant furnishes the 
seed oats, and all grass seed is furnished by the tenant under the present 
lease. The cash rent charge is $5 per acre and has not been changed for 
13 years. 
It is estimated that farm value will be increased by $8.77 per acre, 
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revised plan (Table 7). IJhen the increased value of the farm and the 
greater farm income are considered, there appears to be little reason 
for any objection to such a minor alteration in the farm plan, i.e., 
from the standpoint of the lease itself. 
Table 11. Annual changes in cost for revised farm plan. Farm Il-b.^  







Alfalfa seed 10 
Sweet clover seed 
-7 
Brome seed 7 
Custom work 3h 
Total cost h 7 
®"Does not include annual changes in income and cost which are 
associated with annual crop yield, acreage, and cash rent shifts. 
h' Farm Ill-b 
This is the farm which has a stock-share lease and is operated by 
the son-in-law of the landlord. Only the rotation and the erosion control 
practices employed are changed in the revised plan. Because of the large 
acreage in permanent pasture on this farm (53 acres), it is not possible 
to adjust the rotation to make it correspond exactly with that of Farm 
Ill-a. 
The revised plan includes addition of [46,187 feet of terraces or a 
capital investment of $1155, and the use of fertilizer is approximately 
doubled (Table 12). Since grain and hay are purchased under the present 
lib 
plan, no livestock is added. Further, this farm already has a greater 
investment in livestock than Farm Ill-a, and, although Grade A milk is 
sold on Farm Ill-a, it is not possible to convert to this practice on the 
tenant farm because no market exists as yet in the area. The income 
Table 12. Annual changes in cost for revised farm plan. Farm Ill-b.®' 
Item Tenant Larxilord 
" (dollars) (dollars) 
Interest on investment 58 
Fertilizer h$ 
Seed corn 5 5 
Seed oats -li -ii 
Alfalfa seed -Ij 
Custom work -6 
Total cost I4O 100 
3l Does not include annual changes in income and cost which are 
associated with annual crop yield, acreagd^  and cash rent shifts. 
increase from this revised plan is, thus, due to the addition of terraces 
and the shift in rotations (Appendix). Under the revised plan, corn 
acreage is increased by about 5 acres, hay acreage is decreased by about 
6 acres, and oats acreage is smaller by an acre (Table 5)« 
This stock-share lease contains provisions which might tend to 
promote disharraorQr between any tenant and landlord using similar pro­
visions. All of the cream receipts go to the tenant, and the dairy 
calves are divided equally. In turn, the tenant pays for all supplemen­
tal feed for the dairy cattle, and the skim milk is fed to hogs, from 
which the returns are shared. Also, the poultry proceeds belong to the 
11^ 
tenant, who pays for all purchased feed. All feed costs for the feeder 
cattle enterprise are equally shared, as are the returns:. Such a 
complicated system of sharing costs and returns tends to favor the 
tenant in the dairy enterprise and the owner in the hog and cattle 
enterprises. Thus, the tenant and landlord on Farm Ill-b tend to 
promote the particular enterprise which gives them a relative income 
advantage. 
The income under the revised plan is greater than that of the 
present plan and does not exhibit the same downward trend of income as 
under the present plan. Both the landlord and the tenant share the 
additional net inccme equally because a stock-share lease is used 
(Figure 17). However, a greater proportion of the increase in manage­
ment return (Figure 18) is received by the tenant. This is due to the 
fact that the landlord makes the additional capital investment, while 
there is no alteration in sharing of returns. 
When the es.timated value change is included, both the landlord and 
tenant gain and could afford to compensate the other in order to put the 
plan into operation (Table 9). Therefore, the lease provisions them­
selves do not appear to hinder an adjustment such as in the revised 
farm plan, at least at first glance. 
C. Lease Changes Which Could Permit Shifts to the Revised Farm Plans 
Before analyzing the four cases further, a discussion of possible 
remedial lease changes which could bring about shifts to farming systems 
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higher income over time to both landlord and tenant is in order. Although, 
as previously discussed, results of this case study are not generally 
applicable to all other rental situations, they can apply to cases 
similar to those studied. 
Keeping in mind the basic requirements of efficient leases (as 
expressed in Chapter I), there are several alternative lease changes 
which may be made to permit a shift to more efficient farming systems. 
These changes can be for specific provisions within a particular lease 
type, or the type of lease itself can be changed.^  
1. Lease-type changes 
Shifting to an alternative lease arrangement may have an ameliorative 
effect in some instances. But, to shift from a crop-share to a stock-
share or cash lease does not autanatically assure efficient operation. 
The new lease arrangement must possess the attributes which enable tenant 
and landlord to farm in a manner canparable to similar owner-operators. 
The cash lease has the advantage of aligning costs and incomes with­
in a lease period, but inter-temporal obstacle elements may exist with 
this type of lease as with the share lease. Further, the fixed rent and 
the resulting weather and price risk under the typical cash rental 
arrangement acts as a deterrent to more widespread acceptance of it. Use 
of flexible (for yield and price variations) cash rent arrangements will 
S^ee Chryst, op. cit., for an analysis of why and how these changes 
were made by tenants and landlords in a sample of rented Iowa farms. 
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reduce the risk associated ^ vith this form of rental and may tend to in-
1 
crease its use. 
A shift from a crop-share to a stock-share lease may be warranted 
in many instances where a landlord has adequate capital to invest in 
livestock and where the tenant might be incapable of purchasing additional 
livestock. The problem of corn left in the field after picking can cause 
serious disagreements between tenants and landlords unless pre-arranged 
2 provisions are made. However, this down corn presents fewer problems 
where the livestock which utilize this corn are jointly owned and the 
proceeds shared. 
fiThere a large amount of additional capital investment in livestock 
is required, in order to utilize the additional forage produced with 
charges in rotations similar to those on Farm I-b and Farm I-c, a change 
from a crop-share to a stock-share lease could permit the landlord to 
make the added investment in livestock and receive the benefit from the 
productivity of these livestock inputs as well as the change in rotations. 
On Farm I-c, e.g., the hog enterprise could be doubled without the 
necessity of purchasing feed grain. Thus, use of a stock-share lease 
can provide a means whereby an initial farm unit, which may be small in 
terms of acres, may be so intensively operated that labor, machinery, and 
managerial skills can be more efficiently utilized. 
I^bid., pp. 139-li47. 
2 Suggestions have been made by I. W. Arthur and John F. Timmons. 
Keep leases up with new farming methods. Iowa Farm Science. 5s 115^  116. 
1951. p. 116. 
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landlords and tenants do not possess the managerial preferences 
and abilities necessary for handling livestock and, for this reason, 
should not look to this type of lease as a solution to their problems. 
Further, a tenant under a stock-share lease will not push livestock 
production to the same point as an owner-operator unless the inputs of 
the landlord and the tenant are shared in proportion to the returns. 
For example, a lease may be set up so that tenant and landlord provide 
one-half of the stock and receive one-half of the proceeds. This may 
equilibrate total income and costs at the time. But, when additional 
livestock is purchased, the tenant would be supplying the greater input 
because of his labor, i.e«, if tenant and landlord share equally the cost 
of the livestock. Although a tenant may not find it necessary to hire 
added labor in order to increase livestock production, the amount of his 
own labor which he is willing to employ is determined by the marginal 
rate of substitution of work or income for leisure on his indifference 
curve and the marginal rate of transformation of his work into leisure. 
If he divides returns and provides all the labor, this transformation 
rate is changed so that he will tend to favor leisure over additional 
work. This particular factor may hinder adoption of practices such as 
contouring under any type of share lease. It may be necessary for the 
landlord to provide saae form of incentive for a tenant to push his labor 
input to a greater intensity. For example, a portion of the labor cost 
could be paid to the tenant, or his cash rent could be reduced for that 
year. 
Building investment by the lar^ lord is an example of the same 
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situation in reverse. Even though a stock-share lease is used, a land­
lord cannot be expected to make additional building investment where he 
pays all costs and receives but one-half of the returns. 
Since a change to another lease arrangement does not provide an 
over-all answer to rental problems, those provisions in leases which can 
be altered in order to increase incomes of both tenant and landlord must 
be examined. 
Intra-lease-type changes 
In discussing changes vfhich can be made within a particular lease 
type, there appear to be four major possibilities—share adjustments, 
cash rent changes, longer leases, or arrangements for compensation for 
unused value of improvements. These are discussed below. 
(a) Sharing of costs and returns. Starting with the basic assumption 
that all profit-periphery inputs are to be shared in the same proportion 
as returns, changes in shares must concern the share of returns, not 
merely the shares of individual costs and returns. 
What changes could be made on the four farms in regard to shares 
which might tend to promote more efficient resource use? Held found that 
on 35 out of the ItO tenant farms in his sample using a crop-share lease, 
the landlord received one-half the corn and two-fifths of the oats,^ and 
two of the three crop-share farms with expressed lease obstacles in this 
^Held, Overcoming obstacles to soil erosion control in Western 
Iowa, p. 137. 
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study shared the crops in this manner. There appears to be little 
evidence that differential sharing between oats and corn has any effect 
on the attitudes of tenants and owners toward the relative acreage which 
should be planted to these two crops—at least in Vfestern Iowa. Oats is 
not the major income crop; it is largely a complementary crop to corn in 
that it is used as a nurse crop for legume seedings in the rotation, 
shift from two-fifths to one-half would mean a decrease of one-tenth of 
the income from oats for the tenant and an increase of the same amount 
to the landlord. 
On Farm I-b, a shift to one-half the oats would increase the present 
value of the revised farm plan to the landlord by $683, and, of course, 
would inversely affect tenant income by the same amount. However, the 
income differential with this revised share would not increase landlord 
income in the second and third years by enough to bring the landlord 
income for the revised plan up to the level attained with the present 
plan. It is impossible to make arsy shift in shares or cash rent which 
will overcome this incrane deficit in these years to both the tenant and 
landlord; the income for the farm as a whole is decreased under the 
revised plan in these years (Figure 11). 
If seeding costs were to be shared on this farm, i.e., oats, corn, 
and sweet clover seed, the landlord would assume |162 more cost annually, 
and the present value of the revised plan to him woiild be less by Jal300. 
Obviously, such a recommendation would not find acceptance with the land­
lord without compensating adjustanents. Hew seeding costs are shared 
probably does not adversely affect farming efficiency. The only basis 
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for desiring sharing such costs appears to be as an anticipatory measure. 
That is, innovations in new seed types which would be more costly than 
present seed but which would be profitable to the farm might be more 
readily accepted where costs are shared.^  
Another alternative is to alter the share on all crops and on profit-
periphery costs. This would necessitate a share greater than one-half 
for the landlord if such an alternative were to increase the income of 
both parties. Although changing the total share would have the desired 
effect of increasing income to both parties, this is not necessarily the 
most efficient method of compensation. If the rental share that exists 
now (one-half) represents the true marginal productivity of the cropland 
resource, a shift from, this share will tend to promote further inefficient 
allocation of resources than exists at this time. That is, it is evident 
that, unless the rotation is specified and a long-term lease is drawn 
up, the landlord will continually be inclined tovirard rotations which 
contain greater corn acreages and less forage. Such a cure for inef­
ficiency merely is using one cause of resource mal-allocation as a remedy 
for another. 
On Farm I-b, it would appear that the most acceptable form of compen­
sation by means of share adjustment is to change the landlord's share of 
oats to one-half. This would shift |683 of the value of the revised 
plan from the tenant to the landlord and might tend to make this plan 
more appealing to the landlord. 
T^his was discussed in more detail in Chapter II. 
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A similar situation exists on Farm I-c. If the landlord were to 
receive one-half of the oats, his income would be increased by $19ii in 
the second year, by $70 in the third year, and by |182 in the seventh 
year of the revised plan. Although not increasing landlord return in 
these years to the level attained under the present plan (Figure 13), 
the present value of the revised plan would be increased by $938 to the 
landlord for the ten year period. This is an increase which is almost 
sufficiently large to make the present value of the plan positive for 
the landlord. 
If, on the other hand, the landlord were to share sweet clover and 
oats seed, the discounted value of the plan to him would be decreased 
by %919, an amount greater than the increase from the change in share. 
It is not possible to conclude from these two cases alone, but it 
appears that the practice of the tenant giving the landlord two-fifths 
of the oats and providing all seed is comparable to dividing seed cost 
and returns equally. In other words, the cost of seed oats is approxi­
mately equivalent to one-tenth of the oats crop in this area. 
On Farm Il-b, oats and corn are shared equally under present 
arrangements. If the landlord were to pay one-half the cost of seed 
oats, the present value of the revised plan to him would be decreased 
by $818. The rental share appears to provide little basis for in­
fluencing the tenant's and landlord's views toward the plan revision. 
The revised plan for Farm Ill-b, operated under a stock-share lease 
arrangement, would increase return to both landlord and tenant with the 
present lease provisions. However, a cursory glance at the rental 
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provisions would indicate impending disagreement. About 187 bushels of 
corn and 387 bushels of oats from the total crop product are fed each 
year to the chickens, from which the tenant receives all the proceeds. 
The tenant also gets all of the returns from cream v/hile feeding 7I4 
bushels of corn and 83 bushels of oats to the dairy cattle. For both 
dairy cattle and chickens, the tenant pays for all supplemental feed. 
Assuming that the prices used for valuing the inputs of landlord 
and tenant do represent the productivity of contributed resources, the 
share arrangement for this farm would appear to be "fair" in terms of 
allocating total returns according to total costs (Figure 18). The 
management return to the landlord is slightly greater than that of the 
tenant, but the tenant receives additional income in that he has use of 
a house, rent free. It would appear that one could assume that the 
management contributions of tenant and landlord are equal in such a 
lease, if such an assumption is ever valid. But, this is a good example 
of equation of total returns and conflict within enterprises. This is 
in line with Heady^  who states, "... optimiim allocation of resources 
is alvrays a point of conflict between landlord and tenant if differential 
share rents exist." This statement must, implicitly at least, assume 
that the respective inputs contributed by the tenant and landlord are 
proportional in every enterprise. Optimiam allocation of resources 
between enterprises can be attained with differential shares, but, in 
order for this to occur, the inputs of tenant and landlord must also 
%eady, op. cit., p. 608. 
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vary between enterprises and must be proportional to the share of the 
returns which each receives. , 
An alternative arrangement for this farm might be for the landlord 
to accept a smaller shafe of feeder cattle and hogs in return for a 
greater share of the dairy produce and, possibly, of the chicken 
enterprise. His contribution of land and buildings is less than the 
tenant's contribution, labor and machinery. The method arrived at to 
overcome this difference in contributions of fixed inputs by the two 
parties tends to be inefficient. 
(b) Cash rent adjustment. Forage and grain production can be 
complementary or competitive. In any one year, however, they must be 
competitive, even though a complementary relationship exists over time.^  
This study covers a period of ten years, long enough for much of the 
beneficial effect of legumes in a rotation to be realized. The landlord 
interested in income over such a length of time might gain by charging 
no cash rent for acreage in forage up to that point where grain and 
forage are competitive over time. But, beyond the range of comple­
mentarity, the cash rent per acre required to compensate for acreage 
removed from grain crops becomes increasingly larger as more acres are 
devoted to forage production. 
Cash rents are not very flexible. The cash rent set for pasture 
and hay in 19hO exists today on some tenant-operated farms, e.g.. 
Farm Il-b. Landlord return from corn and oats has increased considerably 
%eady and Jensen, op. cit. p. h21. 
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during this same period, and the wide divergence between rent from corn 
and forage gives added incentive for a landlord wanting a greater 
proportion of his land in corn, especially for landlords with a rela­
tively short-term interest in the farm. An excellent example in this 
category is the elderly widow landlord whose sole means of support is 
income from the farm. ¥fhere cash rents diverge from the value pro­
ductivity of the land, conflicts in interest naturally arise. 
On Farm I-b, the cash rent for hay and pasture is $8 per acre. 
This includes about 15 acres of wooded pasture with low grazing 
capacity. There are 29 acres more in forage under the revised plan 
than under the present plan. YJith almost one-half of the farm in hay 
or pasture, forage and grain are not complementary, even for the ten 
year period. In dollar terms, the landlord receives $20,219 worth of 
crop product under the present plan, compared to only $17,1495 for corn 
and oats with the revised plan. Using a rate of $8 per acre cash rent 
for the added forage acreage, the landlord receives l3>iiU0 more cash 
rent with the revised farm plan. Thus, he gains $716 (not taking 
account of discounting) in gross income, but his annual expenses are 
$21 greater with the revised plan. 
On this farm, the cash rent of $8 is sufficient to compensate for 
the differential in income from the grain crops, but it probably does 
not represent the value productivity of this land. Using a value of 
$18 per ton for hay, the change in value of hay produced amounts to 
about $38 per acre for the added acres. The tenant's expenses probably 
are higher for hay than for corn or oats, but the landlord does furnish 
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all legume seed in most instances where a cash rent for hay land is 
charged.^  As a result, tenants would be unv/illing to share returns 
from forage in the same proportion as the corn and oats. It is not 
reasonable to assume that the value productivity of this land in hay 
is equivalent to the value productivity of the tenant's inputs in hay 
production. But it would appear that a cash rent increase of $2 to tS 
per acre would bring relative landlord return from acres in forage more 
into line with his return from corn. Receipt of a portion of his rent 
as a fixed cash rent reduces landlord chances of greater gains and 
losses, while, at the same time, the tenant's risk is greater. Cash 
rent for the revised plan v/ould average t!620 per year, and, if increased 
to |12 per acre for hay, it would average $7^ 4? per year, an amount which 
might deter tenants with lavr assets from a similar plan. 
An increase of per acre in cash rent for hay would increase the 
present value of the revised plan to the landlord by $1822 and reduce 
the tenant's return by the same amount. This would compensate the 
landlord to such an extent that he would receive a greater gain than 
the tenant. A minor adjustment in cash rent on this farm might provide 
a possible incentive for the landlord to adjust his farming system. 
The soils of Farm I-c are more level and more productive than those 
of Farm I-b. For this reason, the landlord loses relatively more with 
A^n estimated cost of #19.33 per acre for alfalfa hay and |13.07 
per acre for corn was derived by Earl 0. Heady, Harald Jensen, and 
iiarvin Anderson. How to choose the most profitable rotation for your 
farm. Iowa Farm Science. 6: 191-195. 1952. p. 19ii. 
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reductions of corn, and the tenant gains relatively more from increased 
forage production on Farm I-c. The added per acre hay production has a 
value of about II43 per acre. However, the revised plan assumed a charge 
of $15 per acre for cash rent, a figure which appears to give the land­
lord and tenant approximately equal proportional returns from hay and 
corn. If this is true, why is the value of the revised plan so large 
for this farm, and how could compensation be made to counteract the 
landlord's negative return (Table 8)? 
The landlord loses more in income from grain ($5,081) than he gains 
in cash rent ($lt,865) in changing to the revised plan, and he also 
assumes greater annual costs of $31* Thus, the gain goes to the tenant. 
Forage may have different values, depending on how it is utilized. 
On Farm I-b, additional forage is processed by beef cows and feeders, 
and, on Farm I-c, it is utilized by dairy cows and beef cows. In a 
recent study, it was found that the average return per $100 feed fed 
was $218 for dairy cattle on a high forage ration and $1314 for feeder 
calves.^  Although dollars return per dollar of feed fed is not a true 
measure of the productivity of feed inputs, this offers a partial 
explanation for the value of the revised farm plan obtained on Farm I-c. 
No additional labor or building charge was made for increasing the 
size of the livestock enterprise on farms I-b and I-c. Buildings and 
E^arl 0. Heady and Russell 0. Olson. Substitution relationships, 
resource requirements and income variability in the utilization of forage 
crops. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 390. 
1952. p. 922. 
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labor were assumed to be adequate for the change. Where all costs were 
considered in the study by Heady and Olson, average returns per $100 of 
all costs were $10^  and |106 for dairy cattle and feeder calves, respec­
tively.^  This appears to explain the wide variation between value of 
the plan to the landlord and to the tenant on this farm. The tenant must 
have a greater relative return because much of the increased income v^ rould 
come about through more intensive utilization of his labor. 
Cash rent on this farm appears to be in line with productivity of 
the land. But, the average annual cash rent charge of $814$ is of such 
magnitude that tenants may not wish to take on the added risk. If this 
is the case, there are other alternatives. Hay could be shared, a stock-
share lease might be used, or a flexible cash rent arrangement could be 
made. Under the first alternative, the landlord has the problem of 
disposal of his share of the hay, or, if the tenant buys the landlord's 
share, a value must be placed on the hay. Some problems of the stock-
share lease have been discussed above. Use of a flexible cash rent, 
based on costs, prices, and production might also be a feasible alter­
native.^  
Cash rent on Farm Il-b is only $$ per acre and has not changed for 
13 years. An increment of $1 per acre \Tould increase the value of the 
revised farm plan to the landlord by |205. Some adjustment or compen-
I^bid., p. 920. 
2 Chryst, op. cit., presents and evaluates various types of flexible 
cash rent provisions. 
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sation may be feasible through the method of cash rent change \vhich would 
tend to influence the lardlord to adopt a plan which is similar to the 
revised plan. On Farm Ill-b, there is no cash rent, and, of course, cash 
rent adjustment offers no alternative solution for differential returns 
from the revised farming system. 
(c) Long-term lease. Where the returns from inputs in one period 
are distributed over a number of periods, these inputs will not be made 
if there is little assurance of remaining on the farm for a period long 
enough to obtain the returns. An owner-operator plans according to his 
own expectancy of length of tenure. But, on tenant-operated farms, the-
tenant and landlord undoubtedly have different expectations concerning 
the length of time with which they are concerned in maximizing income 
on the particular farm. The planning horizon for the tenant on any 
farm can hardly be longer than that of the landlord. As discussed in 
Chapter II, the additional uncertainty created by short expectations of 
tenure tends to bring about further mal-allocation of resources. 
Extended horizons of expectations can be obtained by the use of 
longer leases. But, if the corresponding disadvantages are greater than 
the advantages, longer leases do not solve this problem. For example, 
if longer leases do teixi to encourage carelessness by the tenant and 
resulting inefficient use of resources, their use does not insure a more 
efficient use of resources over time. However, there is a method of 
lessening lease-created uncertainty without adopting long-term leases. 
(d) Compensation for unexhausted improvements. As discussed in 
Chapter II, there are three bases which might be used for compensation^  
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(1) marginal productivity, (2) origiml cost, and (3) replacement cost. 
If a tenant is assured of compensation for the unexhausted value of his 
inputs, he should be motivated to farm in a manner which more nearly 
resembles that of similar owner-operators. A major difficulty is 
determination of the unexhausted value. To another tenant, the improve­
ment may not have the same value as it had for the outgoing tenant, and 
value of an improvement, in an ex ante sense, must be based on expecta­
tions. Since price expectations vary from individual to individual, the 
landlord and tenant may have completely divergent views in this regard. 
In England, under their elaborate tenancy legislation, an attempt 
is made to compensate outgoing tenants on the basis of value to the 
incoming tenant, i.e., a marginal productivity concept. "A tenant on 
quitting his holding can claim compensation for an old improvement 
amounting to the value of the improvement to an incoming tenant. . . 
In order to be eligible for compensation, certain conditions must be 
met for different types of improvements. The consent of the landlord 
must be obtained for long-term improvements which are normally the re­
sponsibility of the landlord, e.g., buildings. If the landlord does 
not give consent, the matter can be referred to the Minister. But, 
consent of the landlord is not a prerequisite for compensation for 
medium-term improvements, such as fertilizer, lime, and mole drainage, 
although notice must be given the landlord if mole drainage is undertaken.^  
1 Great Britain. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, op. cit., 
p. 16. 
I^bid., p. 17. 
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Even though consent for making the improvement is obtained by the tenant, 
disputes over the amount of compensation can arise. And, where tenant 
and landlord do not agree on the value for compensation, the English 
law provides that the matter must be referred to arbitration.^  
It appears that ccanpensation which is based on a replacement cost 
or marginal productivity concept must be backed up by provisions for 
arbitration. Disputes are bound to arise. Although Iowa law does pro­
vide for arbitration, disagreements may be brought before an arbitration 
O 
board only if both tenant and landlord agree to such a course of action. 
However, an arbitration clause can be included in the lease, as recom­
mended in at least one lease form.3 
If, in order to utilize conpensation, it is necessary to hire an 
appraiser or arbitrator to ascertain the value of the improvement, it 
is obvious that compensation does not provide a means of attaining equal 
efficiency on tenant- and owner-operated farms. The cost of determining 
the unexhausted value is additive to the cost of the input, and the inputs 
which are productive over a period of years will be less intensively 
applied than under owner-operation. They might, however, be more inten­
sively utilized than if no arrangements for compensation were made. 
The services of an appraiser could be provided by the public, if 
it so desires. Hence, there would be no cost to tenant or landlord and 
I^bid., p. 19. 
2 
Timmons, op. cit., pp. 7$, 76. 
I^bid., p. 127. 
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no adverse effect on the intensity of inputs for v<-hich compensation is 
provided. 
If present cost or replacement cost is used as a basis for compen­
sation, the tenant does not receive interest from his full investment 
he does not receive interest on that portion of his input which was not 
utilized while he was on the farm. But, either method of compensation 
is more efficient than compensation for unused productivity if the 
return on investment foregone by the tenant in using cost as a basis 
for payment is less than the cost of hiring a disinterested person to 
appraise the value of the improvement to the incoming tenant. 
Vifhatever the basis for compensation, it should be agreed upon in 
advance by the tenant and landlord. Use of value productivity is 
theoretically sound but difficult to ascertain in practice. Replacement 
cost and, especially, original cost are easier to determine. This has 
been discussed in more detail in Chapter II. If the method to be used 
is stipulated in the lease, disagreements concerning the amount of 
compensation should be circumvented. 
The lease on Farm I-c provides the only example of a compensation 
provision on the farms in this study. On B'arm I-c, the landlord pays 
60 percent of the cost of phosphate fertilizer, and the tenant receives 
20 percent of the total original cost, one-half of his contribution, if 
he moves after one crop year. This provision is based on the assumption 
that the phosphate affects the yields for both years of the meadow in 
H^eady, op. cit., p. 6l5. 
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the rotation. No allowance is made for carry-over effect of increased 
forage on future corn yields, other than in the original share of the 
cost. No arrangements for caupensation for nitrogen fertilizer carry­
over were found on any of the farms studied. 
However, the lack of canpensation provisions for fertilizer and 
other inputs on the farms studied does not appear to restrict the use 
of these inputs below the level of use on the owner-operated farms. 
When the use of commercial fertilizer becomes more widespread in this 
area, compensation provisions may aid the adoption of heavier appli­
cations. 
Although there is little evidence that building improvements are 
needed for adoption of the revised plans on the four tenant farms, 
compensation provisions may provide a means for attaining building 
improvements on rented farms. It is likely that marsy buildings on 
Iowa farms are obsolete. But, where building repairs or new buildings 
would increase farm income, the costs of such improvements must be 
borne by the individual receiving the returns in order to provide 
appropriate incentive for making the improvements. 
A farm lease supplement, which can be attached to any lease, is 
available from the Iowa State College Extension Service for use in ob­
taining improvements on rented farms.^  Tenants and landlords may use 
either expected value of output or cost as a basis for compensation, 
I^. W. Arthur. Farm lease supplement for use in obtaining repairs, 
buildings and soil improvements on a rented farm. Iowa Agricultural 
Extension Service. 1951. 
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but the cost or value is stipulated in advance to avoid the necessity 
of bringing in a third party to evaluate unused value. Suggested rates 
of depreciation are given for various improvements. 
More work needs to be done along the line of determining residual 
values for improvements such as terraces, fertilizer, and buildings. 
As an example of work being done, the carry-over effect of nitrogen 
fertilizer is being checked annually by the Iowa State College Department 
of Agronomy.^  As more evidence is obtained on this and other residual 
effects, this information can be made available for use by tenants and 
landlords. For example, the farm lease supplement suggests a depre-
p 
ciation period of five years for terraces. If the full beneficial 
effect of terracing is not attained for more than five years, use of a 
five year period involves a donation of the remaining productivity of 
the tenant's investment in the terraces (terraces may last indefinitely). 
He may not even receive a return equal to his investment in this period 
of time. Mdre information along this line will enable tenants and land­
lords to arrive at more realistic provisions for compensation. 
Tenants and landlords should be able to arrive at agreements for 
compensation on many improvements. But, with tradition as important a 
factor in leasing as it appears to be, landlords may have reason to 
avoid compensation agreements. .^'<Tien the outgoing tenant departs, the 
compensation is a cost to the landlord, and the gain will be reaped by 
u^menil and Nicholson, op. cit. 
2 Arthur, op. cit. 
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the incoming tenant. Rental shares and cash rents are largely fixed 
within an area, and the landlord may not be able to obtain a tenant who 
is willing to pay for the remaining value of the improvement in cash or 
through increased rental rates. If compensation vfere to become the 
rule rather than the exception, incoming tenants might be more willing 
to pay for the unused value of fertilizer or lime. If building rent 
becomes a common practice, a landlord's payment of compensation to an 
outgoing tenant for a building improvement would presumably be paid back 
to him through an increased building rent for the incoming tenant.^  
English tenancy law also provides that tenants can claim compen­
sation for increasing the value of the farm ". . .by the continuous 
adoption of a special system of farming more beneficial than the system 
of farming laid down in the contract. . . However, their system is 
not unilateral. "A landlord can claim compensation from an outgoing 
tenant for any specific dilapidations on the holding. The compensation 
is the cost of making good the damage.Similarly, under Iowa law, a 
tenant is liable to pay three times the damages caused by waste, per­
missive or voluntary.^  Iowa law, then, provides for compensation by the 
This discussion rests on the assumption that the improvement for 
which compensation is made is of use to the incoming tenant, at least 
to the extent of its cost to him. 
2 
Great Britain. Mnistry of Agriculture and Fisheries, p. 18. 
I^bid., p. 18. 
T^iimnons, op. cit., p. 73* 
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tenant for waste but not for compensation by the landlord where the 
tenant has made improvements on the farm.^  Tenant improvements, the 
removal of which will not damage the premises, can be removed by Iowa 
tenants.^  But, not knowing in advance if the improvement may be 
removed will hinder tenant investment in such improvements.^  Provisions 
can be made in leases, however, which would avoid these problems and 
which would permit the attainment of longer horizons of expectations 
through insuring a return for long-term investments. 
3. Success elements in leases 
A successful owner-tenant relationship is sometimes characterized 
by the new buildings and improvements which the landlord provides for 
the tenant at a negligible cost. A case in point is the winner of the 
sweepstakes award in the Iowa soil conservation achievement awards 
program. The landlord on this farm "... has put back into the farm 
virtually all the incane she has received from it during the 1$ years. 
Further, the article states, "... there has been no change in the 
amount of cash rent for the pasture. . .during the 15 years. . . ."^  
I^bid., p. 75. 
I^bid., p. 75. 
I^bid., p. 75* 
G^lenn Cunningham. Soil-saving sweepstakes award goes to a tenant-
operated farm. Iowa Farm and Home Register, November 1, 19^ }. pp. II-I3. 
I^bid., p. 12. 
I^bid., p. 12. 
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Although the effect that this rental arrangement has had. on the 
value of the farm is not known, it is apparent that this successful 
relationship is, in part at least, a function of the satisfaction which 
the landlord derives from improving the farm. It appears doubtful that 
the criterion of a more efficient lease used in this study, that farm 
income be increased without reducing either the tenant's or the land­
lord's income over time, could be met if a lease arrangement and farming 
system similar to that of this farm were to be superimposed on, e.g., 
Farm I-b or I-c. 
Not all landlords have sufficient income from other sources to 
enable them to reinvest all farm earnings in their farm. Having 
sufficient income frcm other sources to meet their living expenses, not 
all landowners would derive sufficient satisfaction from a well-grocmed 
farm to compensate for the foregone monetary returns. The "beneficent 
landlord" is a noble man, from the standpoint of his tenant, but to 
expect other landlords to "go thou and do likewise" is not reasonable. 
Two farms, Farm I-d and Farm IV-b, were selected in the sample for 
this study because they might suggest remedial hypotheses for further 
study. The success farms in this study are not success farms because of 
the landlord's lack of interest in his own pecuniary return. The land­
lords are, however, responsive to suggestions by the tenants and 
appear to be interested in maximizing income over a period of years 
rather than for one or two years. The understanding between tenants and 
landlords on these farms plays an integral part in bringing about the 
efficiency of resource use attained. 
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(a) Farm I-d. The high farm income on this farm is a result of a 
large input of capital, as the heavy feeding program of the tenant 
yields a large portion of the returns. The one-year lease contains no 
compensation provisions. However, the tenant is secure in his expecta­
tions of tenure. Hence, ccanpensation provisions are unnecessary since 
their objective is achieved otherwise. Cash rent is |10 per acre. 
This is higher than on Farm I-b but lower than that charged for hay 
and pasture on Farm I-c. Because of the large forage acreage and low 
cash rent, the landlord receives an average return on investment of 
5 percent for the ten year period, i.e., his management return is 
approximately zero. 
The tenant furnishes all labor for building and fencing repairs, 
about three weeks labor per year. Although no building rent is charged, 
the buildings are in excellent condition. The landlord, having operated 
this farm himself, has an interest in maintaining it in good condition, 
and he may gain intrinsic returns in so doing. 
The tenant has apparently planned the farming system and convinced 
the landlord of the value of such a system to the landlord. In all of 
his plans, he has had the landlord's cooperation. The tenant has been 
willing to provide his own labor, while the landlord has furnished the 
capital for terracing and buildings. The major success element appears 
to be the attitudes of the tenant and landlord and their willingness to 
work out arrangements for each improvement when the need occurs. Also, 
the tenant has been made to feel that he can remain on the farm as long 
as he desires. It is interesting to note that the tenant on this farm 
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hopes to buy a farm when he obtains sufficient capital. Thus, he is 
using tenancy as a step toward full ownership. 
(b) Farm IV-b. The landlord was born and raised on the farm and is 
familiar with the farming methods necessary for greater profit. He is 
the one taking the 3Bad on most improvements, and the tenant appears to 
follow. The tenant is satisfied to remain on this farm as a tenant; 
he has no desire to purchase his own farm, at least at this time. 
Thus, one of the success tenants is using his rented farm as a step 
toward ownership; the other intends to remain a tenant. Both are 
receiving a high level of income, and both appear to have secure 
expectations of long tenure. Where improvements have been needed, 
tenant and landlord have cone to an understanding on the contributions 
which each party would make. 
D. Attitudes of Ov/ners and Tenants toward the Revised Plans 
In November, 19$3, upon completion of income estimates for the 
present and revised farm plans, the owners and tenants on the four farms 
where lease-oriented obstacles existed were interviewed to obtain their 
reactions to the revised plans. There may be special circumstances which 
tend to explain certain reactions of individual owners and tenants. For 
example, an elderly owner will have a shortened planning horizon and 
would not wish to forego present for future income. In analyzing the 
revised plans above, the analysis was couched in general terms, i.e., 
as applied to cases similar to those studied. Further insight into 
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tenant and landlord resistences or inabilities to carry out the revised 
plans may be gained by a more specific approach. 
1. Farm I-b 
The landlady (actually the landlady's daughter) does not feel that 
the revised plan would augment her income, now or over a ten year period. 
Her attitude toward ar^  change might best be described as negative. She 
stated that a building rent should be paid and expressed an interest in 
establishing an improvement fund, a fund for building repairs composed 
of the tenant's building rent. She did believe that the revised plan 
would increase the farm value but would venture no estimate as to the 
magnitude of the change. 
The tenant appears to be enthusiastic about the plan. He would be 
willing to pay from §2 to more in cash rent per acre but would want 
the landlady to pay for one-half of the corn and oats seed costs if the 
cash rent were increased. He sees no need for compensation provisions 
for fertilizer, but he would be willing to pay a fixed annual rent for 
new improvements which might be needed. His opposition to compensation 
is based on an idea that he and the landlord would be tied down by such 
an arrangement. He expressed a favorable reaction to a plan whereby he 
would pay for new buildings and would be guaranteed ccanpensation for 
pre-arranged percentages of original cost if and when he should move. 
Building rent and a longer lease do not appeal to him. If the buildings 
are maintained, there is no need for a building rent, according to this 
tenant. 
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2. Farm I-c 
The owner of this farm, an elderly v/idow, has a life estate in the 
farm. She is ill and not expected to live much longer. Consequently, 
her interest in this farm is of short duration. Since the landlady 
was ill and could not be interviewed, the farm manager was contacted. 
The revised farm plan is along lines which he would recommend for a 
landlord with a longer planning period. However, the landlady's short 
planning horizon would definitely make the acceptance of such a farming 
system inadvisable. The farm manager estimated that farm value would 
be 150 to 175 per acre greater after ten years if the revised plan 
were in effect than if the present farming pattern were continued. This 
conpares with about $21 per acre, estimated by the procedure described 
in Chapter III. 
The farm management company which manages Farm I-c uses a compensa­
tion provision for phosphate fertilizer in all of their leases. This 
provision was discussed above. Leases for a period longer than one year 
are not approved by this farm marager, unless the tenant would have 
exceptional managerial ability. The manager stated that building rent 
was not feasible, because of existing institutional arrangements, but 
that a building rent for additional improvements, i.e., an annual charge 
for an improvement not on the farm when the lease was drawn up, was 
feasible and could be a means of overcoming landlord resistance to 
capital investments on rented farms. 
The tenant would be interested in following a plan similar to the 
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revised system, but the cash rent for such a plan presents too large a 
fixed cost from his standpoint. He would want one of two alternatives 
if the revised crop plan were adopted. Either shifting to a stock-share 
lease or sharing the hay as well as corn and oats would be acceptable. 
If hay were shared, the landlord would have to accept less than one-half 
the crop as rent or pay some of the costs of harvesting. The tenant 
emphasized that the production of hay is more costly than the production 
of the grain crops, corn and oats. 
There appears to be no solution to the obstacles to the revised plan 
on this farm because of the short expectations of the landlady. She 
discounts income beyond one year almost to zero. One possibility of 
increasing annual income in similar situations might be the application 
of heavier amounts of commercial fertilizer, an input from which a major 
portion of the returns are received in the year of application. However, 
this tenant is not convinced, as yet, that commercial fertilizer will 
increase production. 
3. Farm Il-b 
The landlady is not familiar with agriculture. She thinks that the 
plan revision would increase farm value but that her income would not be 
increased with present lease provisions. She would use compensation 
provisions for fertilizer if doing so would cause the tenant to apply 
it, and she might be interested in the plan if cash rent could be in­
creased but thinks that more livestock is needed on the farm. Hiring of 
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a farm manager or selling the farm are two alternatives. She fears that 
a farm manager would merely collect 10 percent of the gross income with­
out increasing this gross income. Sale of the farm and investment in 
bonds or stocks is a distinct possibility. This woman is interested in 
maintaining the farm or the capital from its sale since she is only 
middle-aged and is concerned with maximizing her returns over many years. 
The tenant believes that the revised plan would be income increasing 
and that farm value would be enhanced over a ten year period. He would 
want the landlady to pay him for his labor in removir^  fences if the 
fields were to be fenced on the contour. If she paid for his labor, 
he would purchase temporary fencing. Also, he stated that he would pay 
an annual cash rent for terraces and new buildings if the landlady would 
provide them. 
h' Farm Ill-b 
This arrangement is in the process of dissolution at the present 
time. Failure to agree on which enterprise should be emphasized is 
largely responsible. No account books have been kept, and the landlord 
has purchased and sold all of the livestock. This lack of accounting 
has also contributed to the serious disagreement between this tenant and 
his father-in-law. 
The revised plan is approved by the tenant. But, he believes that 
the farm is too small and would prefer a larger farm. With a larger 
farm, grain would not have to be purchased, and the same livestock 
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program could be followed. He apparently is opposed to assuming the 
risk associated with processing purchased grains through livestock. He 
is not financially able to buy a farm of his own at this time. There­
fore, he will move if another farm can be found, he will move to town, 
or he and the landlord must settle their differences. Unless new share 
arrangements are made, this latter alternative appears unlikely. 
Suggestions for improving landlord-tenant relations would include 
the necessity of keeping an account of all sales and purchases. In 
this way, the tenant would know where money has gone. The landlord 
might receive some share of the cream, and a greater proportion of the 
proceeds of cattle and hogs might be given to the tenant. As another 
alternative, the landlord could sell the farm to his son-in-law, but 
he would have to accept only a small down payment in order to do so 
because of the low asset position of the tenant. Another possibility 
would be for the tenant to get a 50 percent loan from the Federal 
Land Bank and have the father-in-law accept a second mortgage for the 
remainder. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF FIMDIKGS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The above analysis indicates that both lease-oriented and tenure-
oriented factors affect the efficiency of resource use on rented farms. 
Some obstacles to the adoption of land improvements which may appear 
to be lease-oriented are, in fact, tenure-oriented. For example, 
elderly landlords are interested in maximizing income over a relatively 
short period. Shifts to farming systems which entail a reduction in 
income for two or more years in order to gain greater inccsne in the 
future are hardly applicable for such individuals, especially if lease 
provisions are such that the landlord must absorb all of the decrease 
in income. 
Other factors which tend to distort the allocation of resources 
on rented farms, both intra-temporally and inter-temporally, are 
indigenous to the lease employed. Adjustments in these leases can be 
made which will tend to improve resource use on these rented farms and 
which will increase incomes of both tenant and landlord. 
Certain of these lease adjustments can be suggested at this time. 
However, further research is necessary along lines of diagnosing the 
causes of and providing practical remedies for other lease-oriented 
obstacles to efficient production. If improvement in leases is to be 
made, the suggested remedial measures must be put into use where 
applicable. Implementation of the findings provides the ultimate test 
for the results of research. In line with this approach, suggestions 
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for carrying out these findings are given below. 
A. Leasing Adjustments Suggested by This Study 
Leases can be altered to improve resource allocation by changing 
the type of lease itself, adjusting cash rent, changing the shares 
and costs of particular enterprises for the landlord and tenant, and 
by lengthening tenants' horizons of expectations through longer leases 
or compensation provisions. Alterations in lease provisions should be 
made with thought toward the effect of innovations and changes in price-
cost relationships on resource allocation in succeedir^  years. A 
division of costs and returns which results in an efficient combination 
of resources at the time of the lease agreement can tend to bring about 
a distorted use of these resources with changes in cost-price relation­
ships. 
Custom plays an important role in leasing arrangements. Once an 
agreement has been reached on lease provisions, changes are difficult 
to make. Chryst reported that, in 196 years of renting under a crop-
share lease, only 31 changes were made, and, for 209 years of cash 
leasing, k9 changes were made.^  The adjustments, with respect to share 
leases, were in cash rent paid for hay and pasture, with the exception 
of two share adjustments.'^  Thus, it appears that rental shares are 
C^hryst, op. cit., p. 77. 
I^bid., p. 68. 
I^bid., p. 79. 
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rigidly fixed, and cash rent, although relatively more flexible, is also 
slow to respond to cost-price changes. 
A change in type of lease may be warranted in some instances but 
does not ensure more efficient production. Lhere a tenant has rela­
tively few resources (other than his labor and managerial ability), 
use of a stock-share lease could allow the landlord to provide additional 
capital in order to utilize the labor and management of the tenant more 
fully. As evidenced by a case in this study, Farm Ill-b, the stock-
share lease is not a cure-all for lease difficulties. Changes within 
the lease may also be necessary. 
Adjustments within leases can be brought about by a more complete 
association of costs and returns to landlord and tenant. Few dis­
sociations of costs from returns are peculiarly intra- or inter-temporal, 
and the leases on the tenant-operated farms in this study do not provide 
evidence of strictly intra-temporal dissociations. One cost which can 
be classified as a profit-periphery cost for a one year period, 
fertilizer, is shared in proportion to returns on all farms studied. 
Of course, even fertilizer has effects for more than one year, and the 
intensity of its use cannot be wholly explained by the sharing of 
fertilizer costs and returns in one year. 
Os-sh rent adjustments 
The effects of the revised plans for Farm I-b and Farm I-c on the 
incomes of the tenants and landlords on these farms indicate that the 
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inflexibility of rental rates, in this case of cash rent for pasture 
and hay, could be partially responsible for exploitive farming systems 
practiced on similar farms. Cash rents on these farms have not changed 
at all or only slightly in the last ten years, a period of rapidly 
increasing farm prices. The rent which a landlord receives in ary one 
year from a one-half share of corn is two to five times as large as 
his return from the acres in forage, and, for this reason, landlords 
may tend to demand more corn acreage than would be profitable for the 
farm over time if it were managed by an owner-operator. 
If added forage production is complementary with corn production 
over a period of years and the landlord's planning period is relatively 
long, low cash rent will be less of a hindrance to adopting rotations 
with more forage. In a ten year period, such as that used in this 
study, added forage may not have a complementary effect on the production 
of grain over the full period of years. Some additional forage may be 
complementary, but "... experiments do not indicate exactly how far 
forage acreage can be extended in the rotation before the range of 
complementarity is exhausted and the range of ccmpetition begins."^  
The estimated forage and corn production from the two rotations 
used on Farms I-b and I-c are not complementary for the 10 year period. 
Further experimental evidence may indicate that revisions in these 
estimates should be made, but, using these yield estimates and a discount 
rate of ? percent, the reduction in grain production, in dollar terms. 
H^eady and Jensen, op. cit., p. U37. 
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is so large that the present cash rental rate is insufficient to increase 
the landlord's income^  or it will increase it by only a small amount over 
the 10 years. 
Where similar situations exist, tenants might find it necessary to 
pay a higher cash rent per acre for acres in meadow or to shift to an 
arrangement for sharing the forage production if the landlord is to be 
expected to allow a change to a rotation with greater forage. That is, 
the landlord cannot make such a shift without a reduction in income 
unless lease provisions are altered. ¥ifith an increase in cash rent for 
hay and pasture, the incomes of both tenant and landlord may be decreased 
for the first few years with a shift to rotations containing greater 
forage acreage, whereas the tenant might be able to maintain his income 
with no cash rent increase. Thus, the tenant must be assured of tenure 
long enough to receive the benefits of the increased forage# 
2. Share adjustments 
Because of the influence of custom, rental shares are inflexible. 
It would appear that one of the most progressive steps which might be 
taken toward increasing efficiency on share-type, tenant-operated farms 
lies in centering the bargaining between landlord and tenant on the 
rental share and not on the side conditions of cash rent, building rent, 
or shares of the various costs to be paid by the landlord and tenant. 
If all rented farms in an area did not have identical share rents, it is 
possible that a landlord could improve his land and receive a larger 
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share of the crop as rent, in payment for the increased value of the 
land resources, without risking his standing in the canmunity. 
Further, there seems to be little reason why tenants should not 
pay for use of buildings directly, through a building rent. Vfith 
existing crop-share arrangements, however, a charge for buildings 
might merely be additional, i.e., it would increase the landlord's 
income at the expense of the tenant. With the landlord in a relatively 
strong bargaining position, changes of this sort may be expected. But, 
it appears that landlords and tenants could associate costs and returns 
more directly by reducing the rent on cropland and by use of a building 
rent for the buildings. This should result in an improvement in 
resource allocation without altering the shares of total returns to 
landlord or tenant. 
Sharing of costs in proportion to returns within enterprises by 
tenants and landlords will promote more efficient resource use, but 
sharing total costs and total returns in like proportions is no 
criterion for an efficient lease. 
3* Lengthened horizons of expectations 
A tenant will not be willing to sacrifice present income for 
future returns if he has no assurance of remaining on the farm for 
more than one year. Leases for periods longer than one year may help 
in this regard but meet resistance from seme landlords and tenants who 
feel their mobility or choices would be reduced. Where a change in 
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the farming system involves a reduced farm income for the first years, 
arrangements can be made to ensure that the tenant, the party with the 
shorter expectations of tenure, will not have a reduced income in any 
year. For example, where cash rent must be increased to align costs and 
returns under a farming system which emphasizes forage production, a 
possible alternative would be to maintain cash rent at the original level 
or even lower it for the first years after a shift to rotations contain­
ing greater acreage in forage. In this way, the tenant's income would 
not be lower in any year after the shift than it would have been with 
the old rotation. 
It also may be possible to avoid the decreased income which may 
occur in the first years after changing to rotations containing greater 
percentages of forage by applying large quantities of commercial 
fertilizer. This, of course, would require additional inputs of capital. 
Experimental evidence indicates that a heavy application of fertilizer 
($hli per acre) increased net income from corn on Ida soils by from $60 
to |100 per acre in 1902.^  If capital investment is first made in 
heavy applications of fertilizer, landlords and tenants may be more 
able to finance shifts to longer-term improvements, such as terracing 
and rotation changes,' i.e., if present price-cost relationships continue. 
If improvements are to be made on rented farms, the party receiving 
the returns must pay the cost of the improvement. Adjusting cash rent 
A^nnual progress report Western Iowa Experimental Farm, 1952. 
Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station PSR-70. 1953. P- 17. 
2 
Ibid., p. 19. 
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or share rent during the transitional stage between an exploitive farming 
system and one utilizing erosion control practices is one method of 
providing compensation for unexhausted improvements, i.e., of associating 
costs and returns over time. Other farm improvements, e.g., buildings 
or terraces, can be obtained by having the landlord provide the improve­
ment and charge an annual rental for the tenant's share of its use, or 
the tenant can pay for his share mth assurance that he will receive 
compensation for the unexhausted value of his inputs if he should leave 
the farm. These two methods of obtaining improvements were well-received 
by the tenants and landlords on the farms in this study. All indicated 
they would be willing to go along with either plan. 
Where both tenant and landlord receive income from an improvement, 
such as terraces or contouring under a crop-share lease, both tenant 
and landlord should contribute the same proportion of the cost that 
they receive of the returns. That is, if the landlord pays all costs 
of building terraces, the tenant should contribute labor, accept a 
smaller share of the crops, or pay an annual cash rental for the improve­
ment. Because an improvement increases farm value is no reason why the 
landlord should not receive a return on his investment. He only receives 
return from increased farm value if he sells the farm. Meanwhile, he may 
actually lose with regard to net incane because of increased taxes. 
B. Implementation of Leasing Adjustments 
There are several levels at which the findings of this or any study 
can be put into practice. Although these levels are distinct in one 
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sense^  they do complement each other, and their integration will facili­
tate acceptance of research findings. 
Perhaps the greatest progress toward reducing resource inefficiency 
on rented farms may be made at the public educational level. County 
agricultural extension agents and vocational agriculture instructors 
can provide information to landlords and tenants in regard to leasing 
provisions which would tend to improve resource use on their farms. 
Where landlords and tenants are unable to agree on measures for compen­
sation or sharing of costs or returns, these educators can assist. 
Improvement in lease arrangements on rented farms can increase the in­
comes and satisfactions of the landlords and tenants involved, just as 
adoption of improved farming techniques can have the same effect. 
Because managerial decisions are often made by landlords, an attempt 
should be made to provide them with adequate information, not only about 
leasing but about the technical aspects of farming as well. 
Agricultural educators can help in the removal of custom as a 
barrier to efficient use of resources. If landlords and terants can be 
shown the effects of custom on the utilization of their resources and 
can be given alternatives which tend to improve farm income over their 
relevant planning periods, custcm might be altered. For example, share 
rents could vary on farms of different productivity within a community, 
and the inefficiencies arising out of cash rent premiums and dispropor­
tionate sharing of costs and returns might be reduced. 
The implementation of lease provisions which tend to increase farming 
efficiency might be accelerated if the economic effects of such provisions 
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as used in practice could be made available to the public. One method 
of doing this might be to take a group of farms and test the leases in 
actual use on these farms, i.e., a type of demonstration or "pilot" 
farm concept. 
In order to make substantial progress in breaking down custom and 
in adoptj ng more efficient leasing provisions than those which exist 
today, someone must take the lead. Commercial farm management agencies 
and lending agencies can aid in this respect. A farm management firm 
generally supervises many farms, and, because of the number of farms 
under its management, adoption of remedial leasir^  practices by one 
such firm will improve the leases of many farms. 
Also, commercial farm managers are familiar with the technical 
aspects of farming and have a knowledge of improvements which should be 
made to increase the profit of their farms. Once successful compensation 
provisions and other lease changes are in use by some landlords, the 
impact on neighboring farms should be great. 
Banks can influence tenancy arrangements through extension of credit. 
For example, where a tenant must borrow to make an improvement, a form 
of compensation could be provided by having the landlord sign to take 
over the loan if the tenant should move before the loan is paid up. 
At the administrative level, public action agencies can utilize 
research findings in their own programs. The Soil Conservation Districts 
might reconmend, for example, that tenants and landlords on farms with 
farm plans share costs of erosion control practices (including labor) 
and that the landlord agree to compensation provisions for these land 
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improvements. 
At the legislative level, jpociety may deem it desirable to put 
compensation provisions into th^  law. Also, appointed or elected 
officials could be paid from tas; funds to serve as arbitrators in 
disputes between landlords and tenants, or these arbitrators could 
donate their time as is now done by soil conservation district 
commissioners. However, legislative adjustments must be preceded 
and accompanied by strong and effective educational programs* 
Finally, landlords and tenants may have to approach rental prob­
lems and adjustments with a different perspective. They will have to 
look upon tenancy as j<3diit use of complementary resources. In order 
to gain from a change in farming systems, they must not expect the 
other party to sacrifice income. In other words, if returns from an 
improvement are divided, both must be willing to contribute either 
labor, capital, or both. 
Farm rental arrangements can be improved so that farm improvements 
can be made and incomes of both tenants and landlords increased. But, 
the efforts of the various levels of educational activity, from basic 
research on to the final implementation of the findings, mtist be 
integrated if this is to be so. 
C. Further Leasing Research 
Research must be continued along lines of isolating the causes of 
resource mal-allocation on rented farms. Further analysis of the effects 
of cost and income sharing should be made. In this way, it may be 
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possible to more properly categorize inputs as profit-periphery or non­
profit-periphery inputs, andj thus, economically sound and practical 
recommendations can be made as to which costs must be siiared if efficient 
resource use is to be promoted. 
Marginal productivity analyses may provide information which can be 
utilized to improve farm leases. For example, little is known about 
productivity of buildings and pasture land. Information along these 
lines would facilitate the making of recommendations concerning cash 
rent for buildings and pasture. 
Another area which needs further research is the determination of 
rental shares.^  Under the existing institutional setting, rent is based 
on bargaining betv/een landlord and tenant. Where either landlords or 
tenants need information in order to bargain intelligently, this infor­
mation should be provided to them. Alternative methods of determining 
the relative value of landlord and tenant inputs should be analyzed. 
As more information becomes available on the physical effects of 
erosion control practices and fertilizer on yields over time, more 
accurate estimates of the economic consequences can be made. The agri­
cultural experiment stations can aid landlords and terants in arriving 
at provisions for compensation by providing information on the residual 
effects of building and land improvements. For example, a more complete 
A^ regional leasing study is being carried out at this time by the 
North Central Regional Land Tenure Research Committee in which this 
problem is analyzed in some detail. Virgil L. Hurlburt. Farm Rental 
Practices and Problems in the llidwest. (Preliminary report.) Iowa State 
College Department of Economics and Sociology. 1953* 
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knowledge of the carry-over effects of fertilizers on different soil 
types and of the annual costs of buildings would provide much of the 
information necessary for making compensation agreements. 
Although the number of farms studied is small, there are indications 
from this study that tenure-oriented factors may restrict land and 
building improvements to a large extent. Vi/hat, on the surface, may 
appear to be lease-oriented obstacles to such improvements may be 
actually due to lack of capital, lack of knowledge, or shortened 
horizons of expectations because of the age of the owner or tenant or 
because of property arrangements, e.g., life estates, under which land 
is held. 
D. Possible Tenure Adjustments Indicated by This Study 
Elderly owners discount future production heavily. Because of this, 
they may tend to use resources in a manner which is against the interests 
of society and possibly against their own interests, e.g., if they err 
in forecasting their life span. There is at least one alternative open 
to these people. They can sell their farm and invest the proceeds in, 
among other choices, stocks, bonds, or an annuity. The capital gains 
tax provision of the present income tax law may tend to hinder the 
adoption of such an alternative, especially after maror years of increas­
ing land values. Also, the feeling of security which seems to accompary 
farm ownership, the desire for passing an inheritance on to the children, 
and lack of knowledge of other investment opportunities may influence 
160 
decisions to maintain farm ownership, even though alternative investments 
may give the landlord a greater annual retirement income. For example, 
a 65 year old widow could sell a 160 acre farm valued at $200 per acre 
and could purchase an annuity which would pay $205l annually (if no 
income tax were deducted from the sales price) until death. This 
might be a considerably greater annual income than could be obtained from 
rent for the farm. 
Of course, selling a farm in order to purchase an annuity would mean 
that the farm would not remain for the children to inherit, but the farm 
could be kept in the family by selling it to one of the children. Most 
retired farm owners expect to live from proceeds of their farm. A recent 
study indicates that about three-fourths of the farmers interviewed 
expected to retire on accumulated property and earnings from the farm 
2 holding. Farm owners should be educated as to the value of various 
retirement schemes. In this way, it will be possible for them to make 
decisions which are based on more complete knov/ledge of alternatives. 
Younger landlords, with a restricted knowledge of agriculture, 
might benefit by employing farm managers who could advise them and the 
tenant on a more productive organization of their combined resources. 
B^ased on annuity tables in John F. Timmons and John C. O'Byrne. 
Transferring farm property within families in Icwa. Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Station Research Bulletin 39h- 1953« P« 190. 
2 Earl 0. Heady, W. B. Back, and G. A. Peterson. Interdependence 
between the farm business and the farm household with implications on 
economic efficiency. Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research 
Bulletin 398. 1953. p. U22. 
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The attitude of these ovmers toward hiring managerial services may 
require a change, however. 
Some farm managers are regarded as "rent collectors" by certain 
individuals. The customary method of payment for the services of 
management, 10 percent of the gross landlord product in Iowa, has a 
tendency to promote this attitude, especially from the standpoint of 
the tenants. A manager could maintain or increase his wage, through 
maintainirg or increasing landlord income, simply by changing lease 
provisions so that the tenant receives a smaller share of the total 
returns.^  The services provided by the manager should not decrease 
income to either tenant or landlord if friction is to be avoided. If 
the managerial wage were paid by tenant and landlord, the incentive 
for increasing the inccane of one party at the expense of the other 
would be removed. 
E. Further Tenure Research 
A broad study is being planned, in ?/hich the effects of tenure 
2 
systems on resource allocation are to be analyzed. Comparisons of 
the efficiency of resource use among groups of debt-free owners, 
T^hat is, he could adjust the rental rate if the tenant had no 
other alternative which would be more profitable when costs of moving 
are considered. 
2 North Central Regional Land Tenure Research Committee. Tentative 
outline on effects of alternative tenure arrangements upon the 
organization, use and productivity of resources employed in farm 
firms. (Mimeographed report.) 19^ 3« 
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mortgaged owners, tenants, and owners in transition (life estates, 
father-son agreements, etc.) are to be made. This analysis of the 
effects of tenure has as its objectives the estimation of the effect 
of tenure arrangements upon resource use, isolation of the tenure-
oriented obstacles to improved resource use, and estimation of possible 
remedial measures.^  
The managerial function is divided on rented farms, to a greater 
degree on some than others, and this splitting of the decision-making 
function may adversely affect the allocation of resources on rented 
farms. Where this is true, methods of overcoming this problem need 
to be developed. 
This study, restricted in scope to an analysis of lease-oriented 
obstacles, may provide information and hypotheses which can be tested 
further in the over-all study of resource use under alternative tenure 
arrangements. 
I^bid., p. 9. 
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VI. smmRY 
Rental arrangements play an important role in Iowa agriculture. 
A farmer with inadequate capital to purchase a farm unit large enough 
to enable him to fully utilize his labor and managerial resources may 
gain control of land by renting. He can purchase a small farm and rent 
added acres (a part-owner) or he can rent a complete farm unit (a tenant). 
In 1950, 53 percent of Iowa farmland was operated under some type 
of lease, which emphasizes the extent and importance of renting on 
Iowa agriculture. Furthermore, little decrease in this type of tenure 
is anticipated in the near future. 
Yifhere the costs of ary input are borne by the tenant or landlord 
and returns are not shared in the same proportion, inefficiency of 
resource use is fostered, and there is a tendency to avoid making farm 
improvements. These dissociations of cost and income are of two types, 
inter-temporal and intra-temporal. Fertilizer, weed spray, and corn 
borer control are examples of inputs which return all or nearly all of 
their productivity within one year (intra-temporal inputs)i buildings, 
terraces, and water supplies are examples of investments which yield 
return over a period of years (inter-teraporal inputs). 
This study is limited to the analysis of share-type leases, i.e., 
of the particular provisions in such leases which adversely affect 
resource allocation within the rented farms, including the making of 
improvements. The goal of a lease, as used in this study, is to allow 
I6ii 
the tenant farm to be operated as efficiently as an owner-operated farm 
with a comparable size of business. In line with this goal, the objec-
are; (1) to establish what differences, if argr, exist between the opera­
tion of physically similar, tenant- and owner-operated farms, (2) to 
determine the specific provisions of leases which cause tenants to farm 
in a manner different from owner-operators and to locate the provisions 
which enable certain tenants to operate as if they were owners, and (3) , 
to set forth alternative lease provisions which would allow landlords 
and tenants to more nearly approach ovmer-operators in the efficiency 
with which they utilize farm resources. 
Utilizing information from previous studies in the Ida-Monona soil 
association area of Western Iowa, four groups of farms were selected for 
intensive study. Each group of farms was selected so that the farms in 
the group would be similar with regard to soil type and slope, climate, 
and total capital employed. One owner-operated farm was selected as 
the norm for each group. Of the six tenant-operated farms in the study, 
four were farms v/here it had been stated that the lease presented 
obstacles to efficient use of resources ard, specifically, to the 
utilization of erosion control practices. Two of the tenant farms were 
selected as success farms, i.e., as having a landlord-tenant relation­
ship which did not appear to restrict the efficiency of resource use 
below that of a cmparable owner-operated farm. 
The farming systems on the four obstacle farms were changed to 
correspond with those of the paired owner-operators at those points 
where it appeared that the lease might hinder a change in this direction. 
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The effects of the revised plan and the present plan on the incomes of 
the landlord and tenant were estimated for a ten year period. Also, 
the effect of the revised plan on the value of the farm after the ten 
year period was estimated. 
Crop yields for the different soil types under various rotations 
and erosion control practices were estimated with the assistance of 
members of the Iowa State College Department of Agronomy. Yields were 
not assumed to remain constant, but decreased, were maintained, or 
increased over time, depending on the soil loss due to erosion, the 
nitrogen added through legumes in the rotations, and the effect of 
fertilizer. 
Over the ten year period, net incomes and returns to management 
declined to a greater extent for the tenant-operated farms with lease 
difficulties than for the farms operated by owners or success tenants, 
and the level of returns was also lower for the obstacle farms, i.e., 
under the present farming system. 
In all cases, the value of the revised plan (discounted at a rate 
of 5 percent) was positive for the farm as a whole, and the tenant 
would receive the greatest income increase if present lease provisions 
were maintained and if the tenant would remain on the farm for the full 
ten years. On one 160 acre farm where the revised plan entails an 
increase of 36 acres of forage along with use of contouring on all 
fields, the landlord would absorb a loss in income over the ten year 
period with present lease provisions. The tenant, on the other hand, 
ViTould receive an estimated annual increase in returns of nearly $U00. 
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It was estimated that the use of the revised farming systems on 
the four farms would increase farm value from about II4 to $21 per acre 
over the value if the present plan were continued for ten years. With 
inclusion of the farm value change, the revised plan would increase the 
returns to both the landlord and tenant on all four farms, but the 
tenant receives the greater increase under present leases. 
Where large increases in forage acreage are put into effect, as 
was done on two of the four farms, the farm inccme will be decreased 
for two or three years. The crop-share tenant, utilizing the increased 
forage with additional livestock does not undergo decrease in 
incomej the landlord absorbs the reduction. Primarily, this is due 
to the low cash rent for hay and pasture on these farms. Cash rent is 
relatively inflexible, and, as prices of farm products rise, the 
landlord's net return from corn increases at a greater rate than his 
return from cash rent. Where tenants wish to employ rotations with 
greater forage acreage, this study indicates that they may have to be 
willing to pay higher cash rent than they are paying. 
To reduce the risk associated with fixed canmitments of cash rent, 
the adoption of flexible cash rent based on changes in prices, costs, 
and production may be feasible, or the hay production could be shared 
just as is the production of corn and oats. 
To lengthen tenants' horizons of expectations, longer leases 
might be used. Another method is to assure the tenant of compensation 
for the unexhausted value of any improvements he should make. It appears 
that compensation provisions may give considerable impetus to the 
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adoption of land and building improvements on rented farms. The 
tenants and landlords interviewed stated that they would be willing to 
have the tenant erect or improve buildings and have the landlord 
guarantee payment of decreasing percentages over time of the cost or 
value of the improvement when the tenant leaves the farm. 
Tenants also said that they would be willing to pay an annual 
cash rent for improvements which the landlord might provide after the 
original lease terms had been determined. Either method is feasible. 
The principle to be kept in mind for obtaining improvements on rented 
farms is that the costs of ar^ r improvement should be shared in 
proportion to the returns received over time by tenant and landlord. 
Implementation of the findings of this study can be made at 
several levels. Education performs a vital role in disseminating 
information and in changing custom to allow more efficient lease 
provisions to be employed. Farm managers, public action agencies, and 
legislatures may encourage leasing adjustments through their own par­
ticular means. Tenants and landlords can, by means of a greater 
willingness to bargain, work out practical solutions to problems which 
are reducing the efficiency of resource use on their farms. Further 
research is needed in areas of diagnoses of lease-oriented inefficiencies, 
in developing means of arriving at rent (share or cash), and in pro­
viding information on residual value of resources as an aid in deter­
mining provisions for compensation. 
This study indicates that obstacles to efficient resource use 
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which may appear to be lease-oriented arS, in effect, tenure-oriented. 
Research is needed in the are^ l of tenure-created inefficiencies to 
analyze the effects of mortgage indebtedness, tenancy, and other 
aspects of tenure on resource allocation. 
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Table 13. Prices used in budgeting.^  



















Feeder calves, good to choice (300-500 lbs.) 
























P^rices based on the 1952 price level. 
•L 
The average prices for I9I4O-5I were multiplied by 1.26, the ratio 
of the 1952 index of prices received to the index of prices received for 
19iiO-5l. Prices of Iowa farm products (1930-1952). Iowa Farm Science. 
7: lUQ. 1953. 
S^eptember price. Average Kansas City price for 19i47-5l as compiled 
by Ross 1. Baumann. Ames, Iowa. Iowa prices for budgeting. (Unpublish­
ed data.) (n.d.). Average price was multiplied by .706, the ratio of 
the price of all beef cattle in 19iiO-5l to this price for 19h7-5l. This 
was again multiplied by 1.26, and an estimated $.75 was added for price 
differential between Kansas City and Omaha, 
J 
Omaha price on December 13, 1952. U. S. Production and i/iarketing 
Administration. Livestock Branch. Ivkrket news. 20; 1021-10)414. 1952. 
p. 1028. 
®Average 19i47-5l price for prime steers in Chicago compiled by Bau­
mann, op. cit. This price was multiplied by .706 and 1.26. An estimated 
$3-75, including I3.OO for price differential between choice and prime 
grades and $.75 for freight from Qnaha to Chicago, was subtracted to get 
the November price. Monthly price differentials based on differentials 
in 1937-ii2. U. S. War Food Administration. Livestock, meats, and wool 
market statistics and related data 19i43. Washington, D. C. 19l4i4. p. 56. 
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Table 13. (Continued) 
Item Unit Price 
(dollars) 















Barrows and gilts, choice (220-2I40 lbs.) 
Sows, choice (36O-I4OO lbs.) 














Baby chicks, heavy or medium (straight run) 
Baby chicks, light (straight run) 
Baby chicks, medium or light (pullet) 











Hog concentrate, hO% 
Tankage 
Soybean oilmeal 
Cattle concentrate, 1)0% 
Minerals, hog 
cwt. 










%sing a base price of $19.75> calculated as in footnote b, this 
price was raised 5 percent for barrows and gilts, loTfered 5 percent 
for light sows, and losYered 10 percent for heavy sov;s. These per­
centage relationships existed in December, 1952. U. S. Production and 
Marketing Administration. Livestock Branch. Market news. 20: 1021-10i4i4. 
1952. p. 1030. 
l^owa price on December 15, 1952. U. S. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. Agricultural prices. December 30, 1952. pp. 9, 11, 
17-19. 
i 
Iowa price on November 15, 1952. U. S. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. Agricultural prices. November 28, 1952. pp. 17, 19. 
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Table 13. (Continued) 

















Sweet clover seed 
Timothy seed 





























Milk, Omaha blend (3.8$^  fat) 
Fencing (barbed wire) 












Ju. S. price on December 15, 1952. U. S. Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics. Agricultural prices. January 30, 1953- p. 29. 
l^owa price for 1952. Ibid., p. U. 
O^maha price for 1952 less an estimated $.35 hauling charge and 
$.08 association dues and inspection fees. Henry A. Homme. Ames, 
Iowa. Information on milk prices at the farm. (Private communication.) 
1953. 
"Estimated 19li0-5l average prices canpiled by Baumann, op. cit. 
The I9I4O-5I averages are multiplied by 1.37, the ratio of the index 
of prices paid by Iowa farmers in 1952 to the average index in 19i40-5l. 
Prices of Iowa farm products (1930-1952). Iowa Farm Science. 7; II48. 
1953. 
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Table 13. (Continued) 
Item Unit Price 
\food posts post .71® 
Vifeed spray gal. 5.00^  
Fertilizer (0-20-0) ton 1(8.00 
(0-16-0) ton Uo.oo^  
(i4-l6-0) ton 52.90" 
(10-20-0) ton 85.10" 
(8-32-0) ton 97.75^  
(O-liT-O) ton 85.00^  
(33-0-0) ton 118.00^  
Terracing (whirlwind terracer) foot .025^  
Seed treatment (oats) bu. .03^  
Corn shelling bu. .05^  
Baling (60 lb. bales) ton 3.30^  
'^ Prices on October 1, 1952. Pioneer Phosphate Company. Pioneer 
brand farm fertilizers, consumer's price list. October 1, 1952. 
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Table li^ . Seeding rates used in budgeting. 
Seed Amount 
(per acre) 
Corn 1/6 bu,^  
Oats 3 bu.^  
Soybeans 1 1/k bu.^  
Alfalfa 10 Ibs.^  
Red clover 10 Ibs.^  
Sweet clover 10 Ibs.c 
Brome (in alfalfa - brome mixture) 6 lbs .''3 
Alfalfa (in alfalfa - brome mixture) 8 Ibs.''^  
E^stimated. 
l^owa State College Staff. Midwest farm 
Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Press. 1951. 
handbook. Second edition, 
p. Iij3. 
I^bid., p. 133. 
Table 15. Estimated feed requirements for beef cattle 
Item Corn Hay Pasture 
(pounds) (tons) (days) 
Beef cows^  67 1.1 19i» 
Wintering beef calves^  1.6 60 
Yearling beef heifers® 67 1.1 19U 
•^Morrison, op. cit., p. 839. 
I^bid., p. 117ii. 
°Ibid., p. 839. Same as for beef cows. 
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Table 16. Estimated feed requirements for poultry. 
Corn Oats Supplement 
(bushels) (bushels) (pounds) 
loung flock (pullets to laying age)^  15 I4O 
J 
Young flock (straight-run to laying age) 12 32 355° 
Laying flock^  55 96 3500® 
•^Per 100 birds. 
"Beneke, Estimated feed requirements, p. 1. One gallon of skim 
milk can be substituted for Ig pounds of laying nash with an upper 
limit of 1 gallon per day per 100 mature birds. 
C^hick starter and growing mash. 
%ased on requirements for pullets. Assumed that pullets begin lay­
ing at 5 pounds and cockerels sold at 3 pounds or an average weight of 
U pounds for pullets and cockerels. Requirements for pullets are re­
duced by 5.14 pounds per bird, based on average pounds of feed per pound 
of gain for young chickens. Report Icwa poultry demonstration flocks 
1951-52. Iowa Agricultural Extension Service Pamphlet 906. 1952. p. 5. 
®Laying mash. 
Table 1?. Estimated feed requirements for hogs. 
Corn Oats Tankage 
(bushels) (bushels) (pounds) 
Market hogs (225 pounds)^  13.5 39 
Brood sows^  26 5 110 
3. 
Heady and Olson, op. cit«, p. 937. Used Iowa average system I, but 
tankage is substituted for soybean oilmeal. 
C.. W. McDonald. Approximate feed requirements for livestock. Iowa 
Agricultural Extension Service Pamphlet 121. 1951. 
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Table 18. Estimated feed requirements for dairy cattle. 
Item Corn Oats Hay Pasture 
(bushels) (bushels) (tons) (days) 
Cows with about a 7000 pound 
producing ability (3.5 percent B.F.) 
90 percent roughage ration 
(6i400 lbs. milk)®- 2lt.8 
70 percent roughage ration 





Cows with low producing ability 
(3500 lbs. milk)^  2.0 180 
Dairy calf to one year (550 lbs.) 
Chiefly roughage^  





Dairy heifer (yearling) 
Chiefly roughage® 






Beneke, Estimated feed requirements, p. 3. Six bushels of corn and 
1/3 ton of hay substituted for one ton of silage. 
E^stimated. 
M^orrison, op. cit., p. llTlt. The same system as suggested for 
wintering beef calves is used. Fifteen pounds of hay per day are fed 
for 210 days. Calves are on pasture for the rest of the period, and 
the calves receive 200 pounds of whole milk and 1200 pounds of skim 
milk. Beneke, Estimated feed requirements, p. 5. 
beneke. Estimated feed requirements, p. 
Morrison, op. cit., p. Ili48. An average weight of 700 pounds for 
heifers and a T.D.N, requirement of 9.2 pounds per head per day for 210 
days are assumed. Alfalfa hay has a T.D.N, content of about $0 percent. 
Ibid., p. 1086. 
f Beneke, Estimated feed requirements, p. 
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Table 19. Estimated feed requirements for feeder cattle.^  
Soybean 
Item Corn oilmeal Pasture 
(pounds) (pounds) 
Feeder calves^  
Vfintered on roughages, full grain-
fed on pasture (Nov. 1-Oct. 22) 2lt87 83 263O l^ ?*^  
ViTintered on roughages, pastured 
with no grain during first half 
of grazing season, grain-fed 
during last half of pasture 
period (Nov. 1-Nov. 13) 2007 132 2710 178*^  
Wintered on roughages, pastured 
with no grain during grazing sea­
son. Fattened in dry lot for 
90-100 days (Nov. 1-Jan. 10) 1679 — 3185 135^  
Yearling feeders^  
Pull fed in dry lot (Oct.-Sept.)® 3008 lIiB 3033 — 
Fattened on pasture and in dry lot 
(Oct.-Oct.) 2656 38 21(76 .75s 
Wintered to gain approximately 
one pound per day, rotation 
pasture for 150 days, and then, 
fed out in dry lot (Oct.-Nov.)" 2072 73 2636 1.23^  
B^eneke, Estimated feed requirements, pp. 2, 3» 
Calves with a beginning weight of ijOO pounds are fed to a final 
weight of 1000 pounds. Calves grading good to choice finished to a grade 
of choice. 
P^asture days. 
B^egin as good-choice feeders of 623 pounds and fed to a grade of 
choice. 
e 
Fed to a weight of 1069 pounds. 
f 
Fed to a weight of 1120 pounds. 
P^asture acres. 
Fed to a weight of 1150 pounds. 
Table 20, Annual crop production, costs, and income under present and revised farm 
plans with present lease provisions for the ten year period. Farm I-b. 
Item^  1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
P. com prod. (bu. ) 1956 2476 2661 1901 2291 2572 1619 2413 2452 1629 
R. com prod, (bu,) 2136 665 539 4012 3858 1719 855 3111 3518 
P. oats prod, (bu,) 194.9 1230 1600 1798 1216 1484 1608 1070 1557 1580 
R. oats prod, (bu,) 1882 1354 450 301 1078 2695 1144 636 546 
P. hay prod, (ton) 18.6 36.8 4.0 18.6 32.8 4.0 22.6 32.8 22.6 
R. hay prod, (ton) 18.6 110.1 169.7 32.8 59.5 146.1 121.4 54.1 30.8 
P. cash rent ($) 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
R. cash rent ($) 320 624 920 400 176 496 816 632 424 392 
P. tenant gross income (I) 9149 8900 8978 9075 8821 8920 8982 8749 8956 8968 
R. tenant gross inccane ($) 9653 10560 11265 9615 97a 10498 10840 10660 9486 9470 
P. landlord gross income ($] 1 2175 2300 2550 2088 2167 2451 1828 2203 2391 1827 
R. landlcxrd gross income ($] 1 2422 2^9 1443 3286 3210 1380 2010 1603 2793 3503 
P. farm net income ($) 5524 5984 5955 5324 5644 5736 4866 5693 5566 4857 
R. farm net inccxne ($) 5967 5139 5297 7537 7370 4404 6143 5436 6763 7502 
P. tenant net inccane ($) 4524 4859 4580 4411 4652 4460 4213 4665 4340 4205 
R. tenant net income ($) 4741 4806 5050 5447 5356 4220 5329 5029 5166 5195 
P. landlord net income (1) 1000 1125 1375 913 992 1276 653 1028 1216 652 
Ro landlord net income ($) 1226 333 247 2090 2014 184 814 407 1597 2307 
P. farm mgt, return (f) -1204 -744 -773 -1404 -1084 -992 -1862 -1035 -1172 -1871 
R. farm mgt, return ($) -816 -1711 -1553 687 520 -2446 -707 -1414 -87 652 
P. tenant mgt. retiirn ($) —884 -549 -828 -997 -756 -948 -1195 -743 -1068 -1203 
R. tenant mgt, return (I) -722 -724 -480 -83 -174 -1310 -201 -501 -364 -335 
P. landlord mgt. return (I) -320 -195 55 -407 -328 —44 -667 -292 -104 -668 
R. landlord mgt. return ($) -94 -987 -1073 770 694 -1136 -506 -913 277 987 
I^tems for the present farm plan are designated by P. and for the revised farm plan by R» 
Table 21. Annual crop production, costs, and income under present and revised farm 
plans with present lease provisions for the ten year period. Farm I-c. 
IteniS 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
P. com prod, (bu.) 3886 2639 3200 3149 2790 3245 3022 2231 3418 3091 
R. com prod* (bu.) 4022 1575 1062 2722 2786 3753 1784 2197 1716 3407 
P. oats prod. (bu.) 1696 2226 1776 1592 2089 1555 1667 2017 1497 1483 
R. oats prod. (bu.) 1689 2367 846 744 1901 624 2226 982 1531 1164 
P. hay prod, (ton) 16.0 29.3 29.3 37.3 16.0 29.3 29.3 37.3 16.0 29.3 
R. hay prod, (ton) 16.0 74.5 204.4 141.5 63,1 98.9 90,9 150.0 137,7 83.0 
P. cash rent (f) 285 383 383 405 285 383 383 405 285 383 
R. cash rent ($) 285 615 1485 1080 585 810 675 1140 1065 705 
P. tenant gross income ($) 7087 6653 6766 6782 6515 6689 6588 6694 6664 6546 
R. tenant gross inctane (#) 9394 8976 10271 9088 8747 8825 8907 9359 9407 8709 
P. landlord gross inccane ($ ) 3542 2946 3189 3116 2910 3148 3030 2620 3152 3017 
R. landlord gross inccane (I ) 3573 2394 2470 3190 3076 3600 2565 2955 2705 3412 
P. farm net incone (f) 6538 5478 5890 5811 5338 5772 5553 4936 5725 5498 
R. farm net inccane ($) 7162 5606 6046 7141 6726 7710 6089 6752 6291 7369 
P. tenant net income ($) 3978 3514 3683 3677 3ao 3606 3505 3298 3555 3463 
R. tenant net income ($) 4602 4225 4589 4964 4663 5123 4537 4810 4599 4970 
P. landlord net inccme ($) 2560 1964 2207 2134 1928 2166 2048 1638 2170 2035 
R. landlord net income ($) 2560 1381 1457 2177 2063 2587 1552 1942 1692 2399 
P. farm mgt. return ($) 2367 1307 1719 1640 1167 1601 1382 765 1554 1327 
R. farm mgt. retxirn ($) 2855 1048 1588 2683 2268 3252 1631 2294 1833 2911 
P. tenant mgt, return ($) 1007 543 712 706 439 635 534 327 584 492 
R. tenant mgto return (I) U95 867 1331 1706 1405 1865 2279 1552 1341 1712 
P. landlord mgt. return (|) 1360 764 1007 934 728 966 848 438 970 835 
R. lancllord mgt. return ($) 1360 181 257 977 863 1387 352 742 492 1199 
I^tems for the present faxTn p3an are designated by P, and for the revised farm plan by R. 
Table 22. Annual ca:*op production, costs, and income under present and revised farm 
plans with present lease provisions for the ten year period. Farm Il-b. 
Item^  1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
P. corn prod, (bu.) 2985 446 3061 1559 2047 1591 2391 376 2670 1362 
R. corn prod, (bu,) 2985 462 2851 1727 2349 1793 2264 425 3194 1592 
P. oats prod, (bu.) 297 1934 1181 1019 1196 248 1623 1001 
R. oats prod, (bu,) 297 1934 925 1128 1352 283 1484 1292 
P. hay prod, (ton) 24,9 24.9 24.9 13.9 11.0 24.9 24.9 24.9 13.9 
R. hay prod, (ton) 24.9 24.9 47.0 36.0 11.6 49.4 49.4 26,0 14,4 
P. cash rent (f) 115 115 115 85 35 65 115 115 115 85 
R. cash rent ($) 115 115 195 165 35 65 195 195 115 85 
P. tenant gross income (I) 4803 3753 4855 4047 4319 4076 4389 3625 4584 3837 
R. tenant gross incrane (1) 4803 3753 4902 4059 4573 4280 4538 3804 4948 4115 
P. landlord gross inccme ($) 2310 1218 2243 1653 1875 1660 1879 1042 1971 1442 
R. landlord gross Income ($) 2310 1229 2177 1745 2130 1864 1884 1099 2335 1721 
P. farm net incone (I) 4235 2049 4098 2781 3075 2767 3469 1696 3555 2360 
R. farm net income ($) 4224 2060 4193 3192 3573 3192 3652 2080 4292 2915 
P. tenant net Incaae ($) 2623 1529 2553 1826 1898 1805 2288 1352 2282 1616 
R. tenant net incone ($) 2619 1536 2721 2152 2148 2033 2473 1686 2662 1899 
P. landlord net income ($) 1612 520 1545 955 1177 962 1181 344 1273 744 
R. landlord net income ($) 1605 524 1472 1040 1425 1159 1179 394 1630 1016 
P. farm mgt. return (|) 644 -1542 507 -810 -516 -824 -122 -1895 -36 -1231 
R. farm mgt, return ($) 633 -1531 602 -399 -18 -399 61 -1511 701 -676 
P. tenant mgt, return (1) -218 -1312 -288 -1015 -943 -1036 -553 -1489 -559 -1225 
R. tenant mgt, return (1) -222 -1305 -120 -689 -693 -808 -368 -1155 -179 -942 
P. landlord n^ t, return (f) 862 -230 795 205 427 212 431 —406 523 -6 
R. landlord mgt, return ($) 855 -226 722 290 675 409 429 -356 880 266 
Items for the present farm plan are designated by P. and for the revised farm plan by R. 
Table 23. Annual crop production, costs, and income under present and revised farm 
plans with present lease provisions for the ten year period. Farm Ill-b. 
Item^  1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
P. corn prod. (bu.) 1969 1089 928 762 1772 2174 717 2519 954 
R. com prod, (bu,) 1969 1089 1348 2214 1988 1117 1339 2175 1929 1089 
P. oats prod, (bu.) 883 579 710 622 503 1446 1063 
R. oats prod, (bu,) 950 579 710 — 954 599 739 924 590 
P. hay prod, (ton) 47,5 42.5 53,0 47.5 31,4 89.4 11.1 11,1 
R. hay prod, (ton) 52.5 31,4 41,9 55.2 33.4 44.9 57.2 
P. cash rent (|) .. . 
R. cash rent ($) 
P. tenant gross income (f) 9992 9867 9920 9885 9851 9851 10222 9990 9851 10065 
R. tenant gross income ($) 9969 9867 9921 9851 10020 10093 9933 9851 9853 9871 
P. landlord gross income ($) 6602 6478 6532 6495 6462 6462 6834 6601 6462 6677 
R. landlord gross income ($} 6580 6478 6531 6462 6632 6704 6543 6462 6463 6483 
P. farm net income ($) 7398 6781 6574 6460 7254 7372 5688 6542 7638 6335 
R. farm net income (^ ) 7375 6720 6876 7652 7504 7256 6917 7642 7086 6797 
P. tenant net income (I) 4595 4287 4182 4127 4523 4582 3740 4167 4715 4063 
R, tenant net income ($) 4636 4223 4335 4706 4701 4486 4353 4696 4492 4253 
P. landlord net income ($) 2803 2494 2392 2333 2731 2790 1948 2375 2923 2272 
R. landlord net income ($) 2739 2497 2541 2946 2803 2770 2564 2946 2594 2544 
P. farm mgt, return (|^ ) 3139 2522 2315 2201 2995 3113 1429 2283 3379 2076 
R. farm mgt. return (|) 3058 2403 2559 3335 3187 2939 2600 3325 2769 2480 
P. tenant mgt. return ($) 1492 1184 1079 1024 1420 1479 637 1064 1612 960 
R. tenant mgt, return ($) 1533 1120 1232 1603 1598 1383 1250 1593 1389 1150 
P. landlord mgt» return (1) 1647 1338 1236 1177 1575 1634 792 1219 1767 1116 
R. landlord mgt, return (I) 1525 1283 1327 1732 1589 1556 1350 1732 1380 1330 
I^tems for the present farm plan are designated by P, and for the revised farm plan by R. 
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Table 2k' Yields per acre®' under present farm plan, 
by soil types within fields. Farm I-c. 
Acres 1952 1953 19$h 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Ob MC M Cd 0 M M C 0 M 
le 
.h 28.0 1.2 1.2 32.1 2I4.I 1.2 1.2 31.0 23.0 1.2 
III^  3.5 38.0 2.2 2.2 5ii.o 35.3 2.2 2.2 50.2 32.9 2.2 
ivg 8.1 ii3.0 2.6 2.6 62.0 1)3.0 2.6 2.6 62.0 ij3.0 2.6 
Field 12.0 
C Os C Os C Os c Og C 
III 1.9 32.0 I47.I4 28.6 i42.8 26.0 38.5 23.14 3h'6 21.1 31.2 







G Os C Os C Os c Os C Os 
1.0 28.0 20.3 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 
.1 35.0 23.5 28.6 19.2 25»0 19.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 
.9 50.0 30.h I45.O 27.14 I4O.6 2ii.6 36.6 22.2 32.9 20.0 
12.3 55.0 35.5 53.11 3it.i4 51.8 33.14 50.2 32.i4 ii8.7 31.i4 
.7 60.0 i4l.6 58.8 I4O.7 57.6 39.9 56.5 39.1 55.3 38.3 
15.0 
T^he yields are expressed in tons per acre for hay and in bushels 
per acre for corn and oats. 
O^ats. 
°Meadow (alfalfa and brome mixture). 
C^orn. 
®Ercded Ida silt loam (12-20^  slope). 
%onona silt loam (9-15^  slope). 
SMonona silt loam (2-8^  slope). 
O^ats with sweet clover. 
E^roded Monona silt loam (12-20^  slope). 
N^apier silt loam. 
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Table 2i4. (Continued) 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 195it 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Os C Os c Os C Os c Os C 
I 2.8 23.0 2ii.7 18.0 23,0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 
II 2.1 26.0 31.6 21.2 25.9 19.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 
IV 7.6 36.0 5I4.2 3I4.9 52.6 33.9 51.0 32.9 ii9.5 31.9 it8.0 
V 2.5 I42.O $9.1i I4I.2 58.2 )40.3 57.0 39.5 55.9 38.7 5it.7 
Field 15.0 
C Os C Os C Og c 03 C Os 
I 7.9 28.0 20.3 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 
II it.9 35.0 23.5 28.6 19.2 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 
IV 9.5 55.0 35.5 53.il 3h»k 51.8 33.it 50.2 32.14 ii8.7 31.it 
V 1.7 60.0 Iil<.6 58.8 I4O.7 57.6 39.9 56.5 39.1 55.3 38.3 
Field 2I4.O 
C C 0 M C c 0 M G C 
IV 6.7 62.0 61.ii it2.1 2.6 59.5 58.9 I4O.5 2.6 57.2 56.5 
V 1.3 67.0 67.0 148.0 3.0 67.0 67.0 I48.0 3.0 67.0 67.0 
Field 8.0 
c C C Os C c Os c c 
I . 6 26.0 17.7 21.0 21.0 16.0 21.0 21.0 16.0 21.0 21.0 
II .1 32.0 20.1 2ii.it 22.0 16.0 22.0 22.0 16.0 22.0 22.0 
IV 14.8 50.0 3i.it ii8.2 i(7.ii 29.8 i45.6 itii.8 28.2 il3.2 i|2.ii 
V 10.? 55.0 35.6 53.9 53.I4 3ii.6 52.2 5i.8 33.5 50.7 50.2 
Field 16.0 
c Os C Os c Os c Os C Os 
I 2.3 28.0 20.3 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 
II 2.1 35.0 23.5 28.6 19.2 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 25.0 19.0 
IV 7.7 55.0 35.5 53.it 3i1.it 51.8 33.it 50.2 32.li ii8.7 3i.it 
V 2.9 60.0 ill.6 58.8 iiO.7 57.6 39.9 56.5 39.1 55.3 38.3 
Field 15.0 
M C 0 M M C 0 M M C 
I 6.6 1.2 3it.7 26.0 1.2 1.2 31.0 23.0 1.2 1.2 31.0 
III 2.6 2.2 56.0 36.6 2.2 2.2 52.0 3ii.O 2.2 2.2 ii8.il 
V .8 3.0 67.0 ii8.0 3.0 3.0 67.0 ii8.0 3.0 3.0 67.0 
Field 10.0 
Os C Os 0 Os C Og C Os C 
I 2.1 23.0 2ii,7 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 18.0 23.0 
III 1.1 32.0 it7.it 28.8 ii2.8 26.0 38.5 23.I4 3ii.6 21.1 31.2 
IV 1.8 36.0 5ii.2 3i4.9 52.6 33.9 51.0 32.9 it9.5 31.9 ii8.0 
V 3.0 li2.0 59.14 ill.2 58.2 iiO.3 57.0 39.5 55.9 38.7 5i4.7 
Field 8.0 
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Table 2$. Total crop production^  under present farm plan, 
by soil types within fields. Farm I-c. 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 195ii 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
0^  If M Cd 0 M M 0 0 M 
le 
.it 11 .5 .5 13 10 .5 .5 12 9 .5 
Illf 3.5 133 7.7 7.7 189 12I4 7.7 7.7 176 115 7.7 
IVg 8.1 3ii8 21.1 21.1 502 3I48 21.1 21.1 502 3it8 21.1 
Field 12.0 l»92 29.3 29.3 70ii h62 29.3 29.3 690 it 72 29.3 
c Os C Os c Os c Os C 
III 1.9 68 90 55 81 h9 73 iiii 66 itO 59 
IV 10.1 36I4 352 531 3h2 515 332 500 322 it85 
Field 12.0 I432 637 it07 612 391 588 376 566 362 5itii 
C Os c Os C Os C Os C Os 
I 1.0 28 20 23 18 23 18 23 18 23 18 
Ili .1 h 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
III .9 27 ho 25 37 22 33 20 30 18 
IV 12.3 676 I437 657 I|23 637 iill 617 399 599 386 
vj 
.7 k2 29 hi 28 liO 28 itO 27 39 27 
Field 15.0 19'^  515 76h I496 739 it 61 715 h66 693 it5l 
C^rop production is expressed in tons for hay and in bushels for 
corn and oats. 
O^ats. 
"^ Meadow (alfalfa and brome mixture). 
'^ Corn. 
®Eroded Ida silt loam (12-20^  slope). 
%onona silt loam {9-1$% slope). 
M^onona silt loam (2-8^  slope), 
O^ats with sweet clover. 
E^roded Monona silt loam (12-20^  slope). 
"^ Napier silt loam. 
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Table 2^ . (Continued)* 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 195I4 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
Os c Os C Os c Os c Os c 
I 2.8 614 69 50 6k 50 6ii 50 614 50 614 
II 2.1 55 66 145 514 ItO 52 ho 52 I40 52 
IV 7.6 21h Itl2 265 liOO 258 388 250 376 2k2 365 
V 2.5 105 II48 103 1146 101 1142 99 II4O 97 137 
Field 15.0 1498 695 I463 66k I4I49 6I46 1439 632 k29 618 
G Os c % c c Os 0 Os 
I 7.9 221 160 182 lk2 182 II42 182 II42 182 lk2 
II it.9 172 115 liiO 9k 122 93 122 93 122 93 
IV 9.5 522 337 507 327 k92 317 1477 308 I463 298 
V 1.7 102 71 100 69 98 68 96 66 914 65 
Field 2i|.0 1017 683 929 632 8914 620 877 609 861 598 
C c 0 M C C 0 M c C 
IV 6.7 U5 Itll 282 17.14 399 395 271 17.ii 383 379 
V 1.3 87 87 62 3.9 87 87 62 3.9 87 87 
Field 8.0 502 li98 3lii4 21.3 I486 I482 333 21.3 I470 1)66 
c Os c c 0. c c Os C c 
I .6 16 11 13 13 10 13 13 10 13 13 
II .1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
IV i4.8 2I4O 151 231 228 lk3 219 215 135 207 20I4 
V 10.5 578 37I4 566 561 363 5I48 51414 352 532 527 
Field 16.0 837 538 812 80ii 518 782 77I4 ii99 75I4 7I46 
c Os C C Os c Os C 
I 2.3 6h ii7 53 i4l 53 I4I 53 i4l 53 111 
II 2.1 Ik k9 60 I4O 52 140 52 liO 52 I4O 
IV 7.7 h23 273 I4II 265 399 257 387 2I49 375 2142 
V 2.9 nh 121 171 118 167 116 I6I4 113 160 111 
Field 15.0 735 h90 695 k6k 671 14514 656 kk3 6kO h3k 
6.6 
M C 0 M M c 0 M M c 
I 7.9 229 172 7.9 7.9 205 152 7.9 7.9 205 
III 2.6 5.7 lii6 95 5.7 5.7 135 88 5.7 5.7 126 
V .8 2.I1 5i4 38 2.I4 2.It 5it 38 2.1j 2.I4 5I4 
Field 10.0 16.0 2429 305 16.0 16.0 39I4 278 16.0 16.0 385 
Os c Os C Os c Os C C 
I 2.1 148 52 38 I48 38 I48 38 I48 38 I48 
III 1.1 35 52 32 I47 29 I42 26 38 23 3i» 
IV 1.8 65 98 63 95 61 92 59 69 57 86 
V 3.0 126 178 12ii 175 121 171 118 168 116 1614 
Field 8.0 2724 380 257 365 2149 353 2I4I 3k3 23I4 332 
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Table 26. Yields per acre®' under revised farm plan, 
by soil types within fields. Farm I-c. 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 195i4 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 
ob If M 0 M M C 0 M 
je 
.u 28.0 1.2 1.2 32.1 27.8 1.5 1.5 33.6 25.8 1.6 
III^  3.5 36.0 2.2 2.2 5ij.o 38.1 2.3 2.3 53.3 36.9 2.1) 
IvS 8.1 U3.0 2.6 2.6 62.0 Uii.o 2.6 2.6 63.0 khtS 2.6 
Field 12.0 
0 M C 0 M 0 0 M C 0 
III 1.9 32,0 2.0 51.9 31I.2 2.1 52.8 3ii.3 2.2 51.8 33.5 
IV 10.1 36.0 2.h 58.1 39.0 2.I4 60. ii i<0.8 2.1j 62.0 142.0 
Field 12.0 
C 0 M C 0 M C 0 M C 
I 1.0 3ii.0 23.8 l.i4 35.8 25.7 1.5 35.2 25.5 1.6 35.0 
Ilh 
.1 hl.O 28.5 1.7 ijl.S 30.5 1.8 l4l.l 30.3 1.9 39.1 
III .9 59.0 3it.7 2.2 60.5 36.5 2.3 61. ii 35.7 2.I4 62.0 
IV 
V^  
12.3 59.0 140.5 2.6 61.5 li2.7 2.6 63.0 I4I4.I 2.6 614.0 
.7 6Ii.O i»5.5 3.0 67.0 hl. l  3.0 69.0 ij9.1 3.0 70.0 
Field 15.0 
Os«^  c Os c Os C Os C Os G 
I 2.8 23.0 2U.7 22.5 25.8 20.6 26.5 20.0 27.0 20.0 27.0 
II 2.1 26.0 31.6 26.1 32.0 2I1.O 29.8 22.0 28.0 22.0 28.0 
IV 7.6 36.0 5ii.2 36.6 55.2 36.ii 5i».9 35.8 514.0 35.0 52.9 
V 2.0 h2.0 59.I4 I42.5 60.7 I42.I 60.5 hl 'h 59.6 140.6 58.14 
Field 15.0 
T^he yields are expressed in tons per acre for hay and in bushels 
per acre for corn and oats. 
O^ats. 
° Meadow (alfalfa and brome mixture). 
C^orn. 
®Ercded Ida silt loam (12-20^ slope). 
f Monona silt loam (9-15^ slope). 
M^onona silt loam (2-8^ slope). 
E^roded Monona silt loam (12-20^ slope) 
N^apier silt loam. 
O^ats with sweet clover. 
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Table 26. (Continued) 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 195U 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 
G 0 M M C c 0 M M C 
I 7.9 28.0 20.3 .8 .8 27.6 27.6 20.1 .9 .9 27.2 
II ii.9 35.0 23.5 I.I4 I.I4 35.1 3ii.O 23.8 1.5 1.5 30.0 
IV 9.5 55.0 35.5 2.it 2.i| 55.8 55.5 36.5 2.h 2,h 514.0 
V 1.7 60.0 ijl.6 3.0 3.0 62.5 62.5 ii3.3 3.0 3.0 614.0 
Field 2h*0 
c c 0 M M G C 0 M M 
IV 6.7 62.0 61. i]2.1 2.6 2.6 61.14 60.8 1^2.0 2.6 2.6 
V 1.3 67.0 67.0 i48.0 3.0 3.0 68.5 68.5 1(9.0 3.0 3.0 
Field 8.0 
c 0 M M C 0 M M c 0 
I .6 26.0 17.7 .8 .8 26.6 20.5 .9 .9 26.8 21.1 
II .1 32.0 20.1 l.ij l.ii 35.2 23.8 1.5 1.5 3i4.3 2ij.l 
IV ij.8 50.0 3I.I4 2.h 2.h 56.0 36.7 2.k 2.1 59.6 39.9 
V 10.5 55.0 35.6 3.0 3.0 61.5 itl.3 3.0 3.0 65.14 i4l4.7 
Field 16.0 
G 0 M M 0 C 0 M M c 
I 2.3 3ii.O 23.8 1.1 l.lj 3I4.8 3it.8 2ii.l4 1.5 1.5 3lj.8 
II 2.1 iil.O 27.9 1.7 1.7 l i l ,3 iiO.6 29.0 1.8 1.8 37.7 
IV 7.7 59.0 I4O.5 2.6 2.6 60.2 59.9 hl.h 2.6 2.6 58.5 
V 2.9 6k .0 i(5.5 3.0 3.0 67.0 67.0 kl. l  3.0 3.0 68.8 
Field 15.0 
M c C 0 M M C c 0 M 
I 6.6 1.2 28.5 28.5 25.0 .9 .9 27.3 27.3 22.5 .9 
III 2.6 2.2 53.7 52.5 33.6 2.1 2.1 53.14 53.1 32.2 2.1 
V .8 3.0 67.0 65.0 itO.7 3.0 3.0 65.0 65.0 It2.8 3.0 
Field 10.0 
0 M M C 0 M M c 0 M 
I 2,1 23.0 .8 .8 27.9 23.5 .9 .9 28.1 22.2 1.0 
III 1.1 32.0 2.0 2.0 51.5 33.5 2.1 2.1 51.5 33.5 2.2 
IV 1.8 36.0 2.h 2,h 58.1 39.0 2.h 2. J 4  60. i4 1(0.8 2,h 
V 3.0 12.0 3.0 3.0 63.1 i4i».5 3.0 3.0 66.0 146.0 3.0 
Field 8.0 
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Table 21 .  Total crop production®- under revised farm plan, 
by soil types within fields. Farm I-c. 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 19514 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
0^  M cd 0 M M G 0 M 
I® 
.k 11 .5 .5 13 11 .6 .6 13 10 .6 
3.5 133 7.7 7.7 189 133 8.0 8.0 187 129 8.I4 
ivg 8.1 3ij8 21.1 21.1 502 356 21.1 21.1 510 361 21.1 
Field 12.0 U92 29.3 29.3 70h 500 29.7 29.7 710 500 30.1 
0 M C 0 M C 0 M C 0 
III 1.9 61 3.8 99 65 3.8 100 65 3.8 98 614 
IV 10.1 36it 2i4.2 587 39I4 2i|.2 610 iil2 2ij.2 626 h2li 
Field 12.0 ii25 28.0 686 h59 28.0 710 k77 28.0 72I4 m 
C 0 M C 0 M C 0 M c 
I, 1.0 3h 2h 1.14 36 26 1.5 35 26 1.6 35 
11^  .1 h 3 .2 it 3 .2 I4 3 .2 it 
III .9 53 31 2.0 5i4 33 2.1 55 32 2,2 56 
IV 12.3 726 1498 32.0 756 525 32.0 775 5142 32.0 787 
V^  .7 ii5 32 2.1 I47 3it 2.1 I48 3I4 2.1 149 
Field 15.0 862 588 37.7 897 621 37.9 917 637 38.1 931 
Ogj C Os c Os C Os C Os c 
I 2.8 6ib 69 63 72 58 714 56 76 56 76 
II 2.1 55 66 55 67 50 63 146 59 ii6 59 
IV 7.6 27ii 1^ 12 278 i}20 277 hl7 272 ijlO 266 it02 
V 2.5 105 lii8 106 152 105 151 10i4 1149 102 lii6 
Field 15.0 1498 695 502 711 1^ 90 705 1478 69I4 Ii70 683 
C^rop production is expressed in tons for hay and in bushels for 
corn and oats, 
O^ats• 
M^eadow (alfalfa and brome mixture), 
C^orn. 
®Eroded Ida silt loam (12-20^ slope), 
%onona silt loam (9-15$ slope). 
%onona silt loam (2-8^  slope). 
Eroded Monona silt loam (12-20$ slope). 
N^apier silt loam. 
O^ats with sweet clover. 
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Table 27. (Continued) 
Soil 
type Acres 1952 1953 19514 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 
c 0 M M c C 0 M M C 
I 7.9 221 160 6.3 6.3 218 218 159 7.1 7.1 215 
II I4.9 172 115 6.9 6.9 172 167 117 7.I4 7.14 II47 
IV 9.5 522 337 22.8 22.8 530 527 3147 22.8 22.8 513 
? 1.7 102 71 5.1 5.1 106 106 714 5.1 5.1 109 
Field 2li.O 1017 683 I4I.I 141.1 1026 1018 697 142.14 it2.l4 98I4 
C C 0 M M C C 0 M M 
IV 6.7 ai5 I4II 282 17.14 I7.I4 I4II I4O7 281 17.It 17.ii 
V 1.3 87 87 62 3.9 3.9 89 89 6I4 3.9 3.9 
Field 8.0 502 I498 31414 21.3 21.3 500 1496 3I45 21.3 21.3 
C 0 M M c 0 M M C 0 
I .6 16 11 .5 .5 16 12 .5 .5 16 13 
II .1 3 2 .1 .1 I4 2 .2 .2 3 2 
IV I4.8 2ii0 151 11.5 11.5 269 176 11.5 11.5 286 192 
V 10.5 578 371; 31.5 31.5 6I46 14314 31.5 31.5 687 1469 
Field 16.0 837 538 h3' 6 1(3-6 935 62I4 143.7 1)3.7 992 676 
C 0 M M c C 0 M M C 
I 2.3 78 55 3.2 3.2 80 80 56 3.1; 3.14 80 
II 2.1 86 59 3.6 3.6 87 85 61 3.8 3.8 79 
IV 7.7 h$k 312 20.0 20.0 hSh lj6l 319 20.0 20.0 1450 
V 2.9 186 132 8.7 8.7 19l( 19I4 138 8.7 8.7 200 
Field 15.0 8014 558 35.5 35.5 825 820 57I1 35.9 35.9 809 
M c C 0 M M C c 0 M 
I 6.6 7.9 188 188 165 5.9 5.9 180 180 II48 5.9 
III 2.6 5.7 II4O 136 8? 5.5 5.5 139 138 814 5.5 
V .8 2.14 514 52 33 2.I4 2.14 52 52 3I4 2.14 
Field 10.0 16.0 382 376 285 13.8 13.8 371 370 266 13.8 
0 M M C 0 M M 0 0 M 
I 2.1 I48 1.7 1.7 59 149 1.9 1.9 59 147 2.1 
III 1.1 35 2.2 2.2 57 37 2.3 2.3 57 37 2.I4 
JV 1.8 65 tt.3 14.3 105 70 I4.3 h.3 109 73 14.3 
V 3.0 126 9.0 9.0 189 1314 9.0 9.0 198 138 9.0 
Field 8.0 2714 17.2 17.2 I4IO 290 17.5 17.5 1423 295 17.8 
P-930 
FLOCK a#ERS LISTED ACCORDING TO BREED OF CHICMS RAISED 
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